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The existing analyses in the literature of inter-regionalism focus on a macro 
perspective when they look at the relationship between inter-regional ties and global 
governance. They have not explored the European Union’s (EU) policy development 
toward the Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) in detail which affects 
the EU and ASEAN relationship. They have overlooked explanations and current 
empirical evidence regarding that relationship.  
 
This thesis analyses internal factors within the EU and external factors from 
ASEAN and outside of the EU which influence EU policies toward ASEAN. The 
internal factors are the relevant actors within the various institutional arrangements 
of the EU policy and the promotion of interests of the EU and those of its member 
states and to some extent of common EU values. The modes of engagement between 
the EU and ASEAN, the level of integration within ASEAN and the pressures and 
opportunities from ASEAN and outside the EU are the external factors. Then, this 
thesis assesses how, when and to what extent these factors influence the EU’s policy 
developments toward ASEAN and have implications for the inter-regional 
relationship between the two regions. I examine three EU policies toward ASEAN 
from 2001 to 2009:1) a new partnership with South-East Asia, 2) the joint EU-
ASEAN monitoring mission in Aceh, and 3) an ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA).This thesis is based on a qualitative method of analysis and is part of problem-
driven research. It employs inductive theory building from case studies as the 
research strategy and documents and interviews as methods of data collection. 
 
This thesis presents the variation in importance within factors which influence 
the EU’s policy development toward ASEAN. It highlights different kinds of 
interactions between factors which shape the success or failure of the EU’s policy 
development. The co-operative relationship between these factors is needed to 
conclude agreement between the two regions. However, the conflicting relationship 
between these factors can lead to the failure to reach agreement between them.  
 
With regard to internal factors, this thesis demonstrates that a shared common 
position between relevant and other related actors within each of the various 
institutional arrangements in the EU may assist in the conclusion of an agreement 
between the two regions. As EU interests takes precedence over values, the 
likelihood of achieving an agreement increases.  
 
With regard to external factors, this thesis argues that consultation and 
monitoring mechanisms have been used by the EU as its modes of engagement (as 
opposed to a negotiation) and they affect its policy development and enable it to 
reach an agreement with ASEAN. The conclusion of an agreement between the two 
regions can be easily achieved, when the level of integration within ASEAN remains 
static or weak. However, when the level of integration within ASEAN is stronger, 
the EU would be less likely to achieve its expected agreements with ASEAN. The 
conclusion of an agreement between the EU and ASEAN can be achieved when they 
can resolve these external pressures and take advantage of external opportunities. 
 
 ii 
The trends in and implications for the EU and ASEAN relationship are as 
follows: first, the more the EU applies a balanced treatment of internal and external 
factors, then the more it will support the EU’s policy development and that will 
positively influence the EU and ASEAN relationship. Second, their relationship has 
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The current International Relations (IR) debates focus on discovering which 
international cooperation models may be appropriate in a multi-polar and fragmented 
world (Desai and Vreeland, 2010:1). Most world leaders, policy makers, IR scholars 
and other stakeholders tended to focus on a stagnancy of multilateral frameworks for 
international cooperation (World Economic Forum, 2010:1). However, despite the 
fact that they attempted to search for a new model of international cooperation, they 
did not take into consideration the potential of inter-regionalism as an alternative 
option. It received very little attention from those who were talking about inter-
regional cooperation.  
The main reasons as to why inter-regional cooperation may assist in solving 
static international cooperation, based on multilateral frameworks, are as follows. 
Firstly, inter-regional cooperation covers many areas of cooperation (e.g. political, 
economic and socio-cultural) and involves various actors (e.g. nation states, civil 
societies and business communities). Secondly, it could be a complementary 
framework to the multilateral frameworks of international cooperation because it 
would not undermine them (Santander and Ponjaert, 2009:285). Thirdly, it could 
strengthen the global governance system because it could connect regions in adapting 
to changes in the global order.        
The EU has played a significant role in the sphere of international politics. The 
EU’s role covers several important issues in global affairs such as humanitarian 
action; trade; aid; environmental politics; human rights; and democratic issues. The 
EU is known for its multi-lateral approach and use of civilian power as a major 
instrument in its external relations (Longo, 2010:73-74). It uses non-military 
instruments and the European Security Strategy (Council of the EU, 2003a:1) to 
pursue its international aims and to implement its external policies (Smith, 2003:15).  
European countries have a long tradition of supporting regionalism within the 
EU.1 Based on regional cooperation, the EU’s policy is to foster cooperation with 
                                                 
1 The EU was known previously as the European Community/EC. In this thesis, I use the EC when 
referring to the EU before 1992.    
 2 
other partners. The European Commission (1995:ii-iii) released its perspective that 
the EU supported developing countries to create regional groups because, in the 
context of trade liberalization and capital flows, regional integration  was a  means to 
integrate them into the global economy. The EU implemented an inter-regionalism 
framework as a result of its valuable experience of the regionalization and integration 
process. It has used this framework to build its relationship with ASEAN. 
The EU and ASEAN2 agreed to formalize their relationship through European 
Economic Community–ASEAN Joint Declaration which was signed on 7 March 
1980 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (ASEAN Secretariat, 1980). Their relationship 
resulted in the development of cooperation between two different regions. On the one 
hand, the EU became established as a strong and cohesive regional group. On the 
other hand, ASEAN continues to develop busily its own regional integration 
(Cameron, 2010:1-2).  
This thesis’ subject is the assessment of those factors which explain the EU’s 
policy toward ASEAN. I provide three individual cases, each of which serves to 
indicate those relevant factors in influencing the formulation of the EU’s policy 
toward ASEAN. The policies are: the European Commission’s communication ‘New 
Partnership with South-East Asia’; the EU’s policy in respect to monitoring the 
implementation of a peace agreement in Aceh; and the attempt to create an ASEAN 
and EU free trade agreement (FTA). I explore, in the following pages, the main 
reasons for choosing these policies. The lessons of the EU’s policy development 
towards ASEAN may contribute to the development of the study of inter-regionalism 
in other regions.    
Potentially, the relationship benefits both parties. On the one hand, from the 
EU’s perspective, the EU-ASEAN relationship is a long connection between two 
regional groups. However, for years, their relationship has not been a priority of the 
EU’s external policy because of the geographical distance and the different political 
and economic agendas between both parties. In the last decade, the emerging role 
and developing economic situation of South-East Asia has attracted the EU’s 
attention. ASEAN countries are a potential source of natural resources and raw 
materials for the EU’s needs. ASEAN offers potential economic benefits such as a 
                                                 
2 See maps of these organizations in Appendix 1. 
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strategic location and a huge market for EU trade expansion into Asia. The size of 
the ASEAN population is 583 million people (in 2008) with middle-income 
economies3. ASEAN is home to cheap skilled labourers and a strategic location for 
European investors. All Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of ASEAN 
countries (USD 960 in 1998) and average rate of ASEAN’s economic growth (-7 % 
in 1998) have increased significantly post the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN has a 
growing GDP per capita (USD 2,582 in 2008) and an increased rate of economic 
growth (4.4 % in 2008).4 The EU member states and the EU itself have sought a way 
to improving market access and expanding the EU’s foreign investment in ASEAN. 
Therefore, the EU wants to pay more attention and improve its relationship with 
ASEAN. 
On the other hand, from the ASEAN perspective, the EU and ASEAN 
relationship can improve trade in goods, services and investment activities between 
these two regions and, also, consolidate its development process especially in 
fostering the integration of ASEAN. The EU is an essential trading partner for 
ASEAN. The total population of the EU is 495 million people (in 2008) (Eurostat, 
2008:1) with high income and strong buying-power (ASEAN-EU Vision Group, 
2006:3). ASEAN sees EU investors as an important source of foreign capital.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. The next section consists of research 
interests; the research question; and the aims of this thesis. The third section of this 
chapter is the provisional conceptual framework. The fourth section is the research 
methodology; the case study design; and the data collection methods used in this 
thesis. The last section is the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2. Research Question, Interests and Aims 
The research question was: What explains the EU’s policy development 
toward ASEAN?  
The study is divided into two parts: empirical and theoretical arguments. This 
study’s empirical argument aimed to highlight and understand EU policy 
developments towards ASEAN and the implications for their relationship because 
                                                 
3 The World Bank (2010:1) categorized countries whose GNP per capita ranged from USD 756 to 
USD 9,265. 
4 See Appendixes 2, 3 and 4. 
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they had received international attention as progressive regional co-operations. In the 
last decade, rapid development, in many aspects of cooperation between regions, 
made inter-regionalism one of the most important topics of debate in global affairs. 
In the context of their regional institutional development and regional integration, the 
EU and ASEAN are examples of the most advanced and medium-sized regional 
organizations. The EU represents a block of developed countries and ASEAN 
represents a block of progressively developing countries. On a region to region basis, 
the EU and ASEAN relationship is the EU’s most enduring formal cooperation. 
However, for a long time, the EU-Asia and the EU-ASEAN ties could be described 
as dependent colonial-master relationships (Godement, 2008:41). Previously, the EU 
placed more emphasis on internal factors and paid less attention to external factors in 
developing its policy towards ASEAN. Between 2001 and 2009, there were 
insufficient empirical studies of EU policy development towards ASEAN. These are 
the rationale as to why my research question was so important and interesting and 
needed to be analyzed further.  
The theoretical argument is that there is a need to develop theoretical 
approaches to understand inter-regionalism. The study of inter-regionalism is an 
underdeveloped aspect of IR. According to Robinson and Warleigh-Lack (2011:267), 
there was a need for further examination of the EU’s external relations, especially 
inter-regionalism, in order to understand the outcome of inter-regionalism. The study 
of the EU’s policy development towards ASEAN may help to explain factors which 
are relevant to the study of inter-regionalism, generally, and to understanding the EU 
and ASEAN relationship in particular. This thesis’ analysis was developed in 
response to the need to examine the factors which influenced the EU’s policy 
towards ASEAN. 
This study had two aims which were: firstly, to generate findings which could 
contribute to the study of inter-regionalism which other scholars could use to develop 
their hypotheses and use as reference for the study of other regions. It was part of 
problem-driven research (Shapiro, 2005:180) in that I identified, understood and 
explained problems in cases within the EU’s policy development towards ASEAN 
which affected the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. Then, since there was a 
lack of comprehensive theory in this field, it sought to assist the process of theory-
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building in inter-regionalism and to find the best ways of explaining the above 
mentioned problems (Ibid, p.186-187). This detailed study focused on what, how 
and, to what extent, internal and external factors influenced the EU’s policy 
development towards ASEAN. It allowed me to examine the dynamic interactions 
between these factors and to explain their correlations, which might determine the 
results of EU policies and have an impact on the inter-regional cooperation between 
the two regions. Secondly, this study would provide policy recommendations which 
could be considered and used by government officials; parliamentarians; non-
governmental organisations (NGOs); and other stakeholders from both regions.  
 
1.3. The Provisional Conceptual Framework  
In order to answer the above research question, I outlined the provisional 
conceptual framework. The framework was called ‘provisional’ because, initially, it 
would be employed to explain the EU’s policies towards ASEAN in in-depth cases 
but would be revised later after all cases were finalized. It consisted of causal factors 
which could be a comprehensive blueprint in analyzing the development of the EU’s 
policy towards ASEAN.  
I argue that, with respect to ASEAN, the development of the EU’s policy 
development is a complex matter and is not easy to describe by looking simply at the 
internal factors involved in the EU’s policy-making process. We do not assess only 
the internal factors within the EU in order to understand and explain the development 
of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN; it is, also, important to take into consideration 
the external factors in order to understand the process of the development of the 
EU’s policy towards ASEAN. This is primarily because the internal and external 
factors are interrelated. In the context of inter-regionalism, these factors can provide 
us with a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the EU and 
ASEAN.  
In order to conceptualize the relationship between the EU and ASEAN, I offer 
a framework which, by breaking the framework down into five relevant factors, 
considers the dynamics affecting the EU’s policies in respect of ASEAN. I identified 
and selected these factors because they represented the important determinants of 
internal and external aspects which explained the development of the EU’s policy 
towards ASEAN. This framework came from an inductive analysis of my research 
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which was based on upon empirical data and the literature on IR. In the light of my 
research, I considered this to be a provisional framework and would apply it through 
the examination of individual case studies. This would lead to an understanding of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the framework. My study showed that these five 
factors were important to the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN.   
These factors, which, often, are overlooked in the inter-regional literature, can 
be divided into internal and external factors. The internal factors come from inside of 
the EU, as follows: firstly, the relevant actors involved in the development of the 
EU’s policies regarding ASEAN. In order to develop the EU’s policies toward 
ASEAN, it is crucial to understand what, how and, to what extent, actors interact 
within the various institutional arrangements. Secondly, the promotion of interests or 
values is driving the EU to formulate its policy towards ASEAN. This factor 
examines the rationales behind the EU’s policies towards ASEAN and how they are 
connected with interests and values or a combination of both.    
Furthermore, there are three external factors which come from outside the EU, 
as follows: firstly, the changing interaction process between the EU and ASEAN 
through consultation, monitoring and negotiation. Secondly, the level of integration 
within ASEAN has evolved and developed in terms of institutions and time. This has 
influenced the interaction between both regions. Finally, the external pressures and 
opportunities have affected the EU’s policy toward ASEAN. These pressures and 
opportunities are divided into two elements such as the geo-political situation and the 
external political economy element. Because of the importance of the provisional 
conceptual framework, Chapter 3 provides a detail discussion.  
 
1.4. Research Methodology, Case Study Design and Data Collection  
This research was based on a qualitative method of analysis. A detailed primary 
reason for choosing a qualitative method was because it could provide a holistic 
explanation of factors which explained the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. A 
qualitative method helped me to understand more comprehensively the main reasons 
which explained the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. The qualitative research covered 
various analytical approaches which focused on the interviewees’ views and 
arguments. In a comprehensive way, it elaborated on particular regions and activities 
(King et al, 1994:4). The qualitative research studied the motivations and the 
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connections between factors (Hakim, 2000:36). It was appropriate for me to use 
qualitative methods to analyze the EU member states’ political and economic 
interests; the EU itself, and ASEAN because the outcomes consisted of substantial in 
depth information.  
I used case studies as my research method because I needed an exploratory and 
explanatory framework to investigate the relationship between the EU and ASEAN 
(Yin, 2009:8). In investigating a social problem, the case study approach could be 
employed to provide an explanation which might deal with the complexity and 
subtlety of concrete situations (Denscombe, 2008:38). Lijphart (1971:691) argued 
that “case studies can make an important contribution to the establishment of general 
propositions and thus to theory-building in political science”. By designing a case 
study research, I was able to use more than one method of data collection which 
helped to provide a more comprehensive understanding of my research topic. I used 
explanation building as an analytic technique to assist me in interpreting my findings. 
Yin (2009:141) argued that the objective of explanation building “is to analyse the 
case study data by building an explanation about the case”.   
My research strategy was based partly on building the inductive theory building 
from cases. Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007:25) argued that, “Building 
theory from case studies is a research strategy that involves using one or more cases 
to create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory from case-
based, empirical evidence”. The main objective was to use cases as the foundations 
which could be employed to build theory inductively. Building the inductive theory, 
from cases which had rich empirical data (Ibid) and allowed me to develop theory 
and to establish a framework based on the process or structure of experiences, as 
demonstrated in the data (Thomas, 2006:238). An inductive approach could develop 
and strengthen a theory of inter-regionalism because it could produce accurate, 
interesting and testable arguments (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007:25).        
This study was part of a hypothesis-generating (behaviour patterns) approach. 
Lijphart (1971:692) argued that: “Hypothesis-generating case studies start out with a 
more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses and attempt to formulate definite 
hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases. Their 
objective is to develop theoretical generalizations in areas where no theory exists 
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yet”. This study aimed to contribute to the development of theoretical foundations in 
inter-regionalism since there was a lack of conceivable existing theory offering a 
comprehensive explanation and answer to this topic. My justification for developing 
a conceptual framework rested on the lack of a unified theory; the importance of the 
development of the EU’s policy in the study of inter-regionalism; and insufficient 
empirical evidence explaining the contemporary relationship between the EU and 
ASEAN.  
The strengths of a case study design are that the analysis is holistic (Descombe, 
2008:45) and efficient in terms of time and budget. In this thesis, I used an embedded 
case study design. It had subunits which expanded opportunities for a comprehensive 
analysis of the single case study. However, the weakness of a case study design is 
that the case may shift from the first position to a different position. This situation 
would arise, if I focused more on the subunits and started to neglect the holistic 
aspects of the case. In order to overcome this weakness, the design of the case study 
needed to minimize misrepresentation and to balance the analysis between the case’s 
holistic aspects and its subunits (Yin, 2009:52). 
 I chose the relationship between the EU and ASEAN because it was 
particularly suitable in demonstrating and broadening relationships between two 
regions. I selected cases which represented diversity of policy areas and different 
institutional arrangements. The variation of these policies provided me with 
opportunities for extensive and deep analysis of the relevant factors and their 
interactions. This situation persuaded me to illustrate the patterns in the development 
of the EU’s policy toward ASEAN and to explain the implications of these patterns 
to the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. These cases represented sub-units of 
analysis within their inter-regional cooperation. Yin (2009:50) suggested that it 
should be called an embedded case study design. These EU policies were as follows: 
1.  A new partnership with South-East Asia aimed to improve political, security and 
economic cooperation between the two regions through the promotion of 
commerce and foreign capital; support for regional integration; and the 
preservation of regional stability.  
2. Together with five ASEAN countries, the EU supported a mission to Aceh, 
Indonesia for a peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and 
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the Free Aceh Movement (FAM). This case focused on cooperation between the 
EU and ASEAN in relation to Indonesia. It differed from both a new partnership 
with South-East Asia and an ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The 
reason for the difference was because it was a form of cooperation, especially in 
connection with Indonesian affairs, between the EU and ASEAN on political and 
security issues in the South-East Asia region. The other cases were forms of 
cooperation, especially on the matter of EU and ASEAN affairs, between both 
parties on political, economic and development issues in the region. 
3. The EU attempted to create, through a FTA, another policy to improve the EU 
and ASEAN’s economic relationship. The EU and ASEAN halted their FTA 
talks after two years of negotiations.  
These cases were appropriate because of several following reasons: firstly, all 
cases represented formal cooperation between the EU and the South-East Asia 
region. ASEAN and its member countries represented the South-East Asia region. 
Secondly, they were examples of EU policy outcomes toward ASEAN affecting not 
only trade and the economy but, also, the EU-ASEAN relationship on political and 
security matters. For example, an EU-ASEAN FTA was the EU’s first attempt to 
create a comprehensive economic agreement with ASEAN. The Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM) was the EU’s first engagement with ASEAN in their joint civilian 
mission in South-East Asia. Thirdly, all cases occurred in the period from 2001 to 
2009 on which I focused my study. Fourthly, the development of EU policies toward 
ASEAN would be seen to be based on the success of concluding an inter-regional 
agreement with ASEAN. All cases represented successful and unsuccessful 
outcomes in the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. Fifthly, these 
were reflected in the 2001 EU’s comprehensive strategy towards Asia which aimed, 
for instance, to develop its inter-regional cooperation with ASEAN, one of its key 
partners in Asia’s sub-region. Sixthly, the cases covered internal and external factors 
influencing EU policy development towards ASEAN. For example, in all cases, 
these included various actors involved; the promotion of EU interests and values; 
modes of engagement between the EU and its partners; the level of integration within 
the external partners; and the external pressures/opportunities affecting EU policy 
development.  
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 I used two types of data collection which were documents and in depth 
interviews. Qualitatively, I collected and used, systematically, data from documents 
taken from primary and secondary sources. The primary data sources were joint 
declarations and agreements between the EU and ASEAN; the European 
Commission’s communication papers; the Council’s and Commission’s official 
documents; the Joint Co-Chairmen’s Statements of EU-ASEAN Ministerial 
Meetings; the Official Journal of the European Communities; the progress and 
evaluation reports of the European Parliament; Europe and Europolitics daily 
journals about the EU; ASEAN Series of Documents; and ASEAN Annual Reports.  
 I collected all the documents released by the EU institutions and ASEAN. The 
majority of documents could be accessed from the Law and Europa Library (the 
University of Edinburgh); the National Library of Scotland; the ASEAN Secretariat 
Library; the European Commission’s Central Library; the European Commission’s 
Historical Archives Service; and the EU Council’s Library and Central Archives 
Department. I visited all the above places in order to read and collect documents. I 
received official documents by e-mail from my EU and ASEAN contacts and, also, 
downloaded and read documents through the EU and ASEAN’s websites 
(http://ec.europa.eu/, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ and http://www.aseansec.org). 
In addition, I visited websites and offices of business communities and NGOs which 
focused on the EU-ASEAN affairs and collected documents.  
 My secondary sources were academic books, newspapers and magazines. For 
internet-based sources, I accessed and read electronic journals such as the Journal of 
Contemporary European Research, European Journal of International Relations, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Integration, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Asian Security, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Academy of 
Management Review and The American Political Science Review.  I downloaded and 
read the e-magazines and e-newsletters from related websites, such as Bilaterals 
Online (http://www.bilaterals.org) and Europe’s Forum on International Cooperation 
(http://www.euforic.org/). In all documents, I focussed on the most relevant 
information (Yin, 2009:1055) related to case studies and examined them based on 
their authenticity; credibility/accuracy; and representativeness (Burnhams et all, 
2004:185).   
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 I carried out interviews with representatives of EU institutions; representatives 
of the EU member states; the business community; and NGOs both in the EU and 
ASEAN. Interviews gave me crucial insights into such cases since my interviewees 
were involved in the development of these policies or knew of the situations at that 
time (Yin, 2009:108). They assisted, also, me to gather and cross-check information 
which I could not obtain from documents. On the EU side, the research interviews 
focused on key EU institutions in Brussels, Jakarta and other cities in Europe and 
South-East Asia. I did a series of interviews with: 
• European Commission officials (the Directorates General for External 
Relations and Trade); 
• Council of the EU officials; 
• Representatives of the EU member states in the EU Headquarters; 
• Representatives of the European Parliament; 
• Representatives of NGOs and the business community;  
• Representatives of the EU Delegations in South-East Asia; and 
• Representatives of the EU member states for ASEAN.  
From the ASEAN side, I interviewed representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat; 
representatives of ASEAN countries; an ASEAN parliamentarian; and the 
representatives of non-state actors in South-East Asia. Appendixes 5 and 6 are my 
research notes and a list of the interviewees.  
For the data analysis, I grouped the data from documents and interviews, based 
on case studies and chronologically in order to consider the developments in the 
EU’s policies towards ASEAN. I attempted to identify information from documents 
and quotations from interviews in order to make links between the findings and the 
case studies. With regard to the document data, I classified archival documents based 
on case studies. These documents were divided into the EU side and the ASEAN side 
in order to group them into specific areas. Based on the internal and external factors, 
I coded the documents’ findings and used them to cross-check the results from the 
interviews to avoid bias. With regard to the interview data, I identified my data based 
on the interviewees’ institutions and saved all interviews to Winamp media files. I 
listened to the results of all the recordings to understand the arguments and the 
respondents’ impressions. I transcribed all interviews into a Microsoft word version 
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and saved all arguments and impressions in separate folders. I used relevant 
arguments for my analysis and all impressions constituted the complementary data.  
Based on related institutions, I identified data, coded and retrieved it.  
I consolidated all findings from the documents and the results of interviews 
based on case studies. I included these findings in each of the case studies. Then, I 
developed descriptive and explanatory analyses to examine the internal and external 
factors which influenced the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. 
Afterwards, I visited each of the case studies to establish whether or not the findings 
matched with these internal and external factors and to obtain explanations of their 
dynamic interactions in the EU’s policy developments. I drew analytical inferences 
from the case studies and, from all case studies, compared and synthesized all 
findings in order to generate patterns of behaviour. Other scholars could use these 
behaviour patterns to further both the EU’s external relations with other regions and 
inter-regionalism research.   
I verified my data by implementing triangulation of data, for example, 
document analysis and interviews. Denzin (1978:340) argued that researchers could 
use triangulation of data to solidify their research and cover complete aspects of their 
topic. I worked with my supervisors and PhD colleagues at the University of 
Edinburgh to examine my data. Throughout the data analysis process, I minimized 
my bias by verifying data through combining and cross-checking documents and 
interviews with secondary sources.    
This study’s time frame was from 2001 to 2009. The following were the three 
primary reasons why I selected this period: firstly, there were crucial disagreements 
between the EU and ASEAN with regard to both human rights violations in East 
Timor and Myanmar; and the acceptance of Myanmar as a member of ASEAN in 
1997. East Timor was a former colony of Portugal which Indonesia had occupied 
since 1975. Additionally, the EU disagreed with Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN 
because of human rights violations and the military dictatorship (Europe, 1997a:8). 
Between 1997 and 2000, the EU and ASEAN suspended their dialogue. They 
recommenced their talks in December 2000 (Europe, 2000a:9) and agreed to improve 
their engagement compared to the previous era. In 2003, the EU entered into a new 
partnership with South-East Asia. The EU and ASEAN achieved two joint 
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declarations in 2007.5 These agreements demonstrated that, in the last decade, the EU 
had strengthened its cooperation with ASEAN.  
Secondly, there were a number of internal and external developments for 
ASEAN such as the realization of the ASEAN Community as a foundation for 
ASEAN’s regional integration; the ratification of the ASEAN Charter; and ASEAN’s 
emerging role in an East Asia Summit (EAS). These developments attracted the EU 
to develop its inter-regional cooperation with ASEAN. Thirdly, in November 2009, 
the EU member states adopted the Lisbon Treaty. I selected 2009 as the end point for 
the time frame because, in order to make the EU a more coherent organization, this 
treaty reformed the EU’s governing institutions.     
 
1.5. Thesis Structure  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 highlights the literature 
review of inter-regionalism. It explains the evolution, trend and study of inter-
regionalism; the application of inter-regionalism in the relationship between the EU 
and ASEAN and critiques the existing works on inter-regionalism regarding the EU 
and ASEAN. The existing inter-regional literature lacked a unifying logic and was 
largely a-theoretical.  
Chapter 3 elaborates my provisional conceptual framework which was used to 
analyze all selected case studies within this thesis. It gives the definition of each 
factor which was chosen to explain the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. This chapter 
elaborates the relevance and logic of each factor in inter-regionalism.  
Chapter 4 highlights a New Partnership with South-East Asia as the first case 
of the EU’s policy in respect to ASEAN. I explain the development process of this 
EU policy which is analysed using five relevant factors.  
Chapter 5 explains the EU-ASEAN cooperation on the AMM to monitor the 
implementation of a peace agreement between GoI and FAM. This policy is analysed 
in order to gain a comprehensive explanation of the EU’s institutions and member 
states concerning political and security issues in South-East Asia. I employed the 
provisional conceptual framework to examine and explain the making of this EU 
policy.  
                                                 
5 The Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership and the Joint Declaration at 
the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit. 
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Chapter 6 explains the establishment of an ASEAN-EU FTA. I assessed the 
EU’s external policy to ASEAN in terms of developing the new economic initiative 
for trade and investments between both parties with the objective of building a FTA 
between these regions. I analyzed this policy development based on relevant factors 
which affected the policy outcome.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the main findings of factors and their syntheses which led 
to the behaviour patterns explaining the EU’s policy toward ASEAN. It provides the 
general trends and the implications for inter-regionalism between the EU and 
ASEAN. It explains the theoretical contributions and policy implications which 
could be drawn from the conceptual framework of the development of the EU’s 
policy towards ASEAN and the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. Other 
scholars can use my findings and behaviour patterns as their conceptual frameworks 
to explain other inter-regional relationships, and so that they can understand 
comprehensively how region to region relationships developed over time. Policy 
makers might use this study’s policy recommendations to strengthen the relationship 




















LITERATURE REVIEW: INTER-REGIONALISM 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the literature on globalization, there were links between politics and 
economics at the domestic, regional and global levels. The global system comprised 
various actors, regulations and agendas in its political, economic and socio-cultural 
spheres. Mcgrew (2008:24-25) argued that this situation created a complex global 
governance because of the emergence, during these decades, of international 
organizations, regional institutions and non-state actors who participated and were 
involved in global and domestic affairs. There was increased international 
cooperation between these actors.  
Amongst IR scholars, both in the literature and professions, there was a major 
debate about the international cooperation. The IR scholars contributed a great deal 
to the literature regarding international cooperation. However, there was very little 
discussion about why regions interacted with each other in such relationships and 
how they cooperated with one another. Because the majority of the IR scholars’ 
discussions focused on cooperation amongst nation-states; international 
organizations; non-state actors; and amongst all these actors together in the global 
system (Keohane and Nye 2001:20-32), there was little discussion amongst them in 
considering inter-regionalism as a sub division of international cooperation. A major 
argument was that inter-regionalism added to the knowledge of international 
cooperation discussed in the literature. Therefore, inter-regionalism continued to 
leave open an area of study which IR scholars could explore and develop. 
This chapter aims to review the existing literature on inter-regionalism. It 
identified a gap in the literature namely that most scholars focused on macroscopic 
inter- and trans-regional interactions between regions and failed to provide in depth 
analysis of policy developments in one regional organization towards another 
regional organization. This had implications for their inter-regional ties. This chapter 
is divided into four parts. Following the introduction, the second part explains the 
evolution, trend and study of inter-regionalism. The third part assesses the 
application of inter-regionalism in the EU and ASEAN relationship. I analyse the 
criticism of the existing works on inter-regionalism especially concerning the ties 
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between the EU and ASEAN. Lastly, the conclusion summarizes Chapter 2’s key 
findings.   
 
2.2. The Evolution, Trend and Study of Inter-regionalism  
The progress of regionalism began in the 1950s when the main western 
European states created the European Coal and Steel Community in order to build 
trust and co-operation after the Second World War. The emergence of the European 
regionalism process was followed in other regions which built, also, new regional 
organizations. This phenomenon was known as old regionalism. Nye (1968: vii) 
defined an international region as a relationship between a number of states because, 
in a similar region, there was a mutual inter-dependence amongst them. International 
regionalism might be said to be an arrangement of inter-state groups based on region. 
Most new independent states used regional organizations as a means to struggle for 
their independence and, in the international arena, to protect their sovereignty from 
major powerful states (Acharya 2002:21-22).  
From the 1960s to the 1980s, most regional integration arrangements were the 
result of political and security and, to some extent, economic alliances. These 
regionalism processes were driven mainly by nation-states such as the Organization 
of American States; the League of Arab States; the Organization of African Unity; 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; the Central American 
Common Market; ASEAN; the Andean Community; and the Economic Community 
of West African States. Fawcett and Hurrell (1995:1-6) and Gamble and Payne 
(1996:1-2) argued that regionalism was an arrangement in which processes worked 
together in the context of political, military, security and economic aspects in the 
particular region. I argue that regionalism is an arrangement of regional integration 
amongst countries in the specific region in order to respond mainly to political and 
security competition and economic obstacles originating in the Cold War era.  
Between the 1980s and 1990s, the EC established its relationship with other 
regional organizations. For commercial and developmental purposes, the EC started 
its relationship with few regions such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
States and ASEAN. Their relationship was limited in scope and level of cooperation. 
However, in the late 1980s, the EC’s emphasis was not to focus mainly on its 
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regional cooperation. The EC paid more attention to the matter of its own deeper 
regional integration. The European integration process achieved political and 
economic union as signed by the EU member states in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.   
The end of the Cold War led to an increase in the number of regional projects 
around the world. These regional projects expanded their activities, the number of 
actors, issues and needs both within and outside regions. The success of the EU 
regional integration fostered other regions to create new economic integration 
initiatives. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement were 
concrete examples of economic regionalism. These regional projects were classified 
as the new regionalism. Hettne (1999:1-24) argued that the new regionalism was a 
process of regionalization comprising many actors, issues and institutions. The new 
regionalism covered multidimensional issues such as democracy, trade and 
investment. It involved various actors (governments and non-state actors) and 
institutions (regional organizations and forums) at local, national and regional levels. 
Therefore, new forms of inter-regionalism emerged because of the extension of the 
new regionalism. Inter-regionalism was a turning point in the study of the new 
regionalism (Olivet, 2005:9). After regions improved their status as actors in the 
system of global governance, inter-regionalism began to emerge and separate from 
the new regionalism. There was a need for regions to build their external 
relationships with other regions in order to extend and increase their co-operation. 
The worldwide trend of inter-regionalism grew because regions needed to 
establish and increase their own relationships amongst themselves. From the middle 
of the 1990s to the present day, there were many developments happening within the 
context of the EU relationships with other regions and other inter-regional 
arrangements beyond the EU. In the 2000s, the inter-regional arrangements were 
proliferating, also, outside the EU’s inter-regionalism. Beyond that of the EU, the 
recent development in inter-regionalism was the activity occurring between the 
Asian and Latin American regions. However, beyond the EU and compared to the 
EU’s inter-regionalism with other regions, many inter-regional arrangements  
remained young in terms of age, variation of issues and level of interaction.   
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Recently, compared to the inter-regionalism in the 1980s, the nature and depth 
of inter-regionalism expanded and increased in the context of the variety of forms in 
the relationship; its scope of cooperation; and its participating actors. These forms of 
inter-regional relationship could be seen as bilateral inter-regionalism and trans-
regionalism. The following paragraphs provide a detailed discussion about the 
classification of inter-regional ties. The majority of these recent arrangements 
focused on economic and political relationships. Most areas of inter-regional 
cooperation were deepening and expanding in order to cover various issues such as 
commerce, investment, development, peace and security. The participating actors 
were nation states; non-state actors; and regional organizations. For example, some 
of the most widely recognized inter-regional ties and trans-regional ties are those of 
the EU and ASEAN relationship; the EU and Mercosur relationship; the ASEAN and 
Andean Community relationship; the ASEAN and Mercosur relationship; Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM); Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); the Far East-
Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC); and The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP). 
Therefore, in international cooperation, the study of inter-regionalism is a broad 
based area of research. In the context of IR, inter-regionalism is a developing field of 
study in the system of governance. The study of inter-regionalism continues to be an 
evolving concept which describes and explains the relationship between a region and 
other regions. The majority of inter-regionalism studies were inspired by the trilateral 
relationship of three global economic actors, the EU, the USA and Japan 
representing Western Europe, North America and East Asia (known as the Triad 
regions). Rüland (2002c:1) and Hänggi (1999:56-80) explained that the concept of 
the Triad was related to the three capitalist actors which dominated the world 
economy over the past decades. There were a number of reasons such as the end of 
the Cold War; the emergence of the new regionalism; and the emergence of East 
Asia as a region for potential economic development which, in the 1990s, led to the 
development of close inter-regional ties between the Triad regions. Many discussions 
on inter-regional ties in areas of policy and inter-regionalism issues were inspired 
and overshadowed by the relationship between the Triad regions. 
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There were a small number of IR scholars who were interested in inter-
regionalism. The study of inter-regionalism was an underdeveloped aspect of the 
global governance system. Söderbaum (2011:224-234) argued that, in IR, inter-
regionalism was a poorly analyzed phenomenon and that there was no consensus 
amongst scholars as to its definition. The recent developments showed that some 
scholars created various definitions of inter-regionalism. Roloff (2006:19) explained 
that the definition of inter-regionalism was an interaction between international 
regions in the area of political, economic and societal issues. It was linked to the 
processes of globalization and regionalization faced by nation states. They responded 
to these processes by consolidating regionalism and developing inter-regional co-
operation. We might regard the inter-regionalism process as driven by states which 
were influenced by global conditions. These encouraged them to strengthen and 
foster their own regionalism in order to respond to inter-regionalism. 
Rüland (2000a:3-4) defined inter-regionalism as a region to region dialogue 
with low or high level meetings for the purpose of information exchange and 
cooperation in particular areas such as trade and investment; the environment; and 
combating transnational crime. Inter-regionalism was based on a low level of 
institutionalization on which both regions relied for their institutional infrastructure. 
Hänggi (2005:31-62) added that inter-regionalism was based on major actors 
developing their relationships with other regions and entailed two forms of foreign 
relationships with a third state and other regional groups. Gilson (2005:309-310) and 
Söderbaum (2011:224) argued that the definition of inter-regionalism was the inter-
connection of a region with another region. Gilson (2005:309) explained that inter-
regionalism gathered resources from two regional entities recognized by global 
dynamics. Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004:208) argued that, due to the process of 
globalism and regionalism, inter-regionalism was a combined result of market forces 
and political consequences. It might support multilateralism in managing the world 
economy. Around the globe, it could develop, also, institutionalized economic 
governance among countries or regions.  
From the various above mentioned definitions, I argue that, based on mutual 
interest in multiple areas of co-operation, inter-regionalism is a framework for 
international cooperation between two regions. More specifically, inter-regionalism 
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is the result of one region’s external policy toward another region or a third country 
through interacting and understanding between them based on mutual interest and 
consent in order to achieve an effective relationship. These regions share common 
interests, collective advantages and a better understanding between themselves. The 
primary objective of this action is to find a common denominator in many aspects of 
cooperation (political, economic and socio-cultural aspects) amongst them.  
The empirical evidence was that, through inter-regionalism in the era of 
globalization, the EU improved its relationships with other regional organizations. 
By this means, the EU tried to find common denominators and to create mutual 
advantages with its external partners, for example in the EU and ASEAN relationship 
and in the EU and Mercosur relationship. The majority of the EU’s relationships with 
other regional organizations were based on economic cooperation as a primary 
foundation with political cooperation as an additional requirement. The EU promoted 
its common interests, values and experience in regional integration as a basis for 
developing more inter-regionalism. 
Several scholars developed three views pertaining to regional co-operation. 
These were such as inter-regionalism; trans-regionalism; and a mix/hybrid form of 
regional cooperation. Hänggi (2000:3) argued that inter-regional cooperation could 
be divided into three different forms of inter-regionalism. The first of these forms 
was the relationships between regional blocks. The second form was bi-regional and 
trans-regional ties. Finally, the third form was hybrid regional cooperation which was 
the relationship between regional blocks and third countries. These third countries 
such as in the case of USA, China, India and Indonesia held a strategic position in 
their geographical regions (Ibid, p.7). I argue that the hybrid formation of regional 
cooperation can be defined as the relationship between one regional organization and 
a third country which covers many dimensions such as political, economic and socio-
cultural cooperation. Examples of hybrid formations of inter-regional cooperation are 
the relationship between the EU and China and the EU and Indonesia. 
However, Rüland simplified Hänggi’s classification of inter-regional 
cooperation. He emphasized that the interaction between regional organizations 
could be classified into two types. The first type was bilateral inter-regionalism and 
the second type was a trans-regionalism. Rüland (2000b:2-3) explained that bilateral 
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inter-regionalism could be seen as a low level of institutionalized relationship, for 
example, in specific common projects on trade and investment; transnational crimes; 
and the environment. Examples of bilateral inter-regionalism are the EU and ASEAN 
relationship and the EU and Mercosur relationship. 
Trans-regionalism is a study of trans-regional cooperation between two huge 
regional organizations which have various members in these organizations. Trans-
regional cooperation can invite other actors, from outside two main regional 
organizations, to join in the cooperation. However, the expansion in membership, for 
a new member from outside the two main regional organizations, does not entail 
directly becoming fully part of this trans-regional institution. The infrastructure of 
the trans-regional institution can be built by these two regional organizations and 
their member states, for example: a research centre; a secretariat office; a business 
forum; and a network of think-tanks (Rüland, 2002b:2-3). Concrete examples of 
trans-regionalism are ASEM and APEC.  
Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004:5-6) classified the commercial arrangements 
between regions based on pure inter-regionalism; hybrid inter-regionalism; and trans-
regionalism. Pure inter-regionalism was defined as the relationship between two 
custom unions such as the EU and Mercosur. Hybrid inter-regionalism would mean 
the relationship between a custom union and a group of countries such the EU and 
the ACP states. Trans-regionalism would be the relationship between two groups of 
countries within two different regions. They proposed, also, an inter- and trans-
regionalism model of relationships which involved domestic, state and regional 
players. They attempted to define the role of these players within the institutional 
frameworks of inter-regional relationships (Ibid, p.225-227).    
In order to illustrate a recent situation of the variety of inter-regional relations, 
Hänggi (2006:40 and 56) re-developed his typology on inter-regionalism as follows: 
the first type was the relationship between a regional organization and/or a regional 
organization/third country such as the transatlantic relationship between the EU and 
the USA. The second type was a group to group relationship such as between the EU 
and ASEAN and the EU and the Andean Community. The third type was the 
relationship between a regional organization and a regional group such as ASEM. 
The fourth type was the relationship between two regional groups such as in 
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FEALAC. The fifth type was mega-regional, which was the relationship between a 
group of states from more than two regions such as APEC and the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). He simplified its classification 
into (1) quasi-inter-regional for the first type of relationship, (2) inter-regional, in the 
narrower sense, for the second, third and fourth types of relationship and (3) mega-
regional for the last type of relationship.   
 I argue that there are complex forms of inter-regionalism. However, the 
complexity, in forms inter-regionalism, continues to be contested because, in this 
debate, there remains divergence between these scholars. In order to assist readers in 
understanding the classification of inter-regional cooperation, I follow the simple 
forms of inter-regionalism which are inter-regionalism6, trans-regionalism and hybrid 
formation of regional cooperation. There is a lack of examples in literature on this. 
However, in the subsequent analytical chapters, if it merits consideration, I spend 
time considering hybrid inter-regional cooperation between the EU and ten 
individual member states of ASEAN.        
After the above explanation of various definitions and forms of inter-regional 
cooperation, I elaborate on some critiques which prominent scholars addressed in 
studying inter-regionalism. Rüland, Tavares, Hänggi, Roloff and Söderbaum gave 
critiques on inter-regionalism. Rüland argued that the concept of inter-regionalism 
remained unformed in rigid and solid ways. The weaknesses in empirical and 
theoretical works and their diffuse nature raised doubts as to the importance of inter-
regionalism. It is problematic to explain inter-regionalism because of the number of 
explanatory variables which contrast with the empirical evidence. Inter-regionalism 
relies upon definition, history, geography, policy area, actors/actorness and a 
conceptual/theoretical approach (Rüland 2000c:2). For example, the inter-regional 
cooperation between two regions might build a collective identity in each region. 
However, as yet, the EU and ASEAN relationship has not resulted in a collective 
ASEAN identity for and has tended to create a different identity between the two 
regions because of their different historical backgrounds and values.  
Rüland (2002c:1) suggested that “most of the existing work on interregional 
relations has been descriptive, is lacking a comparative dimension and tentative at 
                                                 
6 Rüland refers to inter-regionalism as a bilateral inter-regionalism in order to distinguish it from 
trans-regionalism. For the purposes of my study, I just continue to refer to it as inter-regionalism. 
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best in theoretical terms”. Tavares (2004:20) added that, group to group, 
relationships without a collective institution would be categorized as having weak 
inter-regional ties. The trans-regional relationship was viewed as containing a huge 
number of memberships. It meant that there was no clear distinction between inter-
regionalism and trans-regionalism. Hänggi, Roloff and Rüland suggested that, as yet, 
most existing studies had not succeeded in giving a clear explanation of inter-
regionalism. They argued that “theoretical explanations, albeit, rare have been 
primarily deductive, at times even speculative and most lacking sufficient empirical 
evidence” (Hänggi et al, 2006:7).  
It is too early to say that Aggarwal and Fogarty’s proposed inter- and trans-
regionalism model of relationships is a comprehensive model sufficient to explain 
inter-regional and trans-regional relationships because it continued to focus on the 
institutional framework of commercial co-operation. It failed to see how, when and, 
to what extent, these players affected the policy-making of inter- and trans-regional 
organizations. There was a lack of empirical evidence within internal dimensions and 
inter- and trans-regional organizations paid small attention to the external dimensions 
of policy-making. Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004:238) admitted that there was an 
absence of a unitary logic in inter-regionalism. Also, deductively-derived approaches 
to both policy and analysis might not be based on a single logic. Their study 
suggested that it was difficult to predict the results for inter-regional regimes and 
that, as an approach to trade policy, inter-regionalism had a type of broad-based 
grounding as opposed to in-depth analysis which informed all viable policy choices. 
Therefore, Rüland (2010:1280) suggested that there was a need to examine in detail 
how, when and, to what extent, state actors; non-state actors; and inter-regional 
institutions influenced the emergence; performance; evolution; and decision-making 
of inter-regional relationships.   
Söderbaum added that, until now, the EU and inter-regionalism continued to be 
a debatable issue because there was doubt as to its fundamental concepts. Therefore, 
our perception and understanding of inter-regionalism remain unclear. Söderbaum 
(2011:224) argued that “the logic, depth and effects of inter-regionalism in the EU’s 
external relations remain contested. A great deal of the skepticism is connected with 
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confusion regarding fundamental concepts, which has blurred our understanding of 
inter-regional dynamics”.     
In IR, inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism remain new areas of study, 
which emerged, in the 1990s, after the rise of the new regionalism. Hence, I believe 
that inter-regionalism requires further definition and a more definitive conceptual 
framework. There is a lack of established theory which can be applied by scholars 
and other interested parties. There are some terms and works but they are insufficient 
to constitute a definite theory. Therefore, there are diverse analytical approaches 
which can be used to explain inter-regionalism.   
 
2.3. The Application of Inter-Regionalism in the Relationship between the EU 
and ASEAN  
 
In this section, I consider the discussions which took place between the EU and 
ASEAN on inter-regionalism and between Europe and Asia on trans-regionalism. 
These discussions were important in improving readers’ understanding of some other 
scholars’ works on the relationship between the EU and ASEAN in particular and the 
EU’s relationship with Asia generally. I hope that they can see a clear distinction 
between inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism. The relationship between the EU 
and ASEAN represents the study of inter-regionalism. The relationship between the 
EU and Asia represents the study of trans-regionalism.    
There were some attempts at analysis by a few scholars who studied inter-
regional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN and trans-regional cooperation 
between Europe and Asia. They used neo-realism; neo-liberalism; social 
constructivism; and the social relations of productions theories to explain these 
relationships. Based on thematic issues, I grouped their analyses of inter-regionalism 
within the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. The literature relating to the EU 
and ASEAN relationship focused on two main areas of analysis. These were as 
follows: firstly, the descriptions, from the 1970s to the 1990s, of historical ties 
between these two regions and secondly, the functions of inter-regionalism related to 
the global governance system. Furthermore, there were a few scholars who are 
grouped together based on their works on trans-regionalism between Europe and 
Asia. These trans-regionalist scholars are formed into groups based on various sub 
thematic issues which are: (i) the evolution, the role and the development of ASEM 
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as a trans-regional institution; (ii) the relationship between Europe and Asia through 
various approaches; and (iii) the connection between Asia and the American 
imperium. The recent developments on inter-regionalism encouraged debate amongst 
scholars to consider it from different points of view. Based on their theme and 
context and in order to illustrate the transformation of inter-regionalism, each group 
of scholars was criticized by other groups of scholars.    
The group of historical scholars consisted of Harris, Bridges, Tornetta and 
Lukas who illustrated, from the beginning of the 1970s to 1980, the history of the 
cooperation between the EC and ASEAN. Their works were driven generally by the 
historical relationship between the two regional entities. Harris and Bridges (1982:2) 
described, from 1972 to 1980, the historical background of the relationship between 
Europe and South-East Asia which was represented by the EC and ASEAN. They 
considered, between 1972 and 1980, Europe’s interests in commerce with investment 
in South-East Asia.  
Tornetta (1989:39-44) described the dynamics and the competition for power 
between various actors including the USA, the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam in 
the former Indochina. There was an Indochinese crisis and wars in this sub region. 
The international community (the United Nations/UN, Japan and the EC) were 
involved in trying to bring about a peaceful solution to the problems in this region.  
Lukas (1989:110-111) argued that, in the 1980s, the relationship between the 
EC and ASEAN and other inter-regional arrangements (e.g. between the EC and the 
Andean Pact and the EC and El Mercado Común Centro Americano) were too young 
in terms of the period of cooperation. This situation presented IR scholars with a 
common difficulty which was to identify the problems and predict the future form of 
inter-regional ties. 
I am critical of the group of historical scholars who wrote descriptively on the 
historical relationship between the EU and ASEAN. Harris, Bridges, Tornetta and 
Lukas considered the EU and ASEAN relationship but, in the initial period of the 
relationship between the EU and ASEAN, focused only on the historical aspects of 
the relationship between these two regions. They did not employ IR theories to 
explain the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. Basically, they described, 
from the 1970s to the 1980s, the historical dynamic of the relationship between these 
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two regions. They illustrated an initial part of the relationship between both regions. 
The reasons as to why they described the relationship based only on historical ties 
was because, at that time, the study of inter-regionalism had not been developed yet. 
They had limitations in obtaining empirical evidence to explain the relationship 
between the EU and ASEAN. At that time, most scholars focused on the study of 
regionalism which dealt with the relationship between countries within a particular 
region.     
The group of scholars, who focused on historical ties between the EU and 
ASEAN, was criticized indirectly by another group of scholars whose approach 
focused more on the functions of inter-regionalism. I call this group, the group of 
functional scholars. Rüland, Doidge, Yeung, Perdikis, Kerr, Robles, Moeller, 
Camroux, Chandra, Manurung, Pambudi and Pakpahan argued that the functions of 
inter-regionalism were understood best as a contribution to the structure of global 
governance through the dynamic of the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. 
Most scholars attempted to use IR theories to examine the relationship between the 
EU and ASEAN. They assessed (i) how the EU and ASEAN relationship could 
contribute to the structure of global governance; (ii) how the commercial relationship 
between regional trade organizations (the EU, ASEAN, APEC and NAFTA) might 
foster an integrated global economy; (iii) how the social relationship between the EU 
and ASEAN was shaped by non-state actors; (iv) how misunderstandings between 
these regions might result in the ineffective function of inter-regionalism; and (v) the 
impacts of a proposed ASEAN-EU FTA on the Indonesian economy. 
Rüland (2001:6-9) described the achievement of inter-regionalism between the 
EU and ASEAN and trans-regionalism between Europe and Asia in order to answer 
in what way inter-regional and trans-regional cooperation contributed to the structure 
of global governance. He used five analytical frameworks to describe several 
functions of inter-regionalism which were inter-regionalism balancing; rationalizing; 
agenda-setting; identity building functions; and institution building. These functions 
were the result of a combination of IR theories which were realism; neo-liberalism; 
and social constructivism. Rüland used realism to explain inter-regionalism and 
trans-regionalism as a means for Triad actors to preserve a balance of power between 
themselves and other regions (inter-regionalism balancing). He employed neo-
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liberalism to assess the inter-regional ties which influenced the institutional building 
function; the agenda-setting function; and the rational function. He applied social 
constructivism to assess inter-regional ties which encouraged the collective identity 
building function between two regions. Based on the five functions of inter-
regionalism and in order to find a way for inter-regional ties to support the system of 
global governance (Ibid), he examined the relationship between the EU and ASEAN 
in the 1980s and the 1990s.  
Rüland (2001:27-29) came to the following five conclusions which were: 
firstly, the EU and ASEAN inter-regionalism faced many problems. For instance, 
their relationship was more of a balancing function which could not lead easily to a 
deeper relationship between them. Secondly, there was a need to institutionalize the 
relationship between the EU and ASEAN. Thirdly, many structures of the Europe 
and Asia relationship brought about a repetition at the global institutional level. 
Fourthly, the ASEM’s role was ineffective in dealing with the Asian financial crisis 
which reduced the strength of the inter-regional and trans-regional ties. Finally, 
within ASEM countries, there was a lack of confidence because of the ASEM’s weak 
role in responding to the Asian financial crisis. 
Doidge (2004:323-324) explored the cooperation, from the 1970s until the 
1990s, between the EU and ASEAN and ASEM. He employed five functions of 
inter- and trans-regional relationships to establish whether or not these five functions 
were performed in the relationship between the EU and ASEAN and in ASEM.  
Through the introduction of actorness as a moderating variable, he illustrated some 
reasons why or why not these functions were performed in the relationship between 
the EU and ASEAN and in ASEM. Doidge concluded that the level of actorness in 
regional blocks would affect, to some extent, the performance of five functions of 
inter- and trans-regional relationships.  
In a later work, Doidge (2011:171-177) described the EU’s inter-regionalism 
with ASEAN, ASEM and Mercosur. He examined, also, the ASEAN and Mercosur 
relationship and the FEALAC. He used five functions of inter- and trans-regional 
relationships and functional varieties of inter-regionalism. The functional varieties of 
inter-regionalism were capacity building inter-regionalism and globally active inter-
regionalism. He concluded that the relationships between the EU and ASEAN; 
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between the EU and ASEM; and between the EU and Mercosur had the function of 
balancing motivations; building capacity; and exercising greater influence at the 
global level. The ASEAN and Mercosur’s relationship and FEALAC’s were based 
on balancing motivations and a globally active inter-regionalism.     
Yeung, Perdikis and Kerr (1999: ix–xi and 1-7) considered that, in the global 
economy, there was a gap in the increasing inter-linkages between regional trade 
organizations. However, from the 1980s to the 1990s, there was no dynamism in the 
trade relations between the EU and ASEAN. They used a trade economist’s 
perspective as a way to answer the above puzzle. The trade economist’s perspective 
aimed at observing developments in international trade relationships based on the old 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO. They reviewed the 
commercial relationship between the EU and ASEAN. In addition, they examined 
APEC’s effect on the trade relationship between NAFTA and ASEAN and its 
importance to the commercial relationship between the EU and ASEAN.  
Moreover, with regard to the EU and ASEAN, they described regionalism in 
the global economy and the creation of regional trade blocs. They compared the trade 
relationship between the EU and ASEAN with the commercial ties between ASEAN 
and APEC. They attempted to connect those trade ties with the NAFTA. They 
concluded their findings by saying that, in the 1990s, the trade relationship between 
the EU and ASEAN was quite weak. They needed to improve their future trade 
relationship. They suggested that, in order to be more institutionalized and coherent 
in its operation, ASEAN had to follow the EU. The creation of bridging 
organizations (such as APEC and the Free Trade Area of the America/FTAA) did not 
foster regional trade organizations (NAFTA, the EU and ASEAN) fully as building 
blocks in the world economy. The WTO might assist regional trade organizations to 
become building blocks in the world economy (Yeung et al, 1999:143-150).           
Robles (2004:ix–xii) focused on the question that if contact at the inter-regional 
level  was improving between actors from different regions, such contact might help, 
also, to solve any divergences by improving their respective regions. He argued that 
at the global and regional levels, structural limitations stimulated the EU and 
ASEAN to create a novel form of social relationship rather than that of inter-regional 
relations. Their relationship, involving two organizations and other non-state actors 
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(such as companies and NGOs), had resulted in a new circumstance for social action 
or constraints which had arisen because of situations, at international and regional 
levels, during the 1980s and the 1990s. This situation described the behaviours of the 
above actors from these two regional blocks.   
When examining the relationship between the EU and ASEAN, based on 
Robert Cox’s theoretical approach, Robles’ emphasized that the integration between 
the social structure and human agency. The structure covered social relations which 
consisted of material means (resources and technology); institutions; and 
conceptions. He argued that two organizations had established conceptions of inter-
regional ties on which their cooperation was founded. Their attempt, to build the 
material and institutional foundations, was adjusted according to the structures of 
production and international order (Cox, 1987:5-9) at the regional and global level 
(Robles, 2004:7–8). The EU and ASEAN had developed a social structure and 
relationship which had been influenced by non-state actors. However, as yet, the 
social relationship between the EU and ASEAN has not developed productively and 
did not support the regionalization in South-East Asia. This had happened as a result 
of the interaction between the high effects of multinational companies and the low 
effects of NGOs (Robles, 2004:165–171). 
Moeller (2007:466) argued that, in the relationship between the EU and 
ASEAN, there was a lack of understanding between these two regions. He assessed 
the situation which caused the EU’s and ASEAN’s relationship not to function 
progressively. This situation resulted in challenges and opportunities for both parties. 
This had been caused by the EU’s inability to interpret ASEAN’s views on stability 
and security; the disunity within the EU position; and the establishment of ASEM 
which led to the EU’s and ASEAN’s relationship taking a different direction. 
Moeller did not use any IR theories to illustrate the relationship between the EU and 
ASEAN. He applied a political scientist’s perspective in understanding the 
relationship between the two regions.  
Camroux (2008:1-2 and 31-33) provided a general overview of the relationship 
between the EU and ASEAN. He compared the political and economic dimensions 
between the EU’s highly institutionalized organization and ASEAN’s uniquely 
multi-dimensional regional entity. He attempted to juxtapose these regional blocs by 
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describing their differences in the political and economic dimensions of cooperation. 
He employed macroscopic observation to contrast these regional blocs. In a later 
work, Camroux (2010:57, 71-73 and 2011:202-204) argued that the EU’s attempt to 
export its model of regional integration elsewhere represented the new stage of 
relations in inter-regionalism. He used his previous works to contrast the political 
and economic dimensions between these two regions. Finally, he raised a question as 
to how to describe regional cooperation: whether or not they represented inter-
regionalism or merely contact in a four-level game? He proposed that inter-
regionalism was a new level within the four level game which extended from 
Putnam’s metaphor of a two level game and Patterson’s and Deutsch’s metaphor of a 
three level game. He concluded that inter-regionalism was an intermediary target of 
the EU, shaping its relationship with other regions. It was caused by different 
capacities within the EU and ASEAN. He advised that inter-regionalism was a 
crucial area of study which needed future research rather than becoming an imagined 
alchemy.  
Chandra, Manurung, Pambudi and Pakpahan’s book presented the economist’s 
case for economic bilateralism and inter-regionalism between the EU and ASEAN 
and the impact on Indonesia. They argued that the EU-ASEAN economic 
relationship would be dominated by the EU. An ASEAN-EU FTA should 
accommodate the developmental objectives of ASEAN and its member states 
especially Indonesia. They used economic bilateralism/inter-regionalism and the 
economic simulation in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which was 
created especially for the example of Indonesia. This economic model is known as 
the Equilibrium Model with an Economic Regional Analysis Dimension 
(EMERALD).7 They concluded that ASEAN needed to concentrate on creating the 
ASEAN Community by 2015 rather than establishing FTAs with other external 
partners. The adjustment cost for an ASEAN-EU FTA would have an impact on 
people’s welfare in Indonesia and in other ASEAN countries. Quantitatively, their 
work showed that 10 % of the EU’s foreign direct investment (FDI), which flowed 
into Indonesia, could undermine the welfare of Indonesians because of the open 
competition between economic actors from the EU and Indonesia. Most economic 
                                                 
7 It measures the advantages and disadvantages for all economic sectors of Indonesian involvement in 
an ASEAN-EU FTA. 
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actors, in Indonesia, would lose their business to economic actors from the EU. If 
Indonesian exports to the EU improved by 18.5 %, there were some economic 
sectors which would win (labour productivity and house hold income) and some 
sectors which would lose (forestry, fisheries, agriculture, chemical, petrol refineries 
and services) (Chandra et al, 2010:2-3 and 96-97).     
I would like to point out that this group of scholars, who believed in the 
functions of inter-regionalism, had some limitations. These were: firstly, Rüland, 
Yeung, Perdikis, Kerr and Robles considered only, through the functions of their 
inter-regional cooperation, the relationship between the EU and ASEAN up to the 
end of 1990s; the contribution of the EU’s and ASEAN’s relationship to a global 
economy; and the social structure between the EU and ASEAN. Their works focused 
on the relationship between the EU and ASEAN during the final years of the Cold 
War era and on the early years after the Cold War. Their works did not cover the 
relationship between the two regions in this millennium era.  
Secondly, Rüland (2005:300) explained that the functions of inter-regional 
cooperation were “more theoretically deduced than empirically real”. On the 
question of inter-regionalism, there was a gap between the approach and the 
empirical evidence. Arising out of Rüland’s work, Doidge examined the application 
of five functions of inter-regional cooperation in the context of the EU and ASEAN 
ties and in ASEM. However, within the functions of inter-regional cooperation, the 
performance of rationalizing, agenda-setting and collective identity formation was 
not really well-performed and developed in the EU and ASEAN ties and in ASEM. 
This was because of several differences in approach between the EU and Asian 
countries such as in the sphere of human rights and democratic principles and the 
discussion of high versus low institutional development between the two regions. His 
research covered, at the same time, the vast topic of the EU and ASEAN ties and 
ASEM. Doidge attempted to compare the actorness between the EU, ASEAN and 
ASEM in the framework of inter- and trans regionalism. However, these regional 
actors had different shapes and characteristics which made it difficult to compare 
them. Robles (2008:11) added that some studies of inter-regionalism and their 
functions seemed to consist of inadequate empirical claims and, theoretically, when 
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explaining ASEM, were insufficient to explain the inter- and trans-regional 
relationship, such as the above functions of interregional cooperation.   
In a later work, by employing the application of five functions of inter-regional 
cooperation; capacity building inter-regionalism; and globally active inter-
regionalism, Doidge examined the EU inter-regionalism with ASEAN, ASEM, 
Mercosur and the ASEAN and Mercosur relationship and FEALAC. These functions 
of inter-regional cooperation covered only the macro dimension of the inter-regional 
relationship between the EU and other regions and non EU inter-regional ties. These 
were insufficient to give us micro/specific explanations on internal and external 
factors, and how and, to what extent, these factors affected the development of the 
EU external policies towards several regions and inter-regional outcomes. This 
situation led to a more general coverage of analyses rather than focusing on specific 
coverage of analyses. Consequently, it was quite difficult to say how the level of 
actorness and the functions of inter-regionalism significantly affected the 
development and performance of the functions of inter-regional cooperation, if a few 
of the functions, as mentioned earlier, were not performed.  
Thirdly, Yeung, Perdikis and Kerr researched the connection between the EU 
and ASEAN trade relationship and the ASEAN and APEC relationship and FTAA 
and NAFTA for their contribution to the world economy. However, this research was 
too broad and limited to provide a comprehensive analysis of the trade relationship 
between EU and ASEAN; the ASEAN and APEC relationship; and NAFTA. Their 
attention was limited to the WTO as the premier way to improving the trade 
relationship amongst regional trade organizations. They captured, to a small degree, 
the importance of inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism as alternative ways of 
cooperation out of a deadlock in the WTO.  
Fourthly, Robles focused on the roles of non-state actors such as the companies 
and NGOs in the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. He argued that, in the 
social structure created by the EU and ASEAN ties before the 2000s, the NGOs’ role 
was low compared to that of the business community. However, I point out that the 
roles of the EU’s institutions, member states and ASEAN countries remained crucial 
to the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. To some extent, the involvement of 
non-state EU and ASEAN actors focused on the trade and socio-cultural areas of 
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cooperation in the ASEM’s framework. The Asia and Europe Foundation was a 
forum for non-state actors from the EU, ASEAN and other ASEM countries which 
were designed to meet and discuss their experiences. However, between 1980 and 
2011, there was no formal forum for non-state actors particularly from the EU and 
ASEAN. Recently, there was a new development in the participation of non-state 
actors in the EU and ASEAN relationship exemplified by the ASEAN-EU Business 
Summits being held by only business communities from both regions between 
2011(in Jakarta) and 2012 (in Phnom Penh) and ongoing. It is too early to make any 
definitive comments on the effectiveness of this interaction among business people 
from the two regions.   
Fifthly, in this group, most scholars illustrated the old period of the EU and 
ASEAN relationship (between the 1970s and the 1990s). Up to 2007, Moller and 
Camroux provided general overviews of the relationship between the EU and 
ASEAN. However, they used only a political scientist’s perspective to describe this 
relationship. Most scholars did not assess comprehensively the EU’s policies during 
the contemporary era of the relationship. The EU released new policies toward 
ASEAN due to the different context from the previous era and the complexity of 
their current inter-regional cooperation. Camroux was too premature, in his 
judgement, that inter-regionalism was an intermediary target of the EU in building a 
relationship with other regions. I argue that inter-regionalism remains one of the 
EU’s main strategies in interacting with third parties (European Commission, 
2006a:9-10). It was clear that there was an attempt by the EU to share its regional 
integration experience with ASEAN. However, this experience was only an 
inspiration for ASEAN when it created its own regional integration. Camroux 
proposed, only slightly, the idea of a four-level game without either explaining it in 
detail or elaborating on it. I argue that inter-regionalism continues to be an evolving 
means of cooperation which needs to be researched further in order to find an 
appropriate perspective in searching for a valid approach and providing empirical 
evidence to explain it.    
Sixthly, Chandra, Manurung, Pambudi and Pakpahan assessed Indonesia’s 
prospects within an ASEAN-EU FTA. They provided qualitative and quantitative 
explanations of their work on the impact of an ASEAN-EU FTA on the Indonesian 
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economy. It was a useful analysis on their overall view of the relationship between 
the EU and Indonesia. However, I argue that their work was too limited in scope 
since it focused too much on the Indonesian economy rather than, as a whole, on the 
ASEAN-EU FTA. It would have been interesting if they could have provided 
analyses on other ASEAN countries’ economies. Then the reader could consider the 
general assessment of how an ASEAN-EU FTA would impact on the economies of 
ASEAN countries.    
In this study, I mention a different group of scholars which I refer to as the 
trans-regional scholars. They criticized inter-regionalism because it was focused too 
narrowly and did not cover wider trans-regional ties. They argued that we needed to 
think trans-regionalism or a broader regional area. In the area of trans-regionalism 
between Europe and Asia, ASEM represented a place of interaction between the EU 
and Asian countries. The trans-regional literature can be divided into the following 
three main areas of analysis (the sub-thematic issues). The first sub-group of trans-
regional scholars focused on the evolution, the role and development of ASEM as a 
primary political and economic forum in the relationship between Europe and Asia. 
As the main part of their analysis, most scholars assessed the evolution, the role and 
development of ASEM from 1996 to the present day. In this sub-group, some 
scholars examined ASEM’s role as a political and economic institution for 
interaction between these two continents. Secondly, another sub-group of trans-
regional scholars considered different approaches such as bilateralism and trans-
regionalism in the EU’s engagement with Asia. Thirdly, a final group of trans-
regional scholar focused on the connections between the American imperium and 
Europe and Asia. The imperium and its surrounding regions established a strong 
pillar of democracy and, in Europe, a system of welfare states and, in Asia, a system 
of economic development and democratization. 
The debate amongst the first sub-group of trans-regional scholars on the 
relationship between Europe and Asia began with the historical and development in 
ASEM. Holland, Gilson, Forster, Camroux and Pakpahan focused on the evolution; 
and the role and development of ASEM as an area of analysis in the Europe and Asia 
relationship. Each elaborated different angles to explain the evolution, the role and 
development of ASEM. Holland (2002:59-84) explained that the EU and ASEAN 
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formed ASEM in the mid-1990s. However, ASEM was only a forum which 
represented a different playing field between its members. The variety of ASEM 
member states could create less cohesion and effectiveness in terms of common 
position.  As one of his examples, Holland described the EU development policy as 
an overview in the wider EU integration discussion within the relationship between 
Europe and Asia. He attempted to describe the essence of policy debate between 
EU’s development policy and the EU’s integration process by using integration 
theories, such as multi-level governance and liberal inter-governmentalism.   
Forster examined the approach of negotiated order in the relationship between 
the EU and ASEM. Forster used Smith’s negotiated order approach which elaborated 
on three crucial areas in the global arena. They were as follows: boundaries, layers 
and networks. Boundaries could be seen as how to define spaces or territories in 
terms of participation and sharing values. Layer meant that the EU had multi-layers 
of contact with other regions such as region to region and bilateral contacts. These 
layers, based on historical backgrounds and political systems, related to different 
aspects of policy interaction. Networks emphasized the involvement of multi-actors 
in solving collective challenges (Smith, 1998:4). 
Forster (2000:798-801) argued that there were four points which could be 
elaborated on from the approach of negotiated order in the interaction between EU 
and ASEM. Firstly, the EU empowers its relationship with ASEM to open 
communication and use norms in order to minimize uncertainty within their 
relationship. Secondly, an approach of negotiated order assisted the reader in 
understanding the competition interests and pressures inside the EU. Thirdly, the 
complexity of the EU policy making mechanism created a long process of policy 
response. Finally, the geo-political situation influenced the interests, on the part of 
the EU member states, to choose and maintain the relationship. 
In considering the relationship between the EU and East Asia through ASEM, 
Gilson (2004:64-65) used neo-realism; neo-liberalism; and social constructivism. She 
attempted to mix these theories to assess the contribution of ASEM to the structure 
of global governance. According to her analysis, ASEM reflected a balance of power 
and a process of trilateral interests of three economic powers, namely, Western 
Europe, North America and East Asia. The EU realized that ASEM had been used to 
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support its trade strategy and strengthen the trilateral trade relationship. The EU and 
East Asia relationship emerged because of the current economic growth and 
development in East Asia and differentiation in resource supplies and allocation 
between these regions. The ASEM effect was quite small within the EU and East 
Asia relationship because of some remaining challenges within ASEM, itself, such as 
its lack of institutional development; broad issues; various involved interests and 
participating actors; and the limited realization of committed agreements between 
both parties.  
In a new article, Gilson (2011:235-242) examined the history of ties between 
Europe and Asia; the end of the Cold War; and the globalization process which 
shaped the relationship between these two regions. Furthermore, she argued that 
ASEM had shaped a new and complex structure of global governance. Within East 
Asia, the institutional aspects of several regional initiatives were based on the 
ASEAN way which employed the principle of non-interference and the consensual 
basis of the decision-making system. ASEM, ASEAN+3 and EAS evolved into 
different forms in an EU style.   
Camroux (2006:2 and 33-37) discussed that inter-regionalism was a valuable 
choice for the governments of the EU and Asia to cooperate and work together in the 
context of ASEM. However, the differences between the EU’s high 
institutionalization and the diversity of Asian countries’ capacity to extend their 
political will, created an asymmetrical situation in ASEM. The main implications of 
the asymmetrical situation are: firstly, in the future, ASEM might represent a 
problematic relationship between both parties. Secondly, ASEM might not improve 
and move forward from its current position. Therefore, the EU and Asia should 
develop their own solid foundations to foster and strengthen ASEM. Camroux did 
not use IR theories to explain the relationship between the EU and Asia. He 
described the asymmetrical ties between the EU and Asia. Always, ASEM’s role has 
been static and, as yet, has not transformed into an effective institution for Europe 
and Asia. ASEM’s role is crucial in terms of accelerating the relationship between 
these regions. 
In Pakpahan’s 2010 article, he argued that there were emerging bilateral and 
regional economic initiatives between Europe and Asia. In the future, these economic 
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initiatives might lead to unbalanced economic development between both regions. 
These situations would create possible challenges and implications for both regions. 
He proposed that the economic initiatives between Europe and Asia should aim to 
develop the least developed countries in Asia. ASEM could establish a common 
flexible framework for these bilateral and regional economic initiatives between 
Europe and Asia. In his approach, he used inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism to 
examine the implications of the economic initiatives between the two regions and 
ASEM’s future role in the relationship between Europe and Asia. He came to the 
conclusion that the relationship between Europe and Asia had been dominated by the 
political and security aspects of cooperation. Their commercial relationship was 
transformed into bilateral and regional trade initiatives. A common flexible 
framework, created by ASEM, could be an instrument for managing and monitoring 
the existing and future bilateral and regional trade initiatives between Europe and 
Asia. The flexible framework aimed to identify the possible social impacts of these 
trade initiatives and to search for the best way in dealing with these impacts 
(Pakpahan, 2010:516 and 530-531).      
In general, Holland, Forster, Gilson, Camroux and Pakpahan argued that each 
of their works focused only on the relationship between the EU and ASEM as a 
primary example of the Europe’s and Asia’s relationship. However, the relationship 
between the EU and ASEM did not cover really whole countries in Europe and Asia. 
In specific terms, Holland attempted to examine the relationship between the EU 
development policy and the process of the EU’s integration with the integration 
theories. From his work, liberal inter-governmentalism was explained adequately at 
the EU level and multi-level governance could be explained at the sub-national, 
national and supra-national levels. Additionally, Foster applied the approach of a 
negotiated order to examine the ties between the EU and ASEM. He focused his 
analysis on boundaries, layers and networks. However, Holland’s and Foster’s 
analyses were unable to give a comprehensive explanation of the decision-making 
process within the EU. Their works had limitations when explaining external factors 
and the complexity of the relationship between the EU and Asia which influenced the 
development of the EU’s policy with respect to ASEM.  
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Gilson mentioned that the relationship between Europe and Asia had filled the 
gap in the trilateral relationship between East Asia, America and Western Europe. 
Her explanation focused only on the relationship between the EU and ASEM. She 
did not consider the different approaches, which the USA might have applied in the 
context of a trilateral relationship. Additionally, she stated that, especially in the East 
Asia region, ASEM had shaped a new and complex structure of global governance. 
However, I argue that ASEM is not the only inter-regional framework which shaped 
a new structure of global governance in this region. In addition, other inter-regional 
and regional frameworks such as the relationship between the EU and ASEAN; 
ASEAN+3; APEC; EAS and TPP contributed, also, to influence the new structure.  
 I would question this sub-group of trans-regional scholars who said that 
Europe and Asia’s relationship was an asymmetrical relationship. In the context of 
ASEM, Europe’s and Asia’s relationship is still quite young (around 15 years old). I 
argue that, in these years, changes to the global, regional and economic situation 
produced new economic actors in the Asian region such as China, India and 
Indonesia. In terms of political, economic and commercial issues, the relationship 
between Europe and Asia may shift gradually from an asymmetrical to a greater 
interdependent relationship. In his previous work, Pakpahan proposed that ASEM’s 
future role would be to oversee the developments between Europe and Asia in 
economic trade initiatives and to enhance ASEM’s effectiveness. His proposal could 
be realized as long as there was good will and positive commitment from the leaders 
of the ASEM countries. If there was a lack of good will amongst the leaders of the 
ASEM countries in reforming the existing mechanism, it would be difficult for 
ASEM to realize his proposal. 
The next sub-group of trans-regional scholars examined, through various 
approaches, the relationship between Europe and Asia. This sub-group of scholars 
revised the first sub-group of scholars’ works and went further than ASEM when 
assessing the relationship between Europe and Asia. Farrell, Balme, Bridges, 
Murray, Rüland, Schubert, Schucher and Storz attempted to consider the Europe and 
Asia regions from various channels of relationship such as through bilateral, regional 
and multilateral ties. They tried to provide, in the context of multi approaches, 
various illustrations which have been done by Europe and Asia.  
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Farrell (2005:135-137) argued that the relationship between the EU and Asian 
countries was non-binding and informal owing to the weak institutionalization 
between both parties. They had worked together in several areas of cooperation such 
as political cooperation; trade and investment cooperation; and cultural cooperation. 
However, there were shortcomings in their relationship such as the weak framework 
of cooperation which limited the areas where they could work together for the benefit 
of both parties. Their association did not support coalition building between both 
parties whereby they might achieve common positions for global international 
agreements. The EU and Asia countries had different ways in regarding the 
ideational aspects and the values between both regions. Farrell employed a 
cooperative hegemony approach to describe the relationship between the EU and 
Asian countries. This approach encompassed the impact of ideas, the important role 
of state actors and the creation of an institution for cooperation between both parties.   
Balme and Bridges (2008:8-14) suggested that the relationship between Europe 
and Asia could be seen in various ways, e.g. as a bilateral relationship between 
European countries and Asian countries; as a relationship between the EU and an 
individual Asian country/sub regional; and as a trans-regional relationship between 
the EU and Asia (ASEM). They used the international political economy approach to 
describe in the context of bilateralism and multilateralism the relationship between 
Europe and Asia. They believed that regional integration and inter-regional ties 
contributed to the development of multilateralism. They suggested that, when 
describing the relationship between Europe and Asia bilateralism and multilateralism 
could complement one another. They described these complex levels of analysis in 
various aspects of cooperation such as political/security and economic aspects. 
Murray (2010:253-262) argued merely that the EU applied multiple approaches 
such as regionalism, inter-regionalism and bilateralism in order to build relationships 
with East Asian countries. The EU attempted to act as a cohesive actor in East Asia 
and to support the development of regionalism there. She used a political scientist’s 
perspective in order to provide a description of the EU’s role as a regional 
interlocutor with East Asia. In this and previous work, she came to the conclusion 
that the EU had to be cautious and realize that there was a different understanding of 
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regional integration from, on the one hand, the European perspective and, on the 
other hand, the Asian perspective (Murray, 2008:3-4). 
Rüland, Schubert and Schucher and Storz (2008:3-31) examined the 
relationship between Europe and Asia only at the trans-regional level. They assessed 
the ties between Europe and Asia by dividing actors into the governmental and the 
non-governmental. They adopted various approaches such as traditional economic 
approaches and political economic approaches to assess the relationship between 
Europe and Asia, in the context of ASEM and, lastly, the political science of inter-
regionalism for the process and functions of inter-regional ties. They consolidated 
these several approaches into a common institutional approach. The relationship 
between Europe and Asia had an institutional setting which impacted on political, 
economic and social behaviours, for example trade and human rights.  
 I would question, in the following terms, this second sub-group of trans-
regional scholars who applied various approaches to illustrate the relationship 
between Europe and Asia: firstly, Farrell suggested that the relationship between the 
EU and Asian countries could be described by employing the cooperative hegemony 
approach. I argue that this approach oversimplifies the real situation in the 
relationship between the EU and Asian countries. There are shortcomings in this 
approach, such as firstly, her explanation it focused only on ideas and did not 
consider interests or combination of interests and ideas. Secondly, the cooperative 
hegemony approach assumed that the EU dominated Asian countries. The EU’s 
values and ideas faced resistance from Asian countries in the context of democratic 
values and the appreciation of human rights.  
Secondly, Balme and Bridges believed that patterns of ties in Europe and Asia 
focused on the development of bilateral and multilateralism with a small contribution 
of inter-regionalism. Their explanations looked to bilateral and inter-regional 
cooperation as their main examples of contribution to multilateralism. However, they 
provided only weak examples of how and, to what extent, bilateral and inter-regional 
cooperation strengthened multilateralism in the context of the relationship between 
Europe and Asia. Therefore, especially in the area of multilateralism there was an 
inconsistency in their argument about the linkage between bilateralism, inter-
regionalism and multilateralism. 
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Thirdly, Murray believed that, in building a relationship with East Asian 
countries, the EU was projecting itself as a cohesive actor. The EU attempted to 
assist the regional integration project in East Asia. I argue that Murray was not clear 
enough in her analysis as to how the EU could assist regionalism amongst East Asian 
countries. She did not provide a detailed explanation of the complexities in 
relationships amongst East Asian countries. She stated only that the EU applied 
different approaches such as in regionalism, inter-regionalism and bilateralism as to 
how to link with East Asian countries. However, she did not give a deeper analysis of 
each individual approach or explain which approach was effective when the EU 
engaged with East Asian countries.        
Fourthly, Rüland, Schubert and Schucher and Storz elaborated on the European 
and Asia relationship regarding governmental and non-governmental actors. They 
employed many approaches to assess the relationship between these two regions. 
However, I argue that they have blurred our understanding of the inter-regional 
dynamic because their examination was too wide-ranging in terms of actors and 
issues of cooperation. They were too limited in scope and focus when defining and 
finding a common institutional setting in assessing the relationship between Europe 
and Asia. Finally, their assessment was not deep and comprehensive enough to 
explain a weak institutional framework and a complex relationship between Europe 
and Asia. 
The last sub-group of trans-regional scholars focused on the connection 
between the American imperium and two regions, namely, Europe and Asia. 
Katzenstein considered imperium as a concept for analyzing rather than as a 
historical reason. He explained that the American imperium was the combination 
between two dimensions of power; territorial and non-territorial which were shaped 
by the linkage regions (Europe and Asia) under the ambit of the USA sphere of 
influence. 
In the American imperium, Katzenstein considered Asia and Europe and how 
they connected with each other. Katzenstein (2005:1) argued that “ours is a world of 
regions, embedded deeply in an American imperium”. He supported this argument 
by building four supporting arguments. Firstly, the American imperium exerted a 
significant influence on regions through a combination of the USA’s territorial and 
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non-territorial powers. Secondly, these regions had a different institutional, structure 
and identity. Europe and Asia had crucial countries, such as Germany and Japan, 
which were close allies of the USA. However, Latin America, the Middle East, South 
Asia and Africa did not have such strong connections with the USA as the USA had 
with Europe and Asia. Thirdly, the USA’s policies would support globalization and 
internationalization which shaped the world of regions. Globalization resulted from 
the processes within the world system where regions were embedded. The global 
process changed nation states and their ties. The system of states affected 
internationalization consisting of different regions. The processes of 
internationalization happened across state borders. Fourthly, regional porousness was 
strengthened politically by vertical relationship. There were connections between 
close allies within regions and the USA; between regions and sub-regions; and 
between the USA and the regions. The American imperium shaped not only the 
world but it reshaped, also, America (Ibid, p.1-42).  
Katzenstein argued that, after the end of the Cold War and the September 11 
attacks, Asia and Europe were sub-ordinates of the American imperium. I argue that 
his argument was too exaggerated. Katzenstein argued that contemporary world 
politics was unipolar with the USA as a leader of the world of regions. However, the 
existing world powers were distributed to other actors, in international politics, such 
as Brazil, Russia, the EU, India and China. The USA’s political and economic 
powers shifted and, to some extent, were distributed amongst these emerging powers. 
The current world is a multi-polar world. The USA is not the only existing super-
power which has ceded her superior position to other emerging powers. However, 
their positions are equal in terms of building relationships amongst regions.     
Most groups of inter-regional and trans-regional scholars gave insights to 
readers about the relationship between the EU and ASEAN in specifically and, in 
general, Europe and Asia ties with tentative answers to explain the system of global 
governance. There were critical points for all groups and sub-groups of scholars 
especially when focusing on the relationship between the EU and ASEAN and 
Europe and Asia. My critical points are: firstly, most groups of inter-regional and 
trans-regional scholars considered the relationship between the EU and ASEAN and 
European and Asian ties from their macro perspective. Secondly, most groups of 
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inter-regional and trans-regional scholars, in their descriptions and analyses, 
examined the relationship between the EU and ASEAN and Europe and Asia by 
means of observations. The majority of their observations and analyses were limited 
only to the surface of the relationship between the EU and ASEAN and Europe and 
Asia. Their works did not cover a micro perspective of the EU when it looks toward 
ASEAN in its relationship. Additionally, my criticism of the trans-regional scholars’ 
sub-groups was that their works focused on ASEM as an example of a progressive 
regime in the study of trans-regionalism between Europe and Asia. However, ASEM 
was a weak regime of trans-regional cooperation because of different perspectives 
and approaches between European and Asian countries in viewing this forum. On the 
one hand, the EU member states saw ASEM as a forum which needed to be 
institutionalized in order to achieve an effective and legally binding trans-regional 
cooperation between Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Asian countries considered 
ASEM as an informal forum where they could deliver flexible commitments without 
any obligation to implement them. 
Thirdly, there was a lack of plausible existing theory with regard to inter-
regionalism. According to Aggarwal and Forgaty (2004:24 and 237), there was a 
lack of unified logic to explain inter-regionalism and this made it difficult to predict 
outcomes for inter-regional cooperation. The indeterminacy of a purely deductive or 
logical approach to all relevant elements of inter-regional relationships could be 
explored further by examining in detail in-depth cases. The reasons for pursuing 
inter-regionalism as an approach depended on the context of specific inter-regional 
ties. The existing literature did not assess, in detail, the process of the EU’s policy 
development toward ASEAN. They did not give comprehensive explanations and 
systematic and up to date empirical evidence with regard to the contemporary 
relationship between the EU and ASEAN. In short, there was insufficient treatment 
of causal factors that mattered which accounted for why one region developed 
certain policies towards another region. 
In the light of these situations, there is a need for continuing research on the 
relationship between the EU and ASEAN particularly on the question of why, in the 
current era, the EU formed certain policies towards ASEAN. In the literature, any 
results from work on this issue appeared to be inadequate. There were few attempts 
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from the above scholars which demonstrated how the relationship between the EU 
and ASEAN functioned. However, we have different perspectives, methodologies 
and approaches. I argue that their explanations and theoretical approaches were 
limited when identifying relevant factors which explained the development of the 
EU’s policy towards ASEAN. Their analyses were inadequate when explaining 
internal and external factors and their interactions which influenced the EU’s policy 
toward ASEAN. They did not take into account all the necessary causal internal and 
external factors to examine how, when and, to what extent, these factors affected the 
development of the EU’s policies towards ASEAN. Their work did not help to 
explain the correlation of the factors which influenced the EU’s policy results 
(successes or failures) and had implications for the inter-regional ties between the 
two regions.  
 
2.4. Conclusion  
Chapter 2 explained the review of the literature about inter-regionalism. It 
explained the development of inter-regionalism. It assessed the application of inter-
regionalism and trans-regionalism specifically in the context of the relationship 
between the EU and ASEAN and that of Europe and Asia generally. There were few 
works which focused on inter-regionalism. However, these works focused primarily 
on the description of, as opposed to providing a comprehensive explanation for inter-
regionalism.  
The existing literature focused only on historical narrative, the functions of 
inter-regional cooperation, the social structure of inter-regional cooperation and 
purposes of inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism. It did little to speak to the issue 
of why the EU created its approaches to other regions especially ASEAN. It was 
insufficient to address the question about both the analytical framework and 
empirical evidence in the EU’s policy development towards ASEAN. In this area of 
study, there was a gap in analysis on the existing literature. The gap in analysis was 
illustrated by an apparent deficiency of relevant factors which could explain the 
development of this EU policy. In the next chapter, I identify important causal 
variables. I use the literature on the EU’s external relations and my study’s empirical 
evidence as my justifications for these and for integration theories regarding internal 




THE PROVISIONAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
3.1. Introduction 
Based on the literature on inter-regionalism, the existing analyses had some 
weaknesses, such as firstly, for the reasons which I explore below their theoretical 
approaches were inadequate to explain the development of the contemporary EU 
policies towards other regions. Secondly, whilst few models took into account 
internal institutional arrangements, most failed to capture both internal and external 
factors which explain the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. Thirdly, 
their theoretical approaches were inadequate in explaining the historical thrust and 
evolution of the EU’s policy; and the motivations and objectives behind inter-
regional cooperation between the EU and other regional organizations such as 
ASEAN. Therefore, there was a lack of inter-regionalism theory which could explain 
inter-regional interactions comprehensively.    
 My conceptual framework addressed these limitations. Firstly, it was able to 
accommodate the diversity of topics, from security policy to trade negotiations, 
within the development of the EU’s policy toward ASEAN. This diversity influenced 
the overall scope and shape of inter-regional strategy towards ASEAN. Secondly, the 
framework captures and consolidated micro and macro aspects of the process and 
effects of inter-regionalism between the EU and ASEAN. Thirdly, it focused on 
analyzing empirical data of the contemporary inter-regional relationship between the 
two regions; this was relatively lacking in previous accounts. I provided empirical 
evidence about the development of the EU’s policy with respect to ASEAN such as a 
new partnership with South-East Asia, the joint action of the EU and ASEAN on 
monitoring the peace agreement in Aceh and the establishment an ASEAN-EU FTA. 
They were prominent cases which were available in the relationship between the EU 
and South-East Asia in the last decade. These detailed cases of various EU policy 
results toward the region could assist me to explain the EU-ASEAN relationship. 
Lastly, I began with specific observations which might inform broader 
generalizations and theories. I expected changes to the actors within the various 
institutional arrangements, the promotion of interests or values which drive the EU’s 
policy, modes of interaction, the level of integration of external partners and the 
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external pressures and opportunities which, over time, might reveal some 
generalization patterns in the EU’s interaction with ASEAN. I derived these five 
recurring themes from the literature of integration theories; the EU’s external 
relations; and empirical evidence about which I argued that there was a need for this 
to be taken into account in explaining the development of the EU’s policy. I did 
something different from the other previously described theorists, which was based 
on an inductive approach, to analyze the causes of the EU policy towards ASEAN. 
In terms of influencing policy development, these internal and external factors 
are assumed to be mutually constitutive and interdependent factors. They had to be 
analyzed simultaneously in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding and 
explanation of the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. Nevertheless, 
this provisional framework provides a reference point and assists the analysis of my 
case studies. There was an explanatory relationship between the provisional 
conceptual framework and the case studies. I used this framework to examine the 
process of policy development; and to analyze the relationship between factors and 
the policy development. Consequently, I explained the relevancy of these factors and 
the success and failure of the policy. This framework was a dynamic model where 
the factors affected each other and the inter-regional cooperation between the two 
regions. 
This chapter aims to propose five relevant factors as a provisional conceptual 
framework which was used, in the context of building inter-regional cooperation, to 
analyze the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. I chose these factors 
as a framework because they could explain internal and external dimensions which 
affected the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. The framework 
argued that any account of the development of EU policy had to consider five 
factors. Firstly, it had to explain relevant actors within the various institutional 
arrangements in the making of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. Secondly, it had to 
highlight the promotion of interests or values which drove the EU’s policy with 
respect to ASEAN. Thirdly, it had to consider the various modes of interaction 
between the EU and ASEAN in the making of the EU’s policy toward ASEAN. 
Fourthly, it had to explain the integration level of external partners. Fifthly, it had to 
highlight the external pressures and opportunities which affected the making of the 
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EU’s policy towards ASEAN. The chapter concludes that these factors would be 
effective in explaining and understanding the relationship between the EU and 
ASEAN.   
 
3.2. The Relevant Actors within the Various Institutional Arrangements in the 
EU’s Policy Development towards ASEAN 
 
The relevant actors were one of the two internal factors in developing inter-
regional policy within a regional organization. They were a relevant factor in 
explaining and determining the development of the EU’s policy in any particular 
context. We can see their importance in the various institutional arrangements 
illustrating how they interplayed and the extent to which they influenced the 
development of the EU’s policy. I explain the relevant actors in the development 
process of the EU’s policy. 
The development of the EU’s policy is linked to the integration theories which 
explain the internal process of the EU’s regional integration. The central point of 
analysis for integration theories such as the share of competence and the actors’ 
behaviours within the EU are the EU’s internal issues and the domestic issues of EU 
member states. These issues relate to the internal decision-making of the EU’s 
policy. The integration theories attempt to explain the internal process of the EU’s 
integration and internal decision-making of a particular policy. However, they have 
limitations in explaining the complexities of external factors which influence the 
process of the EU’s policy. They cannot explain beyond the internal process of the 
EU’s integration. Therefore, the integration theories cannot be considered to be 
comprehensive theories to explain inter-regionalism since they lack external 
dimensions. They are insufficient to deal with inter-regionalism. 
I extracted some ideas from integration theories which would be useful in 
forming internal factors to analyze the development of the EU. There are three main 
integration theories: neo-functionalism; liberal inter-governmentalism; and 
multilevel governance. I explain briefly the core arguments of each integration 
theory. According to Haas (1958:16-17), neo-functionalism argues that political 
community can create political integration based on groups, individuals and 
government. Political integration is the process of political actors (political leaders, 
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policy makers and lobbyists) who have been persuaded to change their loyalties and 
political activities towards a new supranational institution. Neo-functionalism 
believes that the process of European regional integration is caused by the spillover 
effect of integration which starts from the economic element to other elements 
(Dolan, 1975:286). Haas and Schmitter (1966:262) argued that the spillover effect 
was linked to political actors who agreed to extend their authority and cooperation 
for further regional integration.  
However, the theory of liberal inter-governmentalism is strongly critical of 
neo-functionalism because neo-functionalism cannot explain, within a regional 
organization, domestic interests; national formations; and inter-state negotiations 
(Moravcsik, 1993:480). Moravcsik (Ibid, p.479-482) believed that, in deciding the 
EU’s policy outcomes, the nation state was the main actor. He proposed that nation 
states still drove the EU’s policy agendas and choices. Liberal inter-governmentalism 
theory explains integration as the result of national governments’ rational decisions 
showing the interests of strong domestic groups and the relative power of every 
nation state. Nation states calculate to enter into an agreement if it gives maximum 
gain for their domestic constituents and balance of power within the system. 
Therefore, most EU policies are based on the lowest common denominator amongst 
its member states. Moravcsik (Ibid) argued that liberal inter-governmentalism 
divided the EU decision-making process. This was based on two levels as follows: 
the formation of national preferences; and inter-state bargaining. If the EU member 
states have taken final decisions and only delegated them to the Commission, the 
latter does not have the power to make the final decision.  
When it considers the process of the EU’s regional integration, the multilevel 
governance approach does not agree completely with the theory of liberal inter-
governmentalism. According to Hooghe and Marks (2001:1-2), multilevel 
governance argues that, in the EU’s regional integration, every actor has a different 
role at a different level of governance. The EU decision-making involved various 
actors within multiple stages. The EU has the process of collective decision-making 
which interconnects various EU institutions, member states and other political actors 
at the multiple levels such as the EU level, the national level and the sub-national 
level. To some extent, the EU member states have lost some of their authority over 
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their citizens and the power to control the EU’s decision-making. The control of 
authority has shifted from national governments to supranational institutions. With 
regard to EU policy, decision-making has a shared authority and influence at a 
multilevel of governance.   
From the theoretical discussion set out above, the following internal factors, 
contributing to the development of the EU’s policy toward other regions, can be used 
for the analysis of inter-regionalism between the EU and ASEAN. The nature of 
inter-regionalism can be explained and understood by assessing various actors 
involved in the different institutional arrangements within a regional organization 
such as the EU. These actors are divided into relevant and related actors. Relevant 
actors have the competence and authority to initiate; drive forward; negotiate upon; 
and take final decisions in the development of EU policy toward other regions. I 
acknowledge that to some extent, the EU institutional actors (eg. the Commission) 
are not always unitary actors (Carbone, 2007:3 and Cram, 1999:49) for example in 
the case of European integration (Hooghe, 2001:194). However, in this thesis, I treat 
them as unitary actors unless otherwise stated in order to balance the analysis 
between the development of the EU policies and the implications for the EU and 
ASEAN relationship. Related actors are involved in the development of EU policy 
and, in the decision-making process, shape the decisions made by the relevant actors. 
Related actors have consultative/informative, complementary or intervening roles 
affecting the EU’s policy development.    
Additionally, the EU’s institutional mechanism contributes to the pattern of 
EU’s inter-regionalism with other regions, such as ASEAN. Bindi and Shapiro 
(2010:343) argued that: “A EU foreign policy is dependent on the creation of an 
institutional framework that can support a political process of policy formulation”. 
They continued by arguing that: “EU foreign policy is mostly, though not 
exclusively, negotiated by diplomats and foreign ministers in a classic inter-
governmental setting. It follows that a multiplicity of actors with often widely 
varying and sometimes conflicting ideas are involved in the process” (Ibid).  
Söderbaum and Stålgren (2010:4) argued that: “The EU’s external policies are 
supranational and common, whereas in other cases they are intergovernmental”. 
Sometimes, the EU is not only releasing its common policy (such as inter-regional 
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cooperation policy) but, also, in several cases launching its inter-governmental policy 
(such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy /CFSP) toward other regions.  
However, these are always changing, developing and varying in the context of 
the competence of relevant actors within a regional organization. Warleigh (2002:5) 
argued that: “The architecture of the EU has often been re-evaluated and 
reconstructed, with the addition of new institutions and significant changes in the 
powers and functions of the foundational parts of the system”. He stated that: 
“Member governments are prepared to delegate to the Union at any one time, the EU 
institutions serve as an indicator of the direction and condition of the integration 
process” (Ibid, p.6). The relevant actors are an important factor which needs to be 
taken into account in examining the development of the EU’s inter-regional policy of 
and inter-regionalism.  
Relevant actors involved in institutional arrangements tend to be more varied. 
However, every actor has its own role, function and authority in the different 
institutional arrangements. Therefore, it is crucial to know, in the divergent 
institutional arrangements, the relevant actors on which the EU’s inter-regional 
policies are developed.          
The EU’s relevant actors have an influence on the development of the EU 
policy towards ASEAN. The EU’s governance system consists of supranational and 
inter-governmental dimensions which constitute an obstacle in formulating and 
implementing its external policy (Smith 2002: 8-9). There are several relevant actors 
(such as the EU’s institutions and member states) who, within the EU, are involved 
in the making of external policy. In the EU’s institutional arrangements, these actors 
have their own authorities and competences. The Maastricht Treaty and other 
relevant treaties were used as legal foundations of the EU’s institutional 
arrangements. These treaties created supranational bodies which had important roles 
and functions in the development of the EU’s policy toward other regions. Then, 
through their various roles as mentioned earlier, there were related actors involved in 
and influencing the development of EU policy. However, in the decision-making 
process of the EU policy toward other regions, they had less competence than 
relevant actors. The institutional arrangements of the EU’s policy can be seen as a 
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complex process of policy formulation which, within the EU’s internal arena, 
supports the interaction of these various actors.  
The EU external policies towards ASEAN cover many areas such as inter-
regional cooperation policy; trade policy; and CFSP. The EU inter-regional 
cooperation and trade policies reside in the EU’s first pillar which is known as the 
European Community Pillar.8 The CFSP constitutes the second pillar of the EU’s 
institutional arrangement. I assessed relevant and related actors in the processes of 
policy development within the EU and how they fitted with the institutional 
arrangements of the EU’s inter-regional cooperation policy; trade policy; and CFSP 
towards ASEAN.  
  
3.2.1. The EU’s Inter-Regional Cooperation Policy for ASEAN 
The EU’s inter-regional cooperation policy is one of the Community’s external 
policies to other regional organizations, for example, the Commission’s 
communication paper toward South-East Asia. 
The main actors making the EU’s inter-regional policy were the Commission; 
the Council of Ministers; and the European Parliament. The Commission is an EU 
executive body which implements the inter-regional cooperation policy towards 
ASEAN. It creates initiatives by forming a commission paper and coordinating the 
policy implementations of the EU and its member states (European Commission, 
2010a:1). 
The Council is the main institution in the EU’s decision-making body because 
all final decisions are taken by this institution (Council of the EU, 2010:1). The 
power lies in the Council which consists of representatives of the EU member states. 
The Council has responsibility for making security; defence; development; and trade 
policies. When consulting with ASEAN (Ibid), it works with the Commission and 
the Parliament to achieve a common position.     
As regards the EU inter-regional cooperation policy, the European Parliament 
coordinated with the Council over legislative procedures. It could take legislative 
                                                 
8 Before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had three main pillars in its legislation; the European Community 
was the first pillar, CFSP was the second pillar and Justice and Home Affairs was the third pillar. 
After the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, EU legislation, for various policy areas, is done 
based on more co-decision within the EU’s institution and new integrated mechanisms (Council of the 
EU, 2009a:1).  
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initiatives in the EU policy making mechanism. The European Parliament’s power is 
limited because it can give only assessments with regard to the budget and 
implementation mechanisms. 
With regard to the institutional arrangement in the EU’s inter-regional 
cooperation policy, the Commission’s communication paper towards South-East 
Asia, which was formulated in the European Community pillar, is an example of that 
policy. Regarding the EU’s relations with third countries, the 1980 ASEAN and EEC 
Joint Declaration and a 2001 strategic framework for enhanced partnership with Asia 
(European Commission, 2001a:3-4) are an agreement and framework which the EU 
uses for South-East Asia. The EU may extend its cooperation with third parties based 
on its regional cooperation with other regions (EUR-Lex, 2010:1), such as Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 443/92, of 25 February 1992, on financial and technical 
assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America (Europa, 1992:1). The EU’s inter-regional cooperation policy consists 
of economic development policy as a main dimension of policy and politico-security 
policy as a complementary dimension of policy between the EU and its external 
partners, especially ASEAN. 
The brief mechanism of the development of the EU’s inter-regional cooperation 
policy towards a third country or regional organization (EUR-Lex, 2010:1) begins 
with the Commission initiating and composing a communication paper on regional 
cooperation toward a third party. The Commission proposes the communication 
paper to the Council so that it can be scrutinized and negotiated. The Council 
discusses and negotiates internally to achieve the EU’s common position on the 
communication paper for a third party. The Commission, in consultation with the 
Council, discusses with a third party to conclude the communication paper.     
Furthermore, the EU’s inter-regional cooperation decision-making is based on a 
consensus or a compromise, at the Council, amongst the EU member states. 
According to Articles 181, 181 and 300 in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC), the Council employs a qualified majority on a proposed 
agreement from the Commission. The unanimity is needed by the Council, if the 
proposed agreement comprises elements which need to be ratified by internal 
regulations within the Community. The agreement is concluded by the Council after 
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consultation with the European Parliament (Official Journal of the European 
Communities, 2002:110-111). The involvement of the European Parliament remains 
limited in EU inter-regional policy making. The Commission implements the EU 
communication paper in consultation with and monitored by the Council and the 
European Parliament (EUR-Lex, 2010:1).  
 
3.2.2. The EU’s Trade Policy for ASEAN 
The EU’s policy on the creation of an ASEAN-EU FTA is a concrete example 
of the EU’s trade policy. The EU trade policy involved many actors amongst the 
EU’s institutions and its member states. Young (2004:204) argued that: “The EU’s 
institutions can decide whether the member states can join international negotiations 
or they can take an option to join unilaterally”. The important actors in making EU 
trade policy are the Commission; Article 133 Committee9; COREPER; and the 
Council.  
The Commission is an EU executive body especially for the first pillar of the 
EU. The Commission’s role is to create trade proposals; negotiate with other parties; 
and coordinate the actions of the EU and its member states (Eurofic, 2010:1).  Under 
Article 133 (European Commission, 2001a:1) the Council appoints a Committee to 
cooperate with the Commission in the development of the EU’s trade policy. Article 
133 Committee consists of the Commission and representatives of the EU member 
states. It is led by the member state which holds the EU presidency. It coordinates 
relevant parties to create EU trade policy. It is a decision-making centre for the 
Community’s commercial policy. It elaborates related trade issues such as Doha 
Development Rounds; FTA/Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations 
process between EU and other regions; market access instruments for export and 
import; and all trade elements.   
The Committee of Permanent Representative (COREPER) (European Union, 
2010a:1) has responsibility for preparing the Council’s assignments and works. 
Within the EU, it has an important role as a focal point in the decision-making 
system. COREPER has two roles as a forum for discussion and an instrument of 
political control of the EU member states. It has important roles such as setting up 
                                                 
9 It has changed its name to the Trade Policy Committee (Council of the EU, 2011a:1). 
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agendas of the Council meetings and taking responsibility for procedural and 
technical issues. It is led by the Presidency of the Council which coordinates around 
250 committees and related institutions. It is composed of the chief and deputy chief 
of the permanent missions of EU member states. COREPER divides into two 
Committees based on two main issues. All deputy chiefs of permanent missions sit 
on COREPER I which are responsible for technical issues. COREPER II consists of 
chiefs of permanent missions are responsible for political, economic and commercial 
issues.        
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Council of Ministers was the highest decision 
making institution in the EU (Council of the EU, 2008:6). The power of decision-
making resides with the Council. The Council consists of EU member states which 
are responsible for making trade policy. It coordinates with the European Parliament 
to legislate EU trade policy towards ASEAN. It concludes trade policy by qualified 
majority decisions.  
The European Parliament’s role is to make decisions for legislative assignments 
(Eurofic, 2010:1). Before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Parliament had little authority and competence in EU trade policy. It had limited 
power to control the process of making trade policy.  
According to Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, “The Community may 
conclude with one or more states or international organizations agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common 
action and special procedures” (European Commission, 1957:78). The further 
progress of EU integration created a common mandate for the Community to 
represent EU member states and to negotiate with other parties in the trade of goods. 
The Community should share its competence with EU member states for new issues 
of trade such as services and Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs). Article 133 of the TEC is a basic foundation for trade policy within the EU 
and for the EU’s negotiations with third parties. 
The EU trade policy-making mechanism (Nugent, 1999:388 and Holland, 
2002:141) begins when the Commission creates a proposal for trade policy. The 
Commission makes its proposal to the Article 133 Committee and, then, it is 
discussed by the Committee and Commission. Next, the Committee sends the 
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proposal to COREPER to be discussed and negotiated by EU permanent 
representatives. COREPER gives its assessment to the Council of Ministers which 
discusses, finalizes and decides a negotiating mandate for the Commission. The 
Commission (in consultation with the Article 133 Committee) brings its negotiating 
mandate to the table and negotiates with a third party (ASEAN) to establish a FTA. 
Finally, through qualified majority voting, the Council takes the final decision in 
terms of adopting, pending or cancelling an economic agreement between the EU 
and a third party (EUR-Lex, 2006:104). Generally but not always, most crucial 
external trade agreements are adopted with unanimity in their practical application 
(Bomberg et al, 2008:209). It demonstrates that the EU member states have an 
influence in the decision-making process of the EU’s trade policy. However, the EU 
member states share their power and competence with the Commission. The Council 
consults the European Parliament only with regard to developing the EU trade 
policy. Before the Lisbon Treaty, it has no significant power to veto final trade 
policy.  
The making of the EU’s trade policy towards ASEAN involves related actors 
such as business groups and NGOs. The Commission consults in this way in order to 
gain input and understand the aspirations of non-state actors. Scholars have shown 
that the EU’s external policies on economic issues were influenced more by business 
groups than by NGOs, for example, the domination of business interests in the EU 
(Bouwen, 2009:28); the knowledge and experience of business groups regarding 
trade barriers (Woll, 2009:293); and other related trade and investment affairs. The 
business groups have the power to influence the Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament on the process of the EU economic policies. Coxall (2001:58) 
argued that, at the EU level, business groups were one of the most effective lobbyist 
organizations. NGOs enjoy, also, opportunities to lobby EU member states and EU 
institutions to accommodate their interests on human rights; development; trade; and 
environmental issues. However, so far, NGOs have had a limited effect on the final 
results of EU trade policy because of their high ambition; an overstatement of their 
campaign; and minimum public support for their EU trade policy (Dür and De 
Bièvre, 2007:97-98).  
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Bale argued that, sometimes in the initial stages, the Commission depended on 
pressure groups to provide suggestions and comments on policy initiatives. The 
reason why the Commission involved interest groups is because it does not have 
many staff to deal with extensive works and various responsibilities (Bale, 2008: 
264). Bale (Ibid) and Coxall (2001:47-48) argued that interest groups could influence 
EU policy by approaching EU institutions, the Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament either through direct lobby or through a coalition lobby with a 
Euro-group.  
Regarding the representation of a Euro-group at the European level, Richardson 
and Mazey (2001:76) stated that: “Most significant interests in Europe have by now 
formed a Euro-association, no doubt partly reflecting the fact that there are few areas 
of public policy still unaffected by European legislation of various types”. I argue 
that, at the consultative stage, the EU institutions have accommodated aspirations 
from interest groups because this is a way for the EU institutions to gain legitimacy 
of non-state actors. To some extent, the EU institutions preserve symmetric interests 
among non-state actors in the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN.     
  
3.2.3. The EU’s CFSP with respect to ASEAN 
The development of the EU’s policy towards the EU and ASEAN monitoring 
mission in Aceh was based on the CFSP. The EU created the CFSP after the 
Maastricht Treaty was ratified in 1992. This section explains the relevant actors and 
how they interact in the institutional arrangement of the development of the EU’s 
policy on CFSP.  
The relevant actors, involved in the CFSP policy-making process, are as 
follows: firstly, EU member states are the most important actors in the CFSP pillar. 
They initiate proposals for CFSP. Secondly, the Commission can propose actions 
together with the EU member states. This collaboration aims to ensure consistency of 
direction between the European Community and the CFSP pillars. The Commission 
can make an initiative with the EU member states for CFSP actions; however, it does 
not have a right to vote. Through the Council, the EU member states have special 
power to decide CFSP policy. The majority of the CFSP actions have reflected the 
policies of the Presidency of the EU. The EU presidency constitutes a focal point in 
articulating and representing the EU when it communicates with outsiders. It has to 
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play a crucial role in policy making, in the CFSP pillar, by brokering compromises 
between member states (Smith, 2004:108-109). After the ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the EU created a new post of High Representative for the 
CFSP. This post had special tasks to assist the formulation; the preparation; and the 
implementation of CFSP. The aim was to establish a representative person of the EU 
who could discuss CFSP with a third party. Javier Solana, appointed by the EU in 
1999, was the first High Representative for the CFSP (Europa, 2011a:1). 
In June 1999, the European Council held a meeting in Cologne where it agreed 
to form military competence and to create the decision-making institutions 
(European Commission, 2011c:1). In December 1999, the Helsinki European 
Council created significant objectives. These objectives were, firstly, that the EU 
would be able to deploy its military forces within 60 days with a total number of 
50,000–60,000 troops. Secondly, in third countries, the EU could deploy a civilian 
mission such as police mission, judge and prison officials (Council of the EU, 
1999:2-3). In December 2000, the European Council held a meeting in Nice which 
agreed to the establishment of the organizational structure and bodies within the 
Council of Ministers in order to deal with European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) (Council of the EU, 2000: Annex VI). The ESDP is an operational part of 
the CFSP.       
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP’s aims are:  
To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence 
and integrity of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union; to 
preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote 
international cooperation, and to develop and consolidate democracy and 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(Council of the EU, 2008:36). 
 
With regard to the institutional arrangement in the development of the EU’s 
policy on CFSP, the intergovernmental mechanism remains the dominant decision-
making model. Where they have similar interests, the European Council agrees, by 
unanimity amongst the EU member states and the President of the Commission, to 
make common principles and guidelines for CFSP and ESDP. Common principles 
and guidelines cover the EU’s aims and instruments in handling security and defence 
affairs (Council of the EU, 2008:38).  
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The Council of Ministers executes common principles and guidelines by 
selecting a mode of agreement such as Joint Actions or Common Positions. It can 
reach agreement through unanimity or qualified majority voting. The Council’s final 
decisions are based on consensus-building and collective problem-solving. The final 
decisions and declarations are released by the Presidency and the High 
Representative for the CFSP. Joint Actions aim to implement operational actions 
which the EU takes in conflict areas such as Aceh. Common positions refer to the 
EU’s position on specific issues based on themes (human rights and counter-
terrorism) and geographical areas (the Middle East and Asia) (Smith, 2008:50-51 and 
Council of the EU, 2008:39).     
As mentioned in the amended Title V (Article 23) of the Maastricht Treaty 
(EUR-Lex, 2006:19), an EU member state may oppose qualified majority voting, if 
its national interests will be violated. Qualified majority voting is not used if the final 
decision has military effects and implications. An EU member state may use 
constructive abstention in the decision-making without blocking the final decision. 
However, without any actions for against it, an EU member state should support the 
final decision of the Council (Europa, 2011a:1).   
The Presidency of the Council rotates every six months within the EU member 
states. It deals with the CFSP matters and represents the EU’s policy in the 
international arena. It is assisted by the CFSP High Representative who deals with 
the formulation; preparation; and implementation of the EU’s final decisions 
(Council of the EU, 2008:38). The High Representative cooperates with other related 
actors in order to assist the formulation and the implementation of EU policy. These 
related actors who come from inside and outside the EU are able to influence 
relevant actors in the development of this EU policy. These related actors are the 
Commission and non-state actors (eg. Ahtisaari and the CMI).    
Overall, the EU has various institutional arrangements with the involvement of 
relevant and related actors, based on policy areas and objectives; for example, its 
policies toward ASEAN. The relevant actors, in the development of the EU policies, 
were the Commission and the Council of Ministers/EU member states because of 
their competence to take initiatives and decisions on EU policies. Additionally, the 
High Representative assisted the Council in the preparation and implementation of 
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the ESDP in Aceh.  In this regard, the related actors were the European Parliament 
and non-state actors who shaped the development of EU policies without any 
competence to decide them.   
 
3.3.  The Promotion of Interests or Values in the EU’s Policy Development 
towards ASEAN 
 
I would like to give a definition of the interests and common values of EU’s 
member states and the Commission in order to help the reader make a clear 
distinction between them. The interests of the EU member states and the 
Commission are the policy aims and principles of these actors, within the EU in the 
global political and economic system, which want to use its external policy to 
achieve those aims. Peterson and Shackleton (2002:12) argued that the main function 
of the EU’s institutions was to integrate the EU member states’ political interests. 
Landau and Whitman (1997:7-8) argued that, although there were failures amongst 
the member states to reach common interests on several crucial issues, the 
Commission had done well in its role as an initiator and mediator in achieving 
common interests within the EU.   
Lucarelli and Manners (2006:10) defined “values as notions laden with an 
absolute positive significance for the overall order and meaning we try to give to our 
world”. I argue that, collectively, values such as the principle of democracy; 
individual rights; and economic freedom make up a general understanding which, in 
some parts of the world, has a significant impact on community life and culture. 
These values inspired the EU and were translated into its policy foundations and 
decisions. Title I - article 2 and 3 of the Maastricht Treaty clearly states that: “The 
Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. […] The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the 
well-being of its peoples” (European Union, 2010b:17).  
 I defined interest and value as follows:  
 
*.  Interest is more associated with the causal material factor. Examples are 
something of obvious benefit to the EU member states and for the EU’s interests 
like politico-security and economic interests. 
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*. Whereas value is a more causal factor associated with non material. Common EU 
values can be seen in the promotion of human rights; the expansion of a liberal 
market economy; the promotion of democracy; and the rule of law. 
Inter-regionalism can be explained by assessing the promotion of interests, 
values and/or the combination of both in the development of a regional 
organization’s policy. The promotion of interests or common EU values is the second 
factor which needs to be considered in analyzing the development of the EU’s policy 
towards ASEAN. Greenwood (2003:2) argued that EU policy-making was 
influenced by the interests of both member states and the institutions within the EU 
itself, for instance: when member states determined EU policy-making and 
integration. Moravcsik (1998:26) argued that economic political interests defined the 
formulation of EU policy. Howorth (2007:91) added that the EU security policy 
reflected the politico-security ambitions of EU member states. Acharya and Johnston 
(2007:17) added that institutions, established by liberal states, demonstrated 
particular values in their actions such as the promotion of democracy; the 
appreciation of human rights; and the use of humanitarian intervention.  
 I argue that the EU’s main objective is to promote its interests, its common 
values and/or a combination of them which were formed into the EU’s policy 
towards ASEAN. In the case of the relationship between the EU and ASEAN, it 
would be expected that interests, values and/or the combination both of them would 
be shown in different EU policy areas towards ASEAN. It is necessary to understand 
the nature of different EU policy areas in order to identify the interests or values 
which drive each particular EU policy.  
The promotion of the EU’s interests or values was shaped by the institutional 
arrangements and relevant actors involved in the development of the EU’s policy 
towards ASEAN. The institutional arrangements and relevant actors were linked to 
the promotion of interests or values which were translated into the EU’s policy 
towards ASEAN. The promotion of interests or values can be seen by considering a 
regional organization’s different policies based on different areas/pillars and the 
diversity and involvement of relevant actors. Börzel and Risse (2004:2-3 and 15) 
argued that, in the system of the EU’s governance, both the decision-making process 
and the implementation of democracy promotion involved cross pillars and various 
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actors. Their work focused on promoting democracy which included human rights; 
the rule of law; and good governance towards mainly ACP states and, in the 1990s, 
in the East European countries; the New Independent States; and the Mediterranean 
countries. It is a crucial fact that the development of a regional organization’s policy 
towards other regions is linked closely to the promotion of the relevant actors’ 
interests or values.   
Relevant actors shape and determine the process of developing the EU’s policy 
in order to promote their interests. The EU’s political, security and economic 
interests came originally from the EU member states or the EU’s institutions. Within 
the different areas of policy development, these interests can be understood by 
considering the interaction of competing interests and the distribution of authority.  
Therefore, outcomes are achieved through compromise or consensus between 
interests (McCormick, 2008:109-110). Their interests are reflected in the EU’s inter-
regional policy towards ASEAN.     
Common EU values can be seen in its treaties’ principles which have been 
agreed by the EU member states. The EU has influenced, in a general way, other 
regions through the promotion of its values. The aim of an EU action is to influence 
other regions by adopting its own values. Manners (2002:252) argued that the EU 
could be seen as a normative power which, in the world system, spread and shared its 
principles and norms. He identified peace and liberty; democracy; human rights; rule 
of law; and good governance as the EU’s core principles and norms (Ibid, p.243). In 
the EU, the relevant actors are guardians of the promotion of the common EU values 
to other regions such as ASEAN. These relevant actors would like to incorporate 
their common EU values within the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. For example, the 
European Security Strategy mentions clearly that the EU is more secure, if the world 
applies the principle of democracy. The way for the EU to create a safer world and to 
strengthen global governance is through, as its essential elements, the promotion of 
democracy; good governance; and human rights. The strength and effectiveness of 
the EU’s external partners (such as ASEAN, Mercosur and the Andean Community) 
shape the global governance (Council of the EU, 2003a:9-10). Since 1999, the EU 
has paid more attention to promoting its common values to the East European 
countries; the New Independent States; and the Mediterranean countries with various 
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policy instruments, such as political dialogue, association and stability agreements 
and capacity building regarding the issues of democracy and human rights (Börzel 
and Risse, 2004:26-28). The EU emphasizes that its common values are included in 
its inter-regional cooperation policy with South-East Asia (European Commission, 
2003a:14-16). 
Interestingly, the promotion of values can be seen as a two-edged sword. On 
the one hand, it is rational that the EU wishes to share its values with other regions in 
order to achieve better understanding with its external partners. On the other hand, 
the external partners are unlikely to accept these common EU values if they are 
imposed on the inter-regional relationship. The different values between the EU and 
its external partners are crucial matter to be considered and understood by both 
parties if the negative effects to their cooperation are to be avoided.   
The inter-regional relationship is shaped and influenced by the model of 
agreement and, also, by ASEAN’s reception to the EU’s policy. The EU may alter its 
position on interests and values in order to engage with other countries/regions in the 
interdependent world (Wissenbach, 2009:1). In creating and building inter-regional 
policy towards ASEAN, the EU should promote its interests or values carefully. I 
consider each of the EU’s policies toward ASEAN which were linked to the 
promotion of interests, common EU values and/or a mixture of both of them.  
 
3.4. Different Modes of Engagement between the EU and ASEAN: 
Consultation, Negotiation and Monitoring  
 
The development of the EU’s policies towards ASEAN changed over time as 
its mode of engagement with ASEAN varied between consultation, monitoring and 
negotiation. In the development of the EU’s external policy, it is crucial to include 
the external partner affected by the EU’s policy. We need to incorporate the process 
and dynamism of the development of the EU’s policy and its external partner’s 
aspirations in an interactive process of consultation or negotiation. There are two 
reasons to support this perspective which are: firstly, the EU needs, in the process of 
its policy development, to translate, assess and link its external partner’s aspirations 
to its main objectives. Secondly, the EU and its external partner would exchange and 
discuss their aspirations in a process of interaction which might shape the outcomes 
of the EU’s policy development.  
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With regard to inter-regional cooperation, I define that mode of engagement as 
a channel of interaction implemented by one regional organization towards another 
regional organization. A regional organization’s aim, in applying various modes of 
engagement towards other regions, is to share their interests and values; to resolve 
their differences; and to attain their common objectives. Therefore, these two regions 
can manage, through adjustment of their modes of engagement based on their need 
and consent, specific issues such as political and economic challenges which arise 
within the broader context in which they operate. I propose that the principal modes 
of engagement are consultation; negotiation; and monitoring. The process of 
developing EU policy was influenced by its external partner’s aspirations (eg. 
ASEAN) which were advocated via different modes of interaction.  
 I give definitions of consultation; negotiation; and monitoring in the political 
process in order to make a clear distinction amongst these different types of 
interaction. UN (1992:10) explained that, by using exchange of views, consultation 
was a process of settlement of disputes between two parties. Hu (2009:8) added that, 
in order to manage conflict between two parties, consensus was achieved by both 
parties before any official decision was ratified. I argue that, in the context of 
international cooperation, consultation between the EU and ASEAN can be 
categorized as one means of communication. Consultation can be seen as a process 
of discussion between two regional organizations in order to achieve a consensus and 
understanding in the pursuit of their mutual interests and common objectives on 
political, economic and other dimensions of cooperation. These organizations solve 
their problems or differences based on a consensus method. For example, the EU 
consulted ASEAN countries about its role, as a monitoring agency, in monitoring a 
peace agreement between GoI and FAM. The EU and ASEAN countries exchanged 
views and aspirations in terms of incorporating them into the development of the 
EU’s policy on CFSP.  
 
Manzur (2010:5) argued that: 
 
International negotiation is an interactive process serving as 
an instrument to prevent or end conflicts of interest, as well as to solve 
controversy. It may also serve as a means to achieve common 
objectives or agreements among individuals or groups (parties) in relation 
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to a specific object, material or immaterial, within a framework of pre-
established rules, known and accepted by the parties involved.  
 
Druckman (2007:112) explained that there were many kinds of international 
negotiation, e.g. peace negotiations and inter-regional trade negotiations. 
International negotiation consists of exchanging communications between two or 
more parties in a bilateral, trilateral or multilateral framework. It discusses important 
issues which impact on a national, regional or international situation. In the 
negotiation process, these parties use an offer-counter offer bargaining method 
(Avenhaus and Zartman, 2007:9). Hoekman and Vines (2007:317) argued that trade 
negotiations might pursue integrative bargaining which sought mutual gain between 
both parties. 
 I argue that the international negotiation between the EU and ASEAN is a 
process of interactive-bargaining between both parties in order to reach collective 
agreements (the best outcome for each side) on the various aspects of cooperation 
such as political, economic and socio-cultural aspects. The EU and ASEAN should 
agree to the framework of cooperation based on rules and regulations accepted by 
both parties. The negotiation between the two regions can reach a compromise for 
final outcomes amongst them. For example, the EU and ASEAN held several 
negotiations between 2007 and 2009 in order to establish an ASEAN-EU FTA.  
With regard to monitoring, Boulden (2000:1) argued that monitoring could be 
divided into the following two areas: 
1. monitoring, which can be either highly generalized or highly directed 
actions to gather information, and  
2. verification, the process by which compliance of the parties to the 
terms of accords is judged.  
 
Ouellet (2003:1) argued that monitoring was an important part of the ability to 
enforce an agreement. Ouellet (Ibid) continues by adding that monitoring could be 
divided into the following three levels of involvement:  
• At the lowest level, observation, we have pure passive watching and 
inspection. At this level, monitors lack the mandate to judge the 
actions of the parties being monitored; they simply observe what is 
going on.  
• As involvement increases, monitors will begin to judge, to verify 
compliance with the treaty. In this situation, parties may not only 
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observe actions in relation to the agreement, but also judge and report 
violations. This is verification.  
• The last level, one that Boulden does not refer to, is enforcement. At 
this level, monitoring of an agreement involves not merely observing 
and compliance with the treaty, but also enforcing of the agreement 
through positive and negative incentives.  
I wish to give my definition of monitoring which is a process of an institution’s 
competence and capacity to oversee the agreement. In the case of the EU and 
ASEAN about the AMM, the EU and ASEAN monitored jointly the implementation 
of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between GoI and FAM. They established 
the AMM whose main role was as a monitoring institution in the two levels of 
involvement: verification; and enforcement. In order to be watchful on all the peace 
agreement’s points and procedures, the AMM focused its works on verification and 
enforcement of a peace agreement between conflicting parties. It monitored the 
decommissioning and redeployment of troops between GoI and FAM. Subsequently, 
it monitored the implementation of aspects of MoU which related to amnesty; 
reintegration; and human rights (Council of the EU, 2005a:13-16). 
How is the mode of engagement relevant to the development of inter-
regionalism? Inter-regionalism cannot be agreed and developed by both regions, if 
there is no mutual interaction between them. The process of interaction between two 
regions can give us a comprehensive picture of a regional organization’s 
development of policy. The interaction between two regional organizations can 
explain the process of sharing and exchanging information between them in order to 
formulate a mutual policy and to strengthen their cooperation.  
In their process of interaction, a regional organization selects and employs 
various modes of engagement such as consultation; negotiation; and monitoring with 
another regional organization. These modes of engagement are the political and 
diplomatic ways by which a regional organization communicates its objectives and 
absorbs aspirations from another regional organization. A regional organization can 
understand and accommodate the aspirations of another regional organization in 
terms of developing its inter-regional policy. This situation leads to effective 
cooperation between two regional organizations. Therefore, the mode of engagement 
contributes to the development of inter-regionalism. 
 66 
In practice, the EU applied, usually, a consultation mechanism as its mode of 
engagement with ASEAN. Both regions used this mechanism as a model to 
communicate and share their aspirations for cooperation. However, in the last several 
years, there was a change in the way in which they engaged. The EU employed not 
only a consultation mechanism but, also, it applied monitoring and negotiation 
mechanisms in engaging with ASEAN. Commission official A argued that: “It is true 
there has been a shift in policy that was mainly consultation. We were talking about 
many things but basically just talking. It is true that we recognize consultation is 
good. Then, it changes to something more concrete, which is negotiation”.10  
Commission official C added a monitoring mechanism as another mode of 
engagement by saying that: “The other thing that I want to mention is an innovative 
monitoring approach. Monitoring usually means stay out of the process. We thought 
that this is okay but may be it is not enough. Therefore, the Head of AMM proposed 
a concept a bit more proactive”.11 
Through the empirical analysis in Chapters 4 to 6, I connect the development of 
the EU’s inter-regional policy to various modes of engagement. These various modes 
of engagement are consultation; monitoring; and negotiation. The EU deploys these 
various modes of engagement in a process of interpreting and incorporating the 
aspirations and objectives of its external partners in a way which is compatible with 
its aims. ASEAN does similarly. Studying the deployment of these modes of 
engagement produces a richer and more various understanding of the interaction of 
two regions.             
 
3.5.  The Level of Integration within the External Partner 
The development of the EU’s policy is expected to be influenced by the level of 
integration of its external partner. I define the external partner’s level of integration 
as a stage of regional integration which was achieved by the EU’s external partner in 
the context of their cohesiveness and coherence of political, economic and socio-
cultural integration. I propose, within regional organizations and in order to make 
clear distinctions between them and to understand their stage of regional integration, 
                                                 
10Interview with official A, the European Commission, Brussels, 21 March 2011. 
11Interview with official C, the Commission, Brussels, 31 March 2011. 
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a typology of the level of integration based on their developments of regional 
integration.  
 I developed a typology for the level of integration in a regional organization 
which could be identified as being of three main types: namely, a loose regional 
inter-governmental cooperation; a solid regional inter-governmental cooperation; and 
a deeper regional integration. The first type, a loose regional inter-governmental 
cooperation, is a weak type of integration level. This type of integration is a very 
basic level of integration which is only a meeting forum for its member states with 
the lowest level of coordination in selected areas such as trade and investment 
cooperation. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; ACP states; 
and NAFTA are examples of a loose regional inter-governmental cooperation.  
The solid regional intergovernmental cooperation is a soft regionalism which 
has a medium level of integration with main pillars of integration in various elements 
of cooperation such as political and security, economic and socio-cultural. This type 
of integration level employs still an inter-governmental framework in their 
cooperation. ASEAN is an example of a solid regional intergovernmental 
cooperation. 
Lastly, the deeper regional integration is the third type of integration level 
which has deeper regional integration at the political, economic and socio-cultural 
levels. This type of integration level is the pooling of member states’ sovereignty and 
establishing supranational institutions at the regional level. The EU is an example of 
a deeper regional integration project.     
In the case of the relationship between the EU and ASEAN, there are different 
levels of integration. The level of the EU’s regional integration is deep. However, the 
level of ASEAN’s integration is a solid regional inter-governmental cooperation. 
They have different perspectives on understanding the aspirations of their external 
partner. The EU has practices, institutionalized standards and common governance 
system which were employed within its regional framework. The EU promoted a 
regional integration model as its policy (Farrell, 2007:300) in order to share its 
standards and regulations when it establishes cooperation agreements with other 
regions. The EU improves its inter-regional relationship with other regions when 
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these regions follow its requirement in improving their intra-regional institutional 
identity (Aggarwal and Forgaty, 2004:236).  
However, ASEAN furthers its integration because it responds to political and 
economic challenges in the South-East Asia region, for example: the economic 
development within ASEAN countries; and the preservation of security and the 
improvement of economic activities in the region. Comparatively, the EU has 
developed into a supranational organization with strong institutions and solid power. 
The EU has evolved and developed by pooling sovereignty amongst the EU member 
states. However, compared to the EU, ASEAN has had a different aim of regional 
integration. ASEAN countries do not pool their sovereignty. ASEAN is not a 
supranational organization but rather it is an inter-governmental organization. In 
terms of developing its regional integration, ASEAN regional integration has taken a 
different path than that of the EU. ASEAN has incorporated a soft regional 
integration: there is no supra-national body but they seek to harmonize policies inter-
governmentally. It preserves a consensus based decision-making system and, to some 
extent, observes the national sovereignties of its members. The EU regional 
experience may become an inspiration for ASEAN rather than a requirement of their 
relationship. 
From the explanation above, an important difference between the EU and 
ASEAN is their level of integration. Since 1992, the EU has had a progressive 
regional integration in terms of the creation of supranational institutions and power 
distribution among relevant actors. The EU has moved to a coherent and cohesive 
regional organization because all EU member states have taken the decision, in terms 
of political, security, economy and socio-cultural policy, to strengthen its 
organization and deepen its regional integration. Compared to ASEAN, the EU has a 
deeper regional integration.  
However, ASEAN has continued to struggle with its regional integration which 
can be divided into two periods of time, namely, before and after 2003. Before 2003, 
the EU considered that level of integration within ASEAN was quite low because, as 
a preliminary stage of regional economic integration, ASEAN focused on its free 
trade area. ASEAN aimed to eliminate tariff barriers and to establish a regional 
market within South-East Asia (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002a:1). Balassa (1961:1-3) 
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and Cuyvers (2002:1-2) argued that there were four stages of regional economic 
integration which were as follows: the first stage was the creation of a free trade area 
within the region. The second stage was the establishment of a customs union which 
led to a common external tariff for non-members of the regional organization. All 
member states of a regional organization would act together for an international trade 
agreement towards non members of the regional organization. The third stage was 
the creation of a common market which was more progressive when compared to a 
customs union. A common market eliminated all trade obstacles to a free flow of 
labour and funds. The fourth stage was the creation of an economic union which 
united economic policies and institutions within a regional organization’s member 
states.   
After 2003, ASEAN consolidated its efforts at regional integration which I 
refer to as the ASEAN’s developmental transformation. In 2003, ASEAN countries 
committed to integrate themselves through the development of the ASEAN 
Community in 2015. The ASEAN’s developmental transformation was considered as 
ASEAN’s transformation from a loose to a solid regional inter-governmental 
cooperation. It focused on internal developments within ASEAN. These ASEAN 
internal developments were as follows:  
(1) The creation and realization of the ASEAN Community as grounds for ASEAN’s 
regional integration. ASEAN attempted to reduce the disparities in development 
among its countries. 
(2) The formulation and ratification of the ASEAN Charter as a legal foundation for 
ASEAN.  
Therefore, the EU recognized that ASEAN was continuing to develop its own 
regional integration. In order to meet the EU’s objectives, the EU tended to support 
ASEAN regional integration and to improve the level of standard and capability of 
ASEAN. 
After 2003, ASEAN began to develop its regional political and security 
integration. Also, at that time, the level of ASEAN’s political-security integration 
was low. The level of political and security integration took two forms: the strong 
and the weak politically; and security integration. The strong form of political 
integration was related to “the constitution of new political entities which have a 
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certain degree of independence in regard to individual states” (CRIS, 2010:1). The 
weaker form of political integration was related to “co-operation between states and 
formations of state-based regimes” (Ibid).  
Political and security integration had implications for harmonizing a regional 
organization’s political structure and for improving the capacity of the decision-
making system (particularly the politico-security policies). The normative aspect of 
political and security integration was the creation of a political community (CRIS, 
2010:1). In this thesis, the strong form of political integration is related to deeper 
regional integration. The weaker form of political integration is associated with solid 
regional inter-governmental cooperation.  
The different levels of integration between the EU and ASEAN created 
different perspectives and ambitions between both parties. The EU had a high 
expectation of progressive inter-regional cooperation with ASEAN. The EU had 
different level of expectation and standard for its cooperation with ASEAN. The 
different level of integration reflected the degree of the regional organization’s 
coherence and cohesiveness in terms of institutional frameworks and distribution of 
power. Compared to ASEAN, the EU has a strong and solid institutional framework 
and distribution of power. However, ASEAN has a soft institutional framework and 
is a less powerful organization because its member countries have limited its 
institutional framework and power. These situations influenced the process of the 
development of the EU’s policy and interaction between the two regions. For 
example, for a FTA the EU and ASEAN had different level of ambitions and 
capabilities. They had different expectations regarding the structure of their 
agreement; the sectors to be covered; and the rules and regulations within an 
ASEAN-EU FTA.   
The EU has taken this different level of integration as another factor in 
explaining its interaction with ASEAN. Commission official A stated that: “There 
may be another element to take into consideration which explains the interaction 
between these two regions; namely the level of integration within each region. How 
this has been evolving with regard to the institutions concerned is illustrated in our 
history of integration based on institutions”.12       
                                                 
12 Interview with official A, the Commission, Jakarta, 4 August 2010.  
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The relevance of the level of integration to inter-regionalism can be understood 
by considering the development of the EU’s policy. An inter-regional relationship 
can work effectively within two regions, if, between the two regions, there are 
similar understandings and views on various elements of cooperation. The inter-
regional relationship is affected by the external partner’s level of integration. 
Especially in the process of policy development, a regional organization’s policy 
makers may take into account its external partner’s level of integration. Commission 
official A argued that:  
 
This [level of integration] also has an impact on the two regions that are 
interacting. In ASEAN the same thing applies, there is development in the 
integration and institutionalization even though much less than in the EU. 
For example, the new ASEAN Charter and […] the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (CPR) are the developments on the ASEAN 
side. There is an idea about a single community in 2015 that will be a 
single rules based and an AFTA.13  
 
Council official A added that the level of integration within ASEAN was important, 
when the EU began to formulate its policy towards ASEAN.14  
Overall, within the framework of inter-regional cooperation, the external 
partner’s level of integration is a relevant factor to be considered by a regional 
organization in achieving common agreement with its external partner. Especially 
when it develops its policies towards ASEAN, the EU may take the level of 
ASEAN’s integration into account in terms of reaching the lowest common 
understanding between both regions. The level of regional integration of the EU’s 
external partner matters in the EU’s development of policy.  
 
3.6.  External Pressures and Opportunities in the EU’s Policy Development 
towards ASEAN 
 
The external pressures and opportunities influenced the making of the EU’s 
policy towards ASEAN. According to Bretherton and Volger (2006:24), the 
opportunities refer to the external events which contribute to EU action. The EU 
institutions and its member states might use the external situations and external 
actors to shape EU policy (Smith, 2006: 393-394). I argue that, in defining the 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Interview with official A, the Council of the EU, Brussels, 30 March 2011.  
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external pressures and opportunities, various factors from ASEAN and outside the 
EU had significant and direct effects on the process of its policy-making. Both 
external pressures and opportunities together influence and stimulate directly or 
indirectly the internal and external factors to interact when the EU develops its policy 
toward ASEAN.  
The relevance of external pressures and opportunities and inter-regionalism can 
be seen, in the globalized world, from the relationship between political and 
economic interdependence and inter-regional cooperation. Globalization has 
encouraged nation states, international organizations, regional organizations and non-
state actors to work together in tackling common challenges such as economic 
interdependencies; terrorism; and environmental protection. It has increased amongst 
actors the level of competition and interdependence. 
The interdependence of the world has stimulated the mutual need of the EU and 
ASEAN to build a closer relationship. Burchill (2009:68) argued that the period of 
the independent and self-sufficient state was over. There is an economic 
interdependence amongst international actors which motivate them to co-operate 
with each other in the international system in order to gain advantages and avoid 
disadvantages. Jackson and Sørensen (2007:107) added that this situation reflected a 
co-operative world of international relations. Rosecrance (1985:24-31) and Burchill 
(2009:68) argued that, rather than military competition, trade and investment 
cooperation could be one alternative way to provide incentives to international 
actors. 
I argue that, in inter-regional cooperation, the regional organization calculates 
that the geo-political situation and external political economy are significant 
elements. Inter-regional cooperation is an alternative means of international 
relationship between regional organizations in order to improve their benefits and 
include them in rapid developments within the global economy. These elements 
explain how external pressures and opportunities are linked to the policy 
development of a regional organization such as the EU.  
Taking into consideration external factors, I identified external pressures and 
opportunities which influenced the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. The external 
pressures and opportunities can be divided into two general elements of inter-
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regional cooperation: the geo-political situation; and the external political economy. 
These elements may have a significant effect on inter-regional ties.  
In inter-regional cooperation, the geo-political situation is a crucial element. 
The preservation of peace and stability, in the South-East Asia region, is an 
important political and security issue for both the EU and ASEAN. The EU 
understands that, in Aceh, peace would contribute significantly to safety and stability 
within the region. In the case of Aceh, the external opportunities for the EU were the 
willingness and readiness of GoI and FAM to resolve the conflict in a peaceful way 
and the absence of the UN as monitors. However, the external concerns, on the part 
of GoI with regard to the EU and ASEAN monitoring mission, were the 
internationalization of the Aceh issue and the international interference in Indonesian 
domestic affairs. In order to monitor the peace agreement in Aceh, the EU offered a 
different security approach to Indonesia and ASEAN. The EU and ASEAN applied 
their civilian mission in Aceh. This situation created a new geo-strategic position for 
the EU which was involved in South-East Asia. Consequently, in the wider context 
of the Asian region, the EU included ASEAN and Indonesia amongst its geo-
strategic priorities (European Commission, 2003a:12). According to Commission 
official B, “Indonesia will now become a strategic partner. All of that is based on that 
strategic approach and also based on the big success in Aceh, it was a very big 
success for us and we saw that it was a success for all of us. The EU was to be 
involved in that”.15 
 The external political economy element consisted of external pressures and 
opportunities which influenced the development of the EU’s policy. They were 
related to economic and trade matters which were overshadowed by political issues 
such as, firstly, the emergence of bilateral and regional trade initiatives in the South-
East Asia region because of the USA’s greater involvement; and the rise of China in 
the region. Secondly, the external pressure and opportunity for the EU namely the 
creation of a FTA with ASEAN, resulted in the failure of multilateral trading 
negotiations under the Doha Development Round at the WTO; ASEAN’s significant 
role in the East Asia region; and the inclusion of Myanmar into ASEAN and EU free 
trade negotiations. 
                                                 
15 Interview with official B, the Commission, Brussels, 25 March 2011. 
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The emergence of bilateral and regional trade initiatives, in the South-East Asia 
region, strengthened economic co-operations between ASEAN and its crucial 
external partners. This situation was caused by the USA’s greater involvement and 
the rise of China in the region. In order to anticipate the rapid development of the 
South-East Asia economy, the EU shifted its priorities by employing inter-regional 
cooperation as a framework for its external political economy. The deadlock of the 
WTO Doha round negotiations created a significant change to the EU’s external 
economic approach. The EU shifted its focus from a multilateral to an inter-
regional/bilateral basis (European Commission, 2006a:10-12). The EU started to 
negotiate FTAs with regions/countries in order to secure its economic interests and to 
counterweigh the increasing Chinese economy in East Asia. ASEAN’s role in East 
Asia is becoming important because of the evolution of the EAS and the involvement 
of major countries in this forum. In order to foster the process of regionalism in East 
Asia, ASEAN has played a crucial role as a driver amongst other major countries. 
However, Myanmar’s participation in ASEAN and EU free trade negotiations has 
resulted in the EU and ASEAN adopting different positions.  
The EU considers these external pressures and opportunities as relevant factors 
which influenced its policy development. Commission official B argued that these 
pressures and opportunities were crucial factors which the policy makers, within the 
EU, needed to take into account. This person pointed out that: “We felt we had 
interests to be defended based on certain factors, such as the rise of China and the 
USA’s external policy toward the South-East Asia region. These external pressures 
were very important. These are key factors”.16  
The following Figure 3.1 shows a provisional conceptual framework for 
analyzing policy development.  
                                                 





































































   
   






























































































































































































































































3.7. Conclusion  
The EU’s policy development towards ASEAN and the relationship between 
the EU and ASEAN can be explained by relevant factors which may be employed as 
a provisional conceptual framework. The reasons for selecting these factors were: 
firstly, I needed to employ these factors to analyze the rationales of EU policies to 
ASEAN within specific policy areas. These would assist me to identify the 
importance of these factors in the development of EU policy. Secondly, these factors 
helped me, across cases, to develop, over time, the pattern of EU’s policy toward 
ASEAN. Thirdly, I have to consider the extent to which the formulation of the EU 
policy and its outcomes would have consequences for the relationship between the 
two regions.  
Before 2001, the relationship between the EU and ASEAN had not grown 
sufficiently since their economic and political aspirations were only partially fulfilled 
(Holland, 2002:64). Since 1980, the economic relationship between the EU and 
ASEAN has been a cornerstone in their inter-regional ties.17 Until the 2000s, the 
politico-security relationship had not been a priority in their ties. Since 2001, the EU 
has developed further its relationship with ASEAN. It has shown its good will 
toward South-East Asia by launching its new partnership with ASEAN; supporting 
the peace process in Indonesia; and initiating an EU-ASEAN FTA. Chapter 4 

















                                                 




CASE STUDY A NEW PARTNERHIP WITH SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
 
4.1. Introduction 
It has now been more than 30 years since, on 7 March 1980, the EU and 
ASEAN signed their cooperation agreement. Recently, between 2001 and 2010, there 
were significant developments in the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. The 
EU changed its policy and began to build deeper and closer cooperation towards 
ASEAN. In order to strengthen the relationship, it established an umbrella policy 
known as ‘a new partnership with South-East Asia’. It increased its political and 
economic cooperation, and support for regional integration.  
This chapter’s objective is to explain the development of the EU’s policy for a 
new partnership with South-East Asia. It is divided into four sections. The next 
section presents a comprehensive picture, from policy initiative to policy outcome, of 
this EU policy mechanism towards South-East Asia. In the third section, I employ 
my conceptual framework to examine this EU policy in order to obtain a clear 
explanation about the relevant factors which influenced the development of this EU 
policy. The final section is a conclusion.  
 
4.2. A New Partnership with South-East Asia  
 
In the EU’s 2001 comprehensive strategy on Asia, the Commission emphasized 
that the relationship between the EU and ASEAN was a corner stone in the 
relationship between Europe and Asia in the context of political and economic 
cooperation (European Commission, 2001b:22). The Commission wanted to develop 
a new partnership with South-East Asia. The European Parliament (2002:478) 
supported the initiative of the Commission by saying that: “the European Parliament 
has continued to press for upgrading on the EU-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement 
which has been blocked since the early 1990s”.  
The Commission and the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC) held preliminary 
meetings to exchange ideas and opinions about the development of a new partnership 
between the EU and ASEAN. Their preliminary meetings were held in November 
2001 and March 2002 in Brussels (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002b:123-124).     
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In 2003, political, security and terrorism issues attracted a great deal of 
attention from the international community following 11 September 2001. The geo-
political situation, in Asia, encouraged the EU to include political, security and 
terrorism issues as one of the priorities in its Communication paper (Wiessala, 
2003:1-4). The October 2002 bombing in Bali and the August 2003 bombing in 
Jakarta’s JW Marriot Hotel were concrete examples that led the EU to believe it 
needed to develop its security cooperation with ASEAN more closely. The EU 
shifted its perspective and strategic policy to pay more attention to peace and 
stability in South-East Asia.  
The Commission’s communication paper sketched, also, in the context of 
economic ties, the advancement in the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. The 
Commission realized that ASEAN had the vision and purpose to achieve ASEAN’s 
regional integration and to improve its economic relationship with the EU. The 
Commission projected that its communication paper constituted a new EU approach 
in engaging with ASEAN. The European Commission’s (2003:3-4) approach 
focused on the development of the trade framework between the two regions; the 
sharing experience of the EU’s efforts to develop ASEAN’s regional integration (eg. 
the ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support/APRIS) further; and the 
potential outlook for bilateral ties with ASEAN countries.  
When the EU developed this communication paper, the Commission had 
coordinated already the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament within the 
EU. In the next section, I explain the interaction between the above actors which led 
to the establishment of this EU policy. On this point, I outline briefly the content of a 
New Partnership with South-East Asia, which consisted of the following six strategic 
priorities (European Commission, 2003a:14): 
1. Supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; 
2. Promoting human rights, democratic principles and good governance; 
3. Mainstreaming justice and home affairs issues; 
4. Injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations; 
5. Continuing to support the development of less prosperous countries; 
and 
6. Intensifying dialogue and cooperation in specific policy areas.  
 
The European Commission (2003a:19) released the Trans-Regional EU and 
ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) as a regional action plan to foster trade and 
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investment cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. TREATI was a part of a new 
partnership with South-East Asia. It aimed to involve all ASEAN countries in this 
framework in order to improve the trade knowledge and capability of ASEAN’s 
producers and importers with regard to the EU’s trade structure and regulations. It 
aimed, also, to create a flexible framework for ASEAN countries by choosing 
programmes, related to trade and investment issues such as standards for the 
industrial sector; agricultural standards; trade and environment; common customs 
mechanisms; competition policy; investment regulations; services; and sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues (European Commission, 2003a:31-32). There were four phases 
to the EU-ASEAN economic dialogue. The first phase consisted of confidence-
building dialogue amongst participants and the elaboration between both parties of 
common and different positions. Afterwards, they identified related challenges and 
potential areas for cooperation. Subsequently, they would be able to build economic 
commitments between both regions. Finally, in order to integrate with the EU and 
ASEAN inter-regional framework, each of the ASEAN countries could make its own 
time schedule, plans and implementations of various activities. The TREATI’s future 
objective is to support ASEAN countries in their implementation of their trade 
instruments and application of investment regulations to build an ASEAN-EU FTA 
(Ibid). 
Dhannan Sunoto, former Director of External Relations from the ASEAN 
Secretariat (from August 1996 to April 2009), argued that:  
The EU formed TREATI because of FTA. At that time, Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy’s principle on economic integration was that the EU would 
never be able to have an FTA with ASEAN as far as ASEAN still had 
different levels of development. TREATI was a mechanism to try, 
amongst ASEAN countries, to raise the level which was lower in order to 
come up to at least a certain median level of economic development.18 
 
Chris Patten, the External Relations Commissioner of the Commission, in his 
speech at the launch of the Commission’s communication paper, stated that: 
"Economically South-East Asia is set to become one of the most dynamic growth 
areas in the world economy and the EU wants this to be reflected in its trade 
relations" (Singapore News, 2003:3).  
                                                 
18 Interview with Dhannan Sunoto, the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 26 August 2010. 
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 Furthermore, he added that: "Asia is always high on my personal agenda, and 
our new Communication shows how much importance the European Commission 
attaches to our relationship with the region. […] There are many areas where we 
could collaborate more: security, human rights, regional integration and new 
technologies" (Europa, 2003:1). It meant that this communication paper reflected, on 
the part of the EU, the economic and political/security interest and values to engage 
with ASEAN.  
This section has demonstrated the brief background and content of a new 
partnership with South-East Asia. The EU employed a policy instrument to extend 
economic and political relationship; and to assist economic development in ASEAN 
countries. This communication paper aimed to upgrade its cooperation with ASEAN 
which, in the late 1990s, was impeded by the East Timor crisis and the Myanmar 
issue. Next, I examine the factors explaining the development of this EU policy. 
 
4.3.  Analysis of a New Partnership with South-East Asia  
 
4.3.1. The Relevant Actors in the EU’s Policy Development for a New 
Partnership with South-East Asia  
 
The Commission and the Council are the relevant actors of the EU’s inter-
regional cooperation policy. The Commission has the right to initiate a draft of a new 
partnership with South-East Asia. It should get an approval from the Council and, 
also, in order to conclude a new partnership with South-East Asia, the assent of the 
European Parliament.  
The Commission is a leading and coordinating institution in the development of 
this EU policy. The Commission shares its power together with the Council. 
However, it has the authority to coordinate the whole process from policy initiative 
to the actual release of policy. It created the draft of communication paper for South-
East Asia. In order to frame and shape the draft of the communication paper, it had 
an authority to draft legislation and consult with outside interests (Greenwood, 
2003:30-32 and 39-42).  
The role of the European Parliament was not too significant in the development 
of this EU policy (a related actor) since the Parliament would be involved in 
budgetary matters and the implementation framework.  
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The Council has full decision-making powers at the final stages of the policy 
development process. It consists of the EU member states which have a primary role 
in the decision-making process on the EU’s policy (Greenwood, 2003:32). Their 
main expectation was that their interests and values would be reflected in the 
Commission’s communication paper (Council of the EU, 2004:2-6). The next section 
discusses the interests and values of the EU and its member states.  
However, at this point, I outline how and, to what extent, the above actors were 
involved in the institutional arrangements for the development of this EU policy. The 
1980 EEC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement and, in 2001, A Strategic Framework for 
Enhanced Partnership between Europe and Asia were both cooperative foundations 
and a strategy for the Commission to engage with South-East Asia. The Cooperation 
Agreement highlighted only the economic and trade relationship between both 
parties. The Commission hoped that a new partnership with South-East Asia would 
encompass various areas of cooperation from their original Cooperation Agreement 
which included, also, human rights and democracy (European Commission, 2003a:5-
6). The legal basis, for this EU policy, is Council Regulation No 443/92 (EUR-Lex 
1992a:1) on financial and technical assistance and economic cooperation with the 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America. 
In the case of the development of the EU’s policy, the Commission started, on 
the night of the 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, on 27 January 2003 to discuss 
the intention and ideas of its communication paper regarding South-East Asia 
(Council of the EU, 2003b:1). The Commission collected the aspirations and 
interests of ASEAN and, thereby, enabling them to prepare and formulate the draft of 
the Commission’s communication paper. On 18 March 2003, it started inter-service 
consultations between the Directorates General Trade and External Relations. The 
inter-service consultations are a process of discussion between related bodies within 
the Commission with regard to formulating a draft of the Commission’s 
communication paper regarding ASEAN. The Commission explained that, generally, 
the duration of these consultations was short. However, the Commission’s 
communication paper regarding ASEAN took longer because the EU was focusing 
on the situation in Iraq (Europe, 2003a:14). The inter-service consultations aimed to 
identify general interests and aspirations such as trade and investment initiative; 
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development aid; and support for regional integration (Ibid) in order to insert them 
into a draft of the Commission’s communication paper. The Commission 
consolidated all aspirations from its first consultation with ASEAN and the inter-
service consultations within the Commission. The Commission came up with its idea 
and intention for a communication paper which consisted of political, economic and 
development aspects of cooperation (Council of the EU, 2003b:2). However, rather 
than the other aspects of cooperation, the economic aspect was the most crucial 
matter (Ibid, p.3).  
Pascal Lamy, the Trade Commissioner of the Commission visited, for a week 
from 31 March to 5 April 2003,  some countries in the South-East Asia region to 
discuss Commission paper with ASEAN economy ministers (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2003a:1). In the next section, I explain the detailed consultation process between the 
Commission and ASEAN. Meanwhile, on 8 April 2003, the Commission held an 
inter-service consultation with the President of the Commission, Trade 
Commissioner, External Relation Commissioner and other related Commissioners 
within the Commission (European Commission, 2003b:19). They discussed several 
concerns of ASEAN countries which were considered to be included in the draft of 
the Commission paper. The Commission approved, on 9 July 2003, the draft of its 
communication paper (European Commission, 2003c:19). In order to obtain approval 
before the middle of 2003, the Commission submitted the draft of its communication 
paper to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (Europe, 2003b:12).  
Patten and Lamy presented to the Council, on 9 July 2003, a final draft of the 
Commission’s communication paper on the South-East Asia region. They aimed to 
persuade - and obtain approval - from the Council about the importance and 
comprehensiveness of the EU’s economic and political policy with respect to the 
region (European Commission, 2003c:19). Patten said that: “We are not only major 
trading partners, but partners in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and 
drugs trade. Europe is the first donor of development assistance […] but we can do 
more together - and today’s communication sets out a flexible strategy for deeper 
cooperation with individual countries within a regional framework” (Europe, 
2003c:15). With regard to the content of draft of the Commission’s communication 
paper, Lamy added that this was the beginning of: “a new chapter in EU and ASEAN 
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trade relations. TREATI will help to build trust between both regions: we are ready 
to match the level of ambition they put in their own process or regional integration” 
(Ibid). 
According to research data, Commission official B explained the institutional 
arrangement of the development of this communication paper, as follows: “I think 
the Commission was crucial at that time where there was no Lisbon Treaty. The 
Commission took the initiative and asked for a mandate from the member states in 
the Council. The Commission went to the Council and said look, we want to do this. 
The member states had a discussion and said yes that was a good idea. Do it”.19 This 
person further elaborated that “we invited our ambassadors in the area to come in and 
give their inputs and to discuss a little bit with the countries individually […]. It was 
getting information. So we wrote the document”.20  
 
Commission official A added that  
 
We wanted to adopt it [communication paper] with ASEAN, so we needed 
the agreement from ASEAN before we could go formally to the Council to 
get approval. But in the process of preparing this strategy the Council was 
already consulted. Before the formal approval, there was a consultation and 
the Commission received inputs from the EU member states on that 
strategy itself. So, when it was presented in 2003 to ASEAN already 
something had been agreed in the EU.21 
 
The Council gave its green light for the Commission to form a new partnership 
with ASEAN. Consequently, Patten presented the Commission’s communication 
paper entitled New Partnership with South-East Asia: Communication from 
Commission (ASEM, 2003:4) to the South-East Asia region at the 5th ASEM Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting in Bali, Indonesia, on 22-24 July 2003. 
Afterwards, the Commission submitted its communication paper to be adopted 
and ratified by the Council. Council official B explained that the Commission sent 
the draft of a new partnership with South-East Asia to the Council. The EU member 
states would examine and discuss it. They needed to find a common denominator 
amongst them in order to achieve a common position on the draft conclusions 
                                                 
19 Interview with Commission official B, 2011. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Interview with Commission official A, 2010. 
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concerning this policy within the framework of the Council. The Council would 
adopt the draft of a new partnership in the EU policy.22  
Commission official B explained the importance of the EU member states in 
this EU policy development by saying that: “Of course this [the EU policy 
development] included the member states, because we had to get an agreement […]. 
And even I thought officially this agreement was a mix of agreements which also 
meant competence by the member states in this process”.23  
The United Kingdom (UK), Netherlands, Germany and France wanted to form 
a close relationship with ASEAN. Commission official B continued by highlighting 
the EU member states which were really eager to engage, as follows: “You can say 
few countries were more active on this policy, for example the UK, France and to a 
lesser extent Germany. I think all of them, pretty much, were interested. The 
Netherlands had also a strong Asia policy, stronger than in other countries […] for 
big countries, it was also, economically, the driving force”.24 
The UK, Netherlands, Germany and France approached the other EU member 
states in order to convince them of the benefits of having an economic relationship 
with ASEAN. They demonstrated to the other EU member states the importance of 
deepening the EU and ASEAN relationship such as, firstly, the strengthening of 
Europe and Asia trans-regional ties mentioned in a strategic framework for enhanced 
partnership between Europe and Asia which allowed the EU to develop a close 
relationship with South-East Asia (European Commission, 2001b:21-22). Secondly, 
there was a need for the EU and its member states to get access to economic 
resources in order to expand their market for selling their products and to find 
potential locations for their investments. ASEAN could fulfill their economic needs 
(HKTDC, 2003:1). 
The Council can use unanimity or a qualified majority mechanism, if it needs to 
adopt the policy initiative as the EU’s policy (Europa, 2010:1). The European 
Parliament examines the legislation on reinforcing the cooperation between these 
two regions with the aim of ensuring that development aid is efficient and 
transparent. The Council and the European Parliament have identified strategic 
                                                 
22 Interview with official B, the Council of the EU, Brussels, 30 March 2011. 
23 Interview with Commission official B, 2011. 
24 Ibid. 
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priorities for inter-regional cooperation with Asia and Latin America taking into 
consideration the mutual interest of the Community and its external partners.  
On 20 January 2004, the Political and Security Committee (PSC)25 achieved 
agreement on the draft council conclusions in the new partnership with South-East 
Asia. Afterwards, in order to obtain endorsement and authorization, the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU proposed the draft council conclusions to 
COREPER. Then, at its meeting, COREPER recommended to the Council to ratify 
the draft council conclusions (Council of the EU, 2004:1).  
Subsequently, the EU member states (15 countries at that time) agreed to and 
adopted, without debate at the 2558th Council meeting on 26-27 January 2004, the 
draft council conclusions on a new partnership with South-East Asia. The meeting 
was observed by the acceding EU member states (10 countries at that time) (Council 
of the EU, 2004:2-5). The name of this policy has been remained the same, 
‘Communication from Commission: A New Partnership with South-East Asia’. 
There was no significant obstacle to the formulation and finalization of this policy by 
the EU member states inside the Council. 
Overall, the EU’s policy on a new partnership with South-East Asia was a 
mixed agreement between the Commission and the Council whereby these EU 
institutions had competences to take the initiative on policy; to formulate the draft 
policy; to coordinate the policy-making process; and to decide on final policy. With 
the Council acknowledgement, the Commission exercised its competence to 
coordinate and to launch a new partnership with South-East Asia with the Council. 
The Council decided the legislation of a new partnership with South-East Asia and 
ratified it at the end of the development process of this EU policy. The Council had 
more competence than the Commission because it gave an authorization to the 
Commission and adopted, also, the final legislation for this policy.  
The institutional arrangement in the development of the EU’s policy towards 
ASEAN supported and enabled these actors to interact effectively based on their 
roles; apply their functions; and share their competence in order to establish an inter-
regional policy. We understand not only who were the relevant actors involved in the 
development of this EU policy but, also, we know how, when and, to what extent, 
                                                 
25 PSC formulates and coordinates all policy options (the CFSP/ESDP) that could be taken by the 
Council in the crisis situation (Europa, 2011b:1). 
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these actors interacted in the development of this EU policy. At the time, with 
support from the European Parliament, relevant actors, shared a common position on 
the development of this EU policy which strengthened the EU’s stance when 
approaching ASEAN. Therefore, these actors (particularly the Commission and the 
Council) had an impact on shaping and determining the policy outcome.  
 
4.3.2. The Promotion of Interests or Values in the EU’s Policy Development for 
a New Partnership with South-East Asia  
 
 I argue that the Commission’s communication paper was an outcome of the 
promotion of its collective economic interests particularly, the economic interests of 
key EU member states and the EU’s values as a whole. It promoted mixed aspects of 
the EU member states’ economic interests and the common EU values. However, the 
EU member states’ economic interests came before the common EU values. The 
empirical evidence was the trade and investment ties between key EU member states 
and ASEAN in 2000. The common EU values were an additional component which 
the Council Regulation No 443/92 mentioned as a legal basis for a new partnership 
with South-East Asia.  
The economic interest, shown by EU member states, particularly the UK, 
France and Germany, in South-East Asian countries (eg. Indonesia and Vietnam) 
could be expressed bilaterally (Camroux, 2006:35). However, these countries needed 
to incorporate their aspirations through the Commission which, when dealing with 
ASEAN, was a representative of the EU. It was, also, a channel for the EU member 
states through which to promote their collective economic interests in South-East 
Asia. The EU member states’ economic interests dominated clearly this 
communication paper. The EU member states (bigger and smaller member states) 
showed their interest in a deeper economic cooperation with ASEAN as can be seen 
from the four EU member states - the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France - 
which had close trade and investment relationship with the region. These countries 
had an economic interest in engaging more closely with ASEAN. They understood 
that they could secure their economic interests through comprehensive cooperation 
with EU and ASEAN. They wanted to maintain and extend their trade and 
investment activities in South-East Asia.  
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In the case of a trade relationship between the EU and ASEAN, in 2000, the 
UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France were the largest trading partners for 
ASEAN (see Table 4.1). In 2000, Germany, the UK and France were the largest 
exporters to ASEAN with total amounts of  10,675 million,  6,676 million, and  
5,506 million respectively. In 2000, the Netherlands, the UK, Germany and France 
were the largest importers to ASEAN with total amounts of  16,331 million,  
15,326 million,  14,530 million and  7,342 million respectively. In the case of FDI 
between the EU and ASEAN, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany were the main 
investors in South-East Asia from 2003 to 2004 (see Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.1  
The EU Member States and ASEAN Commercial Relationship, 2000 & 2006  
 














































































   
 
 
   
   


































































































A new partnership with South-East Asia promoted, also, common EU values 
which were known as “essential elements” (European Commission, 2003a:15). These 
common EU values are human rights; democracy and the rule of law. These values 
were included by the Commission and the Council in the Commission’s 
communication paper. One of the priorities, within the EU’s policy on a new 
partnership with South-East Asia was promoting human rights, democratic principles 
and good governance (Ibid, p.14-16). There  was a linkage between the promotion of 
common EU values and the legal basis of this communication paper (Council 
Regulation No 443/92) which required that the inter-regional cooperation and 
economic agreement between the EU and ASEAN should include essential elements 
of the common EU values. It emphasized the Community and its member states’ 
need for human rights to be included in the EU’s agreement with Asia and Latin 
America regions (EUR-Lex, 1992a:1). 
Commission official B explained what actually drove this EU’s policy, e.g. the 
promotion of interests or values as follows: “I think, there is little bit of 
interconnection in the way we see it. But certainly, there is interest as I said since we 
saw that we had to defend our interest in that part of the world against the rise of 
China […]. At least, we were still the number one trading partner but we were 
rapidly losing out to China”.26  
This person argued further that:  
That is why we felt we had an interest to defend and to keep our presence. I 
think it has to do with: first, economic interest. Second, security interest 
and certainly, you can say values, democracy and human rights. But I do 
not think we pursue them. To be honest, South-East Asia is a bit of an 
exception because we have always been very vocal about democracy and 
human rights especially with regard to Myanmar […]. But at some moment 
you have to choose what is more important.27 
 
This person stated that “We are still kept hostage by that country [Myanmar]. Even 
we had to make ourselves hostage because we had dug ourselves into concerns about 
values […]. At some point, if we do not do anything, we know it is going to cost 
us”.28 The Myanmar question on human rights and democratic principles has 
                                                 





overshadowed the EU-ASEAN ties since the accession of Myanmar to ASEAN 
(Camroux, 2006:13).   
 I have demonstrated that a new partnership with South-East Asia was driven 
primarily by interests rather than values. The Commission represented the EU 
member states in promoting collective economic interests in South-East Asia. This 
EU policy was driven forwards by the economic interests of key EU member states 
such as the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France. To some extent, a new 
partnership with South-East Asia covered, also, elements of common EU values such 
as human rights; democratic principles; and good governance clauses. The EU 
inserted these common values into a new partnership with South-East Asia. 
However, the common EU values shaped the development of this EU policy only to 
a limited extent. Overall, the promotion of the Commission’s collective economic 
interests (particularly the key EU member states) came before the promotion of 
common EU values. Common EU values were only complementary elements of this 
EU’s policy.  
Within the development of EU policy, there was a connection between relevant 
actors; the EU member states’ economic interests; the common EU values; and the 
legal basis for this EU policy. The Commission and the Council assembled these 
collective economic interests and common EU values which were combined, through 
the institutional arrangement of the inter-regional cooperation agreement, to achieve 
a new partnership with South-East Asia. Later, the Commission and the Council 
attempted to promote their collective economic interests and common values in 
South-East Asia. These mutual internal factors were interconnected and 
complemented one another. They were integrated into an institutionalized machinery 
which became the modus operandi for the development of the EU’s policy for a new 
partnership with South-East Asia. 
 
4.3.4. The Mode of Engagement between the EU and ASEAN  
The minimum consultation mechanism was a mode of engagement which the 
EU used to interact with ASEAN. I would like to divide the application of the mode 
of engagement into two stages: (1) consultation concerning a new partnership with 
South-East Asia; and (2) the finalization of a new partnership with South-East Asia. 
This division seeks to provide a breakdown of the explanation as to how, when 
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interacting with ASEAN in these two stages, the EU employed a minimum 
consultation mechanism which had implications for the development of this EU 
policy.  
 
4.3.4. a.  Consultation concerning a New Partnership with South-East Asia 
At the consultation stage, the Commission employed a minimum consultation 
mechanism on two occasions with ASEAN in order to exchange aspirations and 
receive its external partner’s feedback. The first consultation mechanism, between 
the EU and ASEAN, was held on the evening of the 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial 
Meeting on 27 January 2003 in Brussels, Belgium. The second consultation 
mechanism was held at the 3rd ASEAN Economic Ministers and EU Trade 
Commissioner Meeting on 4 April 2003 in Luang Prabang, Lao PDR. 
In the first consultation meeting, between the EU and ASEAN, the EU viewed 
its commitment to engage more with ASEAN through the framework of inter-
regional cooperation. The EU presented its ideas and intentions on the engagement 
with South-East Asia through the political; security; economic; and development 
aspects of cooperation (ASEAN Secretariat 2003b:1). The Joint Co-Chairmen’s 
statement at the 14th EU–ASEAN Ministerial Meeting pointed out crucial points with 
regard to a new partnership with South-East Asia. These were as follows (Council of 
the EU, 2003b:2-3): 
1. Ministers had extensive preliminary discussions on ideas for 
reinvigorating political, economic and social aspects of the relationship at 
regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels. In this context, the 
Commission reaffirmed its attention to issue a communication on a new 
strategy for EU relations with South-East Asia in the first half of this 
year.  
2. Ministers discussed the priorities for future actions under the ASEAN-
EU Cooperation Programme to support the ASEAN economic integration 
and to enhance ASEAN-EU co-operation in the economic and 
development cooperation areas as well as information actions.  
3. Ministers agreed that future ASEAN-EU cooperation should contribute to 
new dynamism in the trade relationship including expanding trade and 
investment flows, closer cooperation in trade facilitation, market access 
and investment issues.   
  
At the second consultation meeting, between the EU and ASEAN in April 
2003, the EU proposed to ASEAN economic ministers a new trade regional 
framework to overcome trade and investment regulatory issues in the Commission’s 
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communication paper such as: the development of a FTA; the complex trade 
regulations (rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, appreciation of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) and investment regulations); the common custom 
procedures; and the treatment of ASEAN as a regional block. This trade regional 
framework was known as TREATI (Council of the EU, 2003b:1). Lamy introduced 
TREATI to ASEAN countries, which aimed to improve the standards and 
applications of ASEAN’s trade and investments in order to achieve the minimum 
requirements of the EU’s trade and investment regulations (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2003c:73-74).  
The ASEAN economic ministers agreed to insert TREATI as an initiative to 
improve the trade and investment relationship between the EU and ASEAN (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2003a:1). They appreciated, also, the Commission’s effort to provide 
APRIS (Ibid). They highlighted their interest which was to inspire and learn from the 
EU’s regional integration experience in order to further regional economic 
integration within ASEAN. They believed that APRIS would assist not only the 
process of ASEAN regional integration but, also, it would foster the EU and ASEAN 
economic relationship. The ASEAN Ministers appreciated the EU’s intention to 
release, in the middle of 2003,  a new partnership with South-East Asia which would 
enhance the economic ties between the two regions (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003a:1).  
Sunoto said that: “We went to Brussels and had brainstorming sessions with 
Relex29 people and tried to look at what can we elaborate this strategic paper. I think 
we went to other countries in Europe for a second time. We went there with foreign 
affairs people of ASEAN. But I think that what we did was to steer the strategic 
direction of the paper in order to contribute to ASEAN goals and objectives”. 30 He 
further emphasized that “this would help us integrate ASEAN as a community and 
support whatever goals we had […]. It was agreed by the European Commission; and 
that I think confirms the need for the European Commission to share its experiences 
of integration with ASEAN and to do it in political, economic and social culture”.31  
The EU presented and discussed the intention of its new strategy for South-East 
Asia in order to hear and accommodate ASEAN’s aspirations. This was based on the 
                                                 
29 The Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party. 
30 Interview with Sunoto, 2010. 
31 Ibid. 
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minimum consultation mechanism under which the EU and ASEAN could exchange 
their views with regard to the Commission’s communication paper. The Commission 
was trying to make some adjustments in its communication paper by means of inter-
service consultations within the Commission and, also, interaction with the Council 
and the European Parliament.  
 
4.3.4. b. The Finalization of a New Partnership with South-East Asia  
 
However, at the finalization stage of a new partnership with the South-East 
Asia, the Commission adopted a small degree of consultation with ASEAN with 
regard to the development of this EU policy. In practice, the Commission kept 
ASEAN member countries informed about developments on this EU policy. 
Commission official B stated that the Commission used the minimum consultation 
mechanism when it interacted with ASEAN and especially when formulating the 
final draft of its communication paper. This person argued that: “We wrote it pretty 
much ourselves and did not have any negotiation with an external actor. But let’s 
say, you should not exaggerate the extent of our consultations, but we kept them 
informed. That is a better way of putting it. What we were going to say was that it 
was as good as we could do it. It was a minimum of consultation”.32   
The Commission employed a minimum consultation mechanism in order to 
register, at the consultation stage, the ASEAN countries’ aspirations and responses. 
However, at the finalization stage, the Commission kept ASEAN informed 
minimally with regard to developments in its communication concerning a new 
partnership with South-East Asia. ASEAN was a little disappointed with the 
European Commission because the Commission did not involve ASEAN sufficiently 
by requesting its aspirations before a final draft of this EU policy was released. 
Sunoto stated that: “The consultation process was insufficient. The strategic paper of 
the EU is not democratically done. It is really one-sided, with little consultation with 
ASEAN side. They should allow the other partner to look at the communication 
paper. They came in from a different point of view with regard to legal background, 
structured organization and they are really committed”.33  
                                                 
32 Interview with Commission official B, 2011. 
33 Ibid. 
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Consequently, in the context of the consultation process between the 
Commission and ASEAN at that time, the above situation led to a different 
perspective from the ASEAN side. The consultation period was too short and, 
therefore, there was, insufficient time to give responses to the final draft of the 
Commission’s communication paper. This situation was caused by the complexity of 
the institutional arrangements within the EU. ASEAN wanted to check whether or 
not its aspirations had been included in the communication paper before it was 
released.  
This contradictory situation led to a little tension between the Commission and 
ASEAN when, in order to develop a new partnership with South-East Asia, the 
Commission employed a minimum consultation mechanism in its dealings with 
ASEAN. Then, the Commission explained to ASEAN the reasons why it used a 
minimum consultation mechanism. These were as follows: firstly, the EU paid only 
partial attention to ASEAN because of a lack of capacity in ASEAN as a counterpart 
and because, at that time, the EU was developing, also, bilateral ties with ASEAN 
countries. Secondly, there was a need for an improvement for the EU-ASEAN 
development cooperation.34 The Commission had agreed to provide financial aid for 
various programmes in ASEAN and its member countries. The Commission 
increased its amount of aid and the scale of involvement at the regional (ASEAN) 
and bilateral (ASEAN countries) levels. The Commission and ASEAN took this 
decision in order to balance their needs and to avoid discontent between them.  
Furthermore, Sunoto explained that: “We were happy to learn that at the end 
we got about  18 million in that umbrella-cover.35 I think that strategic paper was 
two dimensional. One dimension was at the regional level but most of it was bilateral 
[…]. I think that, at a regional level, they had  800 million. That was the strategic 
paper as a whole, but most of it would be delivered bilaterally”.36 
In order to respond to the situation, the Commission included these reasons in 
its communication on the new partnership with South-East Asia. The Commission 
wanted to support ASEAN and its member countries with cooperative, 
developmental programmes designed to preserve a peaceful and stable region and to 
                                                 
34 Interview with Commission official B, 2011. 
35 The EU’s aid for the EU-ASEAN programmes. 
36 Interview with Sunoto, 2010. 
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improve the ASEAN countries economic development. Then, ASEAN received and 
considered the Commission’s explanations because the Commission had included 
some of ASEAN’s aspirations in a new partnership with South-East Asia.37  
Based on the above evidence, the mode of engagement, to some extent, had an 
effect on the development of the EU’s inter-regional policy towards ASEAN. At the 
consultation stage, the Commission took ASEAN’s aspirations into account when it 
employed a minimum consultation mechanism. However, the Commission informed 
ASEAN only at the finalization stage with regard to the final development of a new 
partnership with South-East Asia. Therefore, ASEAN raised its concerns with the EU 
about its minimal participation on this EU policy. This situation created a small 
degree of tension between the EU and ASEAN. In order to balance their interactions 
and to reach a consensus between both parties, the Commission pursued its interests 
and accommodated some of ASEAN’s aspirations in the communication paper, for 
example: the development aid for least-developed countries in South-East Asia; and 
the enhancement of commercial and economic cooperation between both regions. 
The Commission aimed to meet and serve its goals in South-East Asia by improving 
its development aid and technical assistance for ASEAN and its member countries. 
The mode of engagement led the EU to adjust its communication paper by 
considering and adapting its position to accommodate ASEAN’s aspirations. This 
situation demonstrated a co-operative relationship between the EU and ASEAN 
because the mode of engagement was the way for both parties to exchange 
aspirations; to persuade one another; and to reach a consensus between the two 
parties.  
 
4.3.5. The Level of Integration within ASEAN  
The level of regional integration within ASEAN was still at a preliminary 
stage. When the Commission formulated its new partnership with South-East Asia, 
Commission official B explained that he meant in a way it [the level of integration] 
was important, but it was not important for the communication paper because whilst 
it was the name of the policy for ASEAN, in reality it was a policy for an individual 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
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country. There was a double meaning in that document.38 More specifically, at that 
time, this person explained that ASEAN had a controversial reputation such as there 
was a slow forward movement and ASEAN could not act together. Moreover, in 
ASEAN, there was no intervention; no criticism; and no lowest common 
denominator. However, this situation did not stop the EU having an agreement or 
having a policy approach for the whole of ASEAN.39 
Commission official B advocated the importance of some level of integration 
within the external partner of the EU and stated that: “The level of integration when 
you started to make an agreement, really made sense. Of course a partner that is more 
integrated is a more interesting partner […]. We have been a strong supporter of 
ASEAN integration; this is what we do. On the other hand, we also know that these 
countries want do things differently from us. We never push very hard”.40 This 
person admitted that: “We have always been in favour of stronger ASEAN 
integration and a stronger role for ASEAN […]. We would like ASEAN to be more 
integrated because then it becomes easier for the EU to work with ASEAN”.41 
Council official B added that South-East Asia was moving into an integrated region. 
The Council of the EU recognized the development of this region at the time.42 
From the ASEAN side, ASEAN did not have a common position and strategy 
when they met the EU. Sunoto suggested that:  
We are still not an entity, our interests are still different with each other, 
the priorities are different. We do not have common interests toward the 
EU. It is very difficult to find a common denominator in foreign policy of 
the member states. Therefore, ASEAN does not have a position. ASEAN 
also cannot come out with a coherent strategy in how to engage with the 
EU because it consists of 10 different nationally oriented foreign policies.43  
 
From the EU’s perspective, the Commission identified ASEAN as a loose 
regional inter-governmental organization because it was a less institutionalized 
regional cooperation which could not come up with a common position. The 
Commission considered, to a small extent, the level of integration within ASEAN 
when it formulated its communication paper for South-East Asia. In this sense, the 
                                                 




42 Interview with Council official B, 2011. 
43 Interview with Sunoto, 2010. 
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Commission preferred to reinvigorate its relationship with a solid ASEAN. The 
Commission offered its experience of regional integration and its support as an 
inspiration and provided technical assistance for the improvement of ASEAN’s 
regional integration.     
In their discussion on the Commission’s communication paper, the 
Commission and ASEAN paid attention to two main areas. These were: stages of 
regional economic integration; and the level of development within ASEAN 
countries. I explain the stages of regional economic integration and, at the stage of 
ASEAN’s economic integration at that time. Then, I examine the various level of 
development within ASEAN countries.  
 I begin by explaining the stages of regional economic integration in terms of 
considering the level of integration within ASEAN before 2003. The ASEAN’s 
regional economic integration started, in 1977, with a Preferential Trade Agreement 
(PTA). The PTA offered the application of a preferential tariff for every product 
which originated from ASEAN countries. ASEAN products were cheaper compared 
to products from outside ASEAN countries (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010b:1). ASEAN 
moved towards AFTA in 1992 (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992a:1). AFTA aimed to 
eliminate trade barriers which were against non ASEAN countries. It aimed to create 
economic efficiency and to establish competitive trade for ASEAN countries and non 
ASEAN countries. It concluded, also, the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) agreement which allowed ASEAN countries to decrease their tariffs to 0–5 
% based on Most Favoured Nations (MFN) (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992b:1).  
The birth of AFTA was a response to the emergence of regional integration in 
the EU and to the slow progress in developing a multilateral trading system because 
of the transition period from GATT to the WTO. AFTA aimed to establish ASEAN 
as a single entity of production. ASEAN countries were committed to eliminate tariff 
and non-tariff barriers in order to improve intra-regional trade activities; their 
production base; and the competitiveness of ASEAN itself. ASEAN countries 
promoted the ASEAN Investment Area in order to improve industrial cooperation 
amongst ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries agreed to decrease tariffs and give 
benefits to investors from ASEAN countries in order to attract them to invest their 
funds in the region. The provisions of AFTA were implemented by six ASEAN 
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countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam and the 
Philippines) through the CEPT which, in January 2004, covered 99 % of the products 
within the 0-5 % tariff range. Four ASEAN countries such as Vietnam (2006), Laos 
and Myanmar (2008) and Cambodia (2010) would follow their ASEAN fellows in 
implementing this scheme (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009c:1).   
The difference in level of development between ASEAN countries affected to 
the level of integration within ASEAN. These countries can be divided into three 
types of developmental level such as advanced developing countries (Singapore and 
Brunei Darussalam); middle developing countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia 
and the Philippines); and less developed countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar 
and Laos) (UN DESA, 2011:1). In 2002, GDP per capita in Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam were USD 21,098 and USD 17,158 respectively. However, GDP per 
capita in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in the same year were 
USD 3,899, USD 2,020, USD 932 and USD 955 respectively. GDP per capita in 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar were USD 440, USD 308, USD 369 and 
USD 136 respectively.44 In ASEAN, there was a huge development gap between the 
high, middle and low income countries.   
If we consider the stage of regional economic integration, ASEAN established 
AFTA in 1992. In 2004, effectively, ASEAN has implemented the CEPT. In other 
words, at that time, ASEAN was in the early stages of regional economic integration. 
At the same time, ASEAN faced a huge gap in economic development amongst its 
countries. The difference in developmental level amongst ASEAN countries created 
different policy aims and ambitions within ASEAN. Therefore, at that time, 
ASEAN’s external relationship with its external partners (eg. the EU) was affected.  
In the early 2000s, ASEAN’s policy aimed to strengthen its regional economic 
integration and to narrow any developmental disparities amongst its member 
countries (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003c:6). ASEAN used the consultation mechanism 
to promote its policy aims to the Commission. ASEAN requested the Commission’s 
assistance in supporting its own regional economic integration and reducing the 
development gap amongst its member countries. In the consultation process between 
the EU and ASEAN, the Commission considered this aspiration by ASEAN to be 
                                                 
44 See Appendix 2. 
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included in a new partnership with South-East Asia (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003a:1 
and 2003g: 117). The Commission was known for its competence in planning and 
implementing regional integration based on its experience and knowledge in this 
sphere (Smith, 2003:85). Patten (2002:11) argued that: “We should give as much 
support as we can to regional integration and regional developments in ASEAN. I 
hope that we can help with trade liberalization in ASEAN and that we can draw 
closer to ASEAN”. 
The empirical evidence was that the Commission included ASEAN’s policy 
aims in a new partnership with South-East Asia. Examples are: the European 
Commission (2003a:14-15 and 19-21) supported regional integration for ASEAN 
and continued to foster development in ASEAN’s least developed countries. The 
Commission commenced its efforts, in September 2003, to assist in ASEAN’s 
regional integration through APRIS I. APRIS I aimed to conduct regional integration 
studies; to provide technical assistance in designing and developing of the website 
for the ASEAN consultation to resolve trade and investment issues; and to provide 
capacity building for ASEAN Secretariat staff on the issues of regional economic 
integration (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010c:1).  
Commission official B explained the Commission’s support regional 
integration within ASEAN. This person argued that: “APRIS is, if you look at it, the 
unique selling point for the EU and shows that we have a lot experience with 
integration […]. APRIS was basically giving them an institutional transfer of 
knowledge”.45  
Commission official A explained that: 
  
The idea was to support strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat for 
ASEAN regional integration. We have done 3 programmes of APRIS, 
such as support for technical assistance, organizing meetings with experts 
and improving statistical expertise […].We are ready to provide you with 
our experiences, our technical assistance and our knowledge of 
integration. 46  
 
The European Commission (2003a:18-20) assisted the development of 
ASEAN’s least developed countries by focusing on a poverty reduction programme 
                                                 
45 Interview with Commission official B, 2011. 
46 Interview with Commission official A, 2010. 
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and supporting the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). IAI was an ASEAN 
initiative to narrow the development gap between ASEAN countries in order to 
develop further ASEAN’s regional integration. It aimed to promote economic 
development and to reduce poverty in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam.  
The four main areas of development, for these ASEAN countries were:  
infrastructure; information and communications technology; regional economic 
integration; and human resources (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004a:1). With regard to IAI, 
the Commission supported the ASEAN Energy Facility with total amounts of USD 
1,113,039 and  23,740 respectively. The European private sectors were involved in 
four energy programmes (Ibid, p.5 and ASEAN Secretariat, 2009d:4).   
The level of integration, within ASEAN, was low when the EU was developing 
its policy because, in ASEAN, regional integration was only at a preliminary stage. 
ASEAN continued to focus on the AFTA as the first foundation for an economic 
regional integration. ASEAN countries had different levels of economic development 
which were classified variously according to their economic and developmental 
situation. These were as follows: high income developing countries; middle income 
developing countries; and least developed countries. It cannot be denied that the EU 
wanted to improve its relationship with the South-East Asia region since, in Asia, it 
was still an emerging economic region. The above situation affected the development 
of the Commission’s communication paper. At that time, the EU’s concern over 
ASEAN regional integration was a new phenomenon. The EU recognized that its 
own economic interests were best served if it shared its regional integration 
experience with ASEAN. For example, TREATI and APRIS on the Commission 
paper were symbiotic, one to another, in order to promote the EU’s economic 
rules/standards and to encourage ASEAN to further its integration. A more integrated 
ASEAN would make it easier for the EU to improve its economic cooperation with 
ASEAN. Therefore, the EU wanted to support ASEAN regional integration and to 
minimize the gap in economic development amongst ASEAN countries which would 
create a foundation for an integrated ASEAN. Therefore, the EU considered the level 
of integration, within ASEAN, would be accommodated in a new partnership with 
South-East Asia.             
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4.3.6. External Pressure for and Opportunity in the EU’s Policy Development 
for a New Partnership with South-East Asia 
 
The external pressure for and opportunity in the development of this EU policy 
were the results of emerging bilateral and regional trade initiatives in the South-East 
Asia region. The USA’s greater involvement and the rise of China brought about the 
improvement of economic initiatives in the region. Both pressure and opportunity 
were associated with the external political and economic element. I examine the 
above situations which, in early 2000, had an impact on the emergence of economic 
initiatives in this region. Subsequently, I explain the impact of the emergence of 
bilateral and regional trade initiatives on the development of a new partnership with 
South-East Asia.  
Since the 1970s, the USA has had a significant influence on this region. In the 
Cold War era, security was the USA’s primary focus in this region. The USA 
empowered this region as a buffer zone against the spread of communism emanating 
from the Soviet Union (Nesadurai, 1996:35). After the Cold War era, the USA 
shifted its attention from security issues to economic issues (Ibid, p.39). In 1989, it 
established APEC as an instrument of foreign policy to engage with the South-East 
Asia, Pacific and East Asia regions (Ibid, p.33). 
The Asian financial crisis hit the South-East Asian countries between 1997 and 
1998. This situation reduced the USA’s primary interest in South-East Asia. In the 
late 1990s, the USA changed its interest from the South-East Asia region to East 
Asian countries such as China, Japan and South Korea. However, this situation did 
not exist for a long time due to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Center in New York. Afterwards, the USA focused on fighting terrorist 
activities around the globe especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, it 
reduced its foreign policy focus on South-East Asia (Mauzy and Job, 2007:629). 
The USA’s political and security interests, in the South-East Asia region, were 
(Mauzy and Job, 2007:628-629): firstly, peace and stability within the region for 
political and economic purposes. The USA has had close allies in this region such as 
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. It has military bases and defence 
cooperation with these countries. Secondly, the USA wanted to counter China’s 
influence in the region. The USA viewed, as a challenge, China’s peaceful rise 
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especially China’s expanding military and economic influence in South-East Asia. 
The USA approached ASEAN countries to build security and economic ties in order 
to preserve its influence in this region. Thirdly, the USA was concerned with the 
development of human rights and democracy in ASEAN countries, especially in 
Myanmar.  
Since their formal cooperation in 1977, the economic relationship between the 
USA and ASEAN has fluctuated. In 2003, the USA’s position was that of the second 
largest trading partner and ASEAN’s first export destination. Based on statistical 
data, ASEAN exported merchandise to the USA totalling USD 69,674.2 million in 
2003. ASEAN imported merchandises from the USA which totalled USD 48,211.5 
million in 2003 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009a:82-83). However, in 2009, the USA’s 
position declined into fourth position after China, the EU and Japan, as one of 
ASEAN’s trading partners. In 2009, the total value in exports from ASEAN to the 
USA was USD 82,201 million. In the same year, ASEAN’s total import value from 
the USA was USD 67,370 million (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010d:1). ASEAN has had a 
trade surplus with the USA. Looking at FDI inflow to ASEAN, the USA was the 
third largest investor in 2003, investing total funds of USD 1,494 million. From 2003 
to 2009, the USA’s total investment in ASEAN increased to USD 27,052 million. In 
2009, the USA was still the third largest investor in ASEAN. 47      
In engaging with ASEAN, the USA adopted regional and bilateral approaches.  
In considering the regional approach, the USA agreed to the ASEAN Cooperation 
Plan in 2002. This cooperation plan dealt with trans-national issues such as terrorism; 
drugs; disaster management; environmental protection; and support for ASEAN’s 
regional integration. In 2005, the relationship between the USA and ASEAN 
improved through the framework of ASEAN and USA Enhanced Partnership. Both 
parties emphasized economic cooperation by signing, in 2006, a trade and investment 
framework agreement (TIFA). In considering the bilateral approach, the USA 
proposed to ASEAN countries, in October 2002, the Enterprise for ASEAN 
Initiatives (EAI) in order to build a bilateral FTA between itself and individual 
ASEAN countries (US Trade Representative, 2002:1). It approached ASEAN 
countries by applying EAI through two main requirements (US-ASEAN Business 
                                                 
47 See Table 6.4 in Chapter 6. 
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Council, 2002:1), as follows: firstly, the USA requested that its ASEAN counterparts 
be members of the WTO. Secondly, an ASEAN country should agree to sign TIFA 
with the USA.48 The USA used its economic relationship with ASEAN countries as a 
complementary means to supporting its military supremacy in the region. 
With regard to the ASEAN and China relationship, it has fluctuated since the 
Cold War era. The nature of their relationship changed from a cautious relationship, 
in the Cold War era, to a close relationship in the contemporary era. In July 1991, the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, attended, as a guest, the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting. The Chinese government was interested in building mutual economic 
cooperation with ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010e:1). ASEAN wanted to develop 
its economic relationship with China (Roy, 2005:320) and to decrease its dependency 
on the USA’s economy. Additionally, after the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen 
Square, China was subject to strong pressures and sanctions by Western countries 
(Drury and Li, 2006:310).     
In July 1996, China and ASEAN agreed to sign a formal agreement during the 
ASEAN and China dialogue in Jakarta. Their relationship reached a high level since, 
in October 2003, they signed the Strategic Partnership in Bali. The strategic 
partnership between both parties consisted of many areas of cooperation such as 
agriculture; trade and investment; tourism; technology; health; energy; 
transportation; capacity building for human resources; and the development of the 
Mekong River (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010e:1). China supported and participated in 
the various regional forums for political and economic cooperation between ASEAN 
and its external partners such as APEC, ASEM, the ASEAN+3 and the EAS. These 
initiatives created a meeting place for China and ASEAN where they could explore 
any opportunity for cooperation. 
In the sphere of political and security cooperation, ASEAN and China built 
mutual trust and confidence in order to avoid an arms conflict (Shambaugh, 
2004:75). China respected the ASEAN countries’ sovereignty. China declared that it 
would resolve, through dialogue, land and sea disputes with ASEAN countries (Roy, 
2005:307). Historically, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam and 
                                                 
48 Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia signed TIFA with the USA. 
The USA and Singapore have been implementing their FTA since 2004. The USA has negotiated a 
FTA with Thailand (Dosch 2009:228, US Trade Representative 2011a:1 and 2011b:1). 
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Malaysia had common sea border disputes, in the South China Sea, with regard to 
Spratly and the Paracel Islands. ASEAN approached China through collective 
security and dialogue at the regional level (Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002c:1 and 2011b:6-7). Through the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN involved China in political and security 
cooperation together with other external partners. At the bilateral level, some 
ASEAN countries established annual security dialogues with China, e.g. Indonesia, 
Vietnam and the Philippines. On 8 October 2003, China acceded to the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003d:148). It 
was a positive signal for ASEAN that China agreed to build political and security 
cooperation with it based on co-operative dialogue. 
In the area of economic cooperation, ASEAN countries exported raw materials, 
natural resources and simple electronic products to supply Chinese industrial 
activities. China and ASEAN products, based on agricultural products and textiles, 
were quite similar. China improved their high technology products such as cars; 
engines; and spare-parts.  
During the Asian financial crisis, there was a contradictory situation in respect 
of the economic part of the relationship between China and ASEAN. On the one 
hand, China assisted ASEAN to deal with its economic turbulence. In 1998, this 
situation made ASEAN feel that China supported it (Economy, 2005:415). On the 
other hand, since the late 1990s, many foreign investors and companies moved their 
funds and productions from ASEAN countries to China because of the intensive and 
cheap labour compared to that of ASEAN countries. China tried to change this 
perception by establishing a more positive image amongst ASEAN countries. In the 
late 1990s, China responded positively to ASEAN‘s idea of building a cooperative 
framework through ASEAN+3. In the early 2000s, China was growing as a regional 
actor in Asia (Sutter, 2007:3). Some ASEAN countries felt insecure and suspicious 
of China with its economic development and hegemonic power. China responded to 
this situation by offering, in 2002, an ASEAN and China FTA. China and ASEAN 
implemented this FTA effectively in 2010. In order to improve economic and social 
cooperation between China and ASEAN, they established the ASEAN-China Center 
(2011:1) in Beijing.     
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The economic cooperation between China and ASEAN increased significantly 
from 2003 to 2009, as follows: the total value in exports by ASEAN to China 
improved from USD 28,987 million (in 2003) to USD 81,591 million (in 2009). The 
total value of imports by ASEAN from China increased from USD 30,043 million (in 
2003) to USD 96,594 (in 2009). China preserved its trade surplus with ASEAN 
between 2003 and 2009. China’s position as ASEAN’s trading partner grew in 
strength from fourth in 2003 (7.2 % of ASEAN’s total trade) (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2009a:92-93) to first position in 2009 (11.6 % of ASEAN’s total trade) (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2010d:1). There was a significant FDI increase by China in ASEAN. 
Total Chinese FDI invested in ASEAN was USD 186 million in 2003. From 2003 to 
2009, China’s total FDI rose sharply to USD 9,122 million.49 In 2009, China was the 
fifth largest investor in South-East Asia.   
The above discussions depict two circumstances which arose simultaneously in 
the South-East Asia region. These were as follows: the greater involvement of the 
USA; and China’s rise in the region. China used commercial and investment ties and 
confidence building measures to build its image as a peaceful neighbour and to form 
an ASEAN-China FTA. At the same time, the USA re-oriented its focus on areas of 
economic and political interest to balance the expansive Chinese influence in the 
South-East Asia region and to offer bilateral FTAs to its allies in the region. 
Understandably, both the USA’s greater involvement in the South-East Asia region 
and China’s rise led, at that time, to an increase in economic activities in the region. 
These countries expanded their cooperation with ASEAN in order to obtain 
economic resources such as raw materials and to enlarge their market access to the 
region. In the early 2000s, the economic performance of ASEAN countries improved 
gradually based on their average economic growth of around 5-5.5 % between 2002 
and 2003 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007a:34-35). Total FDI inflows to ASEAN 
increased from USD 18,022.6 million in 2002 to USD 24,324.7 million in 2003 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2009a:128).  
Consequently, there was an increase in the number of regional and bilateral 
trade initiatives originating from ASEAN and its external partners. Many of the 
countries, outside South-East Asia, were attracted to establishing and developing 
                                                 
49 See Table 6.4 in Chapter 6.  
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their economic cooperation with ASEAN and its member countries. There was an 
incremental development in bilateral and regional trade initiatives which were 
notified to WTO; there were around 116 FTAs between 2000 and 2006. In these 
years, South-East Asia accounted for 22 % of the total of trade agreements. 
Examples of these economic initiatives, discussed and negotiated in the early 2000s, 
were: the New Zealand and Singapore FTA; the Japan and Singapore FTA; the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Singapore FTA; the ASEAN and 
China FTA; the USA and Singapore FTA (WTO, 2008a:1); and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership.  
Herewith the implication of the discussion was that the emergence of bilateral 
and regional economic initiatives, within the South-East Asia region, provided the 
EU both with an external pressure and a valuable opportunity. The EU recognized 
the dynamics of economic activities within the region. In the early 2000s, the EU 
was involved in the expansion of its own market and the political transformation 
within the European continent and around the world. These, in turn, led to the 
improvement in trade; investment; developmental activities; and political dialogues 
between the EU and its external partners. This situation affected economic activities 
amongst countries and regions such as East Asia and South-East Asia outside the 
European continent. The European Commission (2001b:28) was known for its 
competence and capacities in these activities and in responding to the advent of these 
economic and political activities outside its territory. It developed political and 
economic cooperation in order to shape the global economic governance and to link 
its interests with this economic dynamic and the opportunities outside its region 
(Ibid). 
The Commission was shaped by the implications of the above external 
developments in order to make it more coherent and cohesive in the development of 
its new partnership with South-East Asia. It consolidated its position and interest by 
responding to the emergence of bilateral and regional economic cooperation in the 
South-East Asia region which was affected by the USA’s greater involvement and 
China’s increasing presence in that particular region. It took this situation into 
account when establishing a comprehensive policy which could fulfill the needs of 
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the EU and its member states with respect to the region. Commission official B 
implied that: 
The American policy certainly drove us. You see the evolution starting 
from negotiation with ASEAN as a second level to a regional agreement 
influenced by America. Yes, we were not only competing with China but 
also with America. Basically, those are our competitors. In the economic 
field, I remember that it was important from the trade side to keep an eye 
on American initiatives in the region. The Americans were doing the same 
and were also driven by the Chinese.50  
 
This person continued by arguing that:  
The rise of China of course makes us feel that ASEAN is an important area 
with 500 million people and a very resource-rich area. We felt that we were 
losing ground especially to China. We were put under pressure, I think, by 
the rapid rise of China who was using these countries to get more and more 
supplies, such as timber and oil, and then absorbing these resources into its 
economy. We felt we had interests to defend owing to the rise of China and 
the influence of American policy.51 
 
Moeller (2007:474) argued that ASEAN viewed the EU as an unreliable partner. 
As shown during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the EU lacked interest in the 
South-East Asia region and offered support to ASEAN via the IMF. However, it was 
never realized in the region. This was unlike the USA and China who approached 
ASEAN offering long-term involvement in the region. Feinberg (2003:1039) argued 
that the USA viewed bilateral and regional FTAs (with Singapore and within an 
ASEAN-US framework) as means by which to affect the political economy of 
ASEAN countries and to further the USA’s security interests. Ba (2003:643) added 
that the rise of Chinese influence in Asia brought a closer Sino-ASEAN relationship 
and mitigated the USA’s political and economic influence in South-East Asia. In 
2002, China started FTA negotiations with ASEAN. Therefore, this situation 
generated the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade initiatives in South-East 
Asia. 
With these constraints obviously evident, the Commission was in a difficult 
situation at that time. On the one hand, the EU’s economic policy aimed mainly to 
conclude the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA). On the other hand, there 
were developments in the regional and bilateral economic initiatives outside Europe 
                                                 
50 Interview with Commission official B, 2011. 
51 Ibid. 
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particularly in South-East Asia. Commission official A pointed out that: “We were 
more for the multilateral […]. At that time, there were no new FTAs at all. There was 
Commissioner Lamy who clearly stated that he did not want to have new FTAs until 
the multilateral worked since it was he who launched the DDA. Then, the USA was 
more active at that time. I think that was the start of the spaghetti bowl or the noodle 
bowl of agreements”.52 
At the meeting between the Commission and the European Parliament on 2 
June 2003, Erika Mann, a PSE (a socialist group) Member of European Parliament, 
argued that the Commission was slow to develop FTAs with its main trading 
partners. She stated that: 
The Commission puts the multilateral approach first [...]. However, 
despite strong economic relations, the EU does not have a single FTA in 
Asia. An FTA with an Asian country will anchor the presence of the EU in 
that region. Regional leaders in ASEAN have indicated that agreements 
such as that proposed by Singapore to the EU would not endanger regional 
relations (European Parliament, 2003:1).  
 
She reminded the Commission that “from a strategical viewpoint, the 
commercial presence of the EU would also counterbalance the influence and 
dominance of China and the US” (European Parliament, 2003:1). Lamy responded 
by saying that “it is initiatives of this kind that we are in the process of launching, 
particularly in South-East Asia in the form of a very recent cross-regional EU-
ASEAN initiative”(Ibid). Meanwhile, Patten emphasized that South-East Asia could 
be one of the most dynamic growth regions in the world (European Commission, 
2003d:1). The EU has shifted its focus to South-East Asia, since it responded to the 
above situation. 
Overall, in the development of this EU policy, there was a co-operative 
relationship between the Commission’s collective economic interests, particularly 
economic interests of key EU member states and the external pressure and 
opportunity. These factors influenced one another. In 2003, there was an emergence 
of bilateral and regional economic initiatives within the South-East Asia region. It 
was influenced by China’s rise and the USA’s greater involvement within the region. 
China and the USA wanted to improve their political and economic relationship with 
                                                 
52 Interview with Commission official A, 2010.  
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ASEAN. The USA’s and China’s extensive involvement in the South-East Asia 
region affected the EU which did not want to be late in strengthening its presence in 
the region. The EU regarded this dynamic situation as an external pressure when it 
was developing its policy towards ASEAN. The EU member states’ economic 
interests required the EU to be involved in these economic initiatives in order to 
achieve its economic benefits. The EU and its member states did not want to be 
excluded from the emergence of bilateral and regional economic initiatives in the 
region. The EU considered these as external opportunities and recognized the 
economic and political expansion of its competitors in the region. Consequently, the 
EU member states supported the need for the Commission to establish an inter-
regional policy in order to engage with the region. The outcome was that the 
Commission emerged with its comprehensive policy towards the region covering 
trade; investment; development issues; and political dialogue. 
 
4.4.  Conclusion  
 
There are relevant factors which influenced the development of a new 
partnership with South-East Asia. These are as follows: firstly, the relevant actors, 
involved in the formulation of this policy, were mainly the Commission and the 
Council. The Commission was an initiator and a coordinator in the development of 
this EU policy. It provided information about and consulted on its communication 
paper with the Council and the European Parliament before presenting it to ASEAN. 
The Council, unanimously, confirmed and adopted this policy. The institutional 
arrangement of this EU policy was placed in the Community pillar. The co-operative 
foundations and an inter-regional strategy for the development of this policy were the 
1980 EEC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement and a Strategic Framework for 
Enhanced Partnership between Europe and Asia in 2001. The legal basis for this EU 
policy was the Council Regulation No 443/92 on financial and technical assistance 
and economic cooperation with the developing countries in Asia and Latin America. 
The institutional arrangement of this EU policy might require the EU to include, in 
this EU policy, not only economic and political objectives but, also, common EU 
values. It enabled the Commission and the Council, also, to interact and to share their 
competence in creating a new partnership with South-East Asia. The Commission 
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and the Council had greater competence and a significant role in shaping and 
deciding this EU policy. The Parliament was a related actor which gave its consent to 
the relevant actors in that process. These actors shared a common position which 
enhanced their stance in achieving a new partnership with South-East Asia. 
Secondly, the Commission promoted collective economic interests, particularly 
key EU member states and common EU values. The UK, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands were interested in fostering closer cooperation between the EU and 
ASEAN. They had trade and investment activities in South-East Asia. To some 
extent, the Commission promoted, also, democracy and human rights as common EU 
values. The collective economic interests were more dominant in this EU policy 
compared to common EU values. The relevant actors promoted their interests and 
common EU values to ASEAN within the institutional arrangement of this EU 
policy. They interacted with each other as the internal factors within the EU. In short, 
the promotion of interests and common EU values (to a limited extent) influenced the 
development of this EU policy.   
Thirdly, the mode of engagement between the EU and ASEAN was a minimum 
consultation mechanism. At the consultation stage, there were two main 
consultations between the EU and ASEAN. For the Commission’s communication 
paper, the EU and ASEAN discussed and exchanged their aspirations and respective 
positions. These consultations were means for ASEAN to explain its views on the 
intentions of the Commission’s communication paper. However, the consultation 
period was insufficient for ASEAN in terms of providing feedback on the final 
communication paper. This was owing to the institutional complexity within the 
EU’s structure. At the finalization stage, the Commission informed ASEAN 
countries only about the finalization of this EU policy.  
The Commission applied a minimum consultation mechanism for two reasons. 
Firstly, at that time, the EU focused partially on ASEAN because ASEAN had a 
minimum capacity as a partner and because the EU attempted to develop bilateral 
relationships with ASEAN countries. Secondly, there was a necessity to enhance the 
EU-ASEAN development cooperation. In order to balance needs and minimize 
possible discontent on the part of either party, the Commission provided 
development and economic incentives for ASEAN. ASEAN had raised these 
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aspirations previously at the consultation stage between both parties. The 
Commission accepted these aspirations in order to build a consensus with ASEAN 
for a new partnership with South-East Asia. The mode of engagement was a means 
which the EU employed to share its interests and to gain ASEAN’s confidence.    
Fourthly, at that time, there was a low level of regional integration within 
ASEAN. ASEAN still struggled with its regional economic integration and different 
levels of development amongst its member states. From the beginning, the EU 
looked at this situation as a challenge for its new partnership with the South-East 
Asia region which ASEAN needed to overcome. The EU considered that an 
integrated ASEAN would serve its economic interests in the region. The EU’s aim 
was to help ASEAN to establish regional integration in order to achieve a level of 
political and economic development similar to its own. The EU demonstrated its 
support for ASEAN’s regional integration by offering APRIS, a poverty reduction 
programme, and by supporting IAI.      
Fifthly, the emergence of bilateral and regional trade initiatives in the South-
East Asia region can be seen both as an external pressure and as an opportunity for 
the EU’s policy makers. The USA’s greater involvement and China’s rise affected 
the proliferation of economic initiatives in the region. The EU was in a dilemma 
between the preservation of its economic policy to conclude the WTO DDA and 
being excluded from the development of economic initiatives in the region. The 
Commission and the EU member states realized that, in this region, the 
developments would bring economic benefits for the EU’s companies and investors. 
They attempted to defend the EU business community from discriminatory actions 
resulting from their not being part of many bilateral and regional trade initiatives 
which existed already and which were developing still in this region. Both the 
external pressure and opportunity had become linked co-operatively to the EU’s 
interests and this influenced the development of this EU policy.    
In the next chapter, I use my conceptual framework to examine the 
development of the EU’s policy towards the EU-ASEAN joint monitoring mission in 
South-East Asia. This effort required dynamic analysis and detailed empirical 





CASE STUDY OF THE EU AND ASEAN MONITORING MISSION  




On 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland (AMM, 2005a:8), GoI and FAM 
agreed to sign a MoU for a peace agreement on Aceh. The EU supported the 
negotiations, which were mediated by Martti Ahtisaari, the leader of the Crisis 
Management Initiatives (CMI).53 The EU’s policy towards Aceh came about as a 
result of GoI and FAM inviting the EU and ASEAN to monitor the implementation 
of the peace agreement. They were appointed by the conflicting parties to form the 
AMM in Aceh (Council of the EU, 2005a:13-16). This was an important case in 
respect of the EU’s policy towards Indonesia and South-East Asia. Through the 
AMM, it was a joint civilian mission comprised of the EU and ASEAN countries. 
The AMM worked from 15 September 2005 to 15 December 2006 on tasks such as 
the initial post-conflict security phase and building trust between the parties. 
This chapter aims to explain the development of the EU’s policy for the EU and 
ASEAN monitoring mission in Aceh. It is organized into four sections. After the 
introduction, the next section elaborates on the process of the peace agreement 
between GoI and FAM. I explain the role of the EU and ASEAN countries in 
supporting the peace process and implementing the peace agreement in Aceh. The 
third section analyses the development of the EU’s policy on Aceh in the context of 
my conceptual framework which explains the relevant factors affecting the reasons 
as to why the EU launched this policy. The final section is the conclusion.    
 
5.2.  The Process of the Peace Agreement between GoI and FAM    
On 26 December 2004, the tsunami swept away most areas in the Aceh 
province and Nias Island in Indonesia. Many people died because of this natural 
disaster. The situation in Aceh, post-tsunami, exerted pressure on GoI and FAM to 
hold talks and achieve a peace agreement. The international community sent a 
message to both conflicting parties that humanitarian actions and the reconstruction 
process in Aceh could be implemented properly, only if there was peace in Aceh. 
                                                 
53 An independent NGO works to resolve conflict and to build sustainable peace.  
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GoI and the international community worked together to respond to this situation 
(Awaluddin, 2009:53).  
The EU’s involvement began by responding to the tsunami catastrophe in Aceh 
and Nias Island through humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The EU was one 
of the international donors participating in humanitarian, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction actions in these affected areas. The EU contributed  60 million for 
humanitarian aid (European Commission, 2009b:4). It cooperated with UN agencies, 
Red Cross communities and NGOs in helping victims with food, water and shelters. 
The Commission worked with GoI and other international donors to rebuild 
those areas affected by tsunami. GoI created the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) for Aceh 
and Nias Island. The MDF was co-chaired by GoI (the Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction Agency); the World Bank, and the EU. They had five priorities for 
these affected areas which were: (1) community recovery; (2) governance; (3) 
economic development; (4) environmental sustainability; and (5) infrastructure. The 
EU was the biggest contributor to the MDF, around USD 604.91 million (European 
Commission, 2009b:3 and World Bank, 2011:1).54  
The Commission acted not only in a humanitarian capacity but, also, as a 
facilitator for a peace process in Aceh. In January 2005, the Commission’s Predrag 
Avramoviç and Aldo Dell’Ariccia visited Indonesia to examine the situation in Aceh. 
They attempted to find out what the CMI could do as a mediator in peace talks 
between GoI and FAM. In February 2005, the CMI communicated intensively with 
Avramoviç to obtain financial support from the Commission. The Commission, with 
Solana’s approval, provided financial support to the CMI with a total amount of  
269,375 within the framework of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)55. The EU 
hoped that, within six months, the CMI would be able to mediate in the peace talks 
between GoI and FAM (Herrberg, 2008:32-35). 
In January 2005, GoI and FAM started officially a peace dialogue in Helsinki. 
Ahtisaari and the CMI were requested to mediate and facilitate between these 
conflicting parties. There were five rounds of discussions between GoI and FAM 
before they achieved a peace agreement. The first round of discussions discussed the 
                                                 
54 See Appendix 8. 
55 It allows the Community doing rapid action in order to respond to crisis. 
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framework for special autonomy in Aceh. The parties had diverging positions 
because GoI proposed, as a solution for Aceh, the Aceh Special Autonomy Laws 
which had been passed by the Indonesian Parliament in 2001. However, FAM 
wanted to discuss a framework of independence for Aceh. Ahtisaari emphasized to 
FAM that it should follow his proposed agendas such as special autonomy for Aceh; 
an amnesty and related procedures; security arrangements; and a monitoring mission. 
Ahtisaari formulated a time table for the implementation of a peace agreement 
between GoI and FAM (Awaluddin, 2009:73-101).  
The second round of discussions was held from 21 to 23 February 2005. They 
discussed the following two main agendas which were: firstly, the concept of special 
autonomy versus the concept of self-government. On the one hand, GoI proposed the 
concept of special autonomy. On the other hand, FAM responded to the GoI’s offer 
by insisting on the concept of self-government. However, Ahtisaari changed the 
terminology of special autonomy into regional autonomy in order to bridge the 
differences between both parties. He opened the ongoing discussion on this particular 
issue which would continue to the third round of talks. In the second agenda, they 
discussed the composition of a monitoring mission which consisted of military and 
civil elements and the roles of the EU and ASEAN as monitors of the peace 
agreement.      
The third round addressed several agendas such as, firstly, an amnesty for all 
Acehnese detainees, who had been sentenced for FAM activities in Indonesia, and 
for all FAM activists who were abroad. Secondly, they discussed the structure of 
regional government which had been included in the special autonomy. The regional 
government had an authority to decide its own department structure based on its own 
needs. Thirdly, the regional autonomy would be concerned with a division of 
revenues which would return to Aceh around 70 % of its natural resources and 
related affairs. It was an offer from GoI to convince FAM about the future of Aceh. 
Furthermore, Ahtisaari invited Brigadier General Jaako Oksanen, a Finnish army 
official who had great experience in international monitoring programmes, to discuss 
a future monitoring mechanism with both negotiating parties. Ahtisaari proposed to 
GoI and FAM that the EU and ASEAN would be included in future monitoring 
activities such as monitoring institutions (Awaluddin, 2009:139-149). The EU, 
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through the Council’s PSC, showed its good will to participate as an observer during 
the process of peace negotiations between GoI and FAM (Europe, 2005a:4).   
In the fourth round of discussions, Ahtisaari re-invited GoI and FAM to hold 
peace negotiations from 26 to 30 May 2005 in Helsinki. There were the following 
two main agenda items at this meeting. The first agenda item was FAM’s proposal of 
local political parties. The second agenda item was the presence of Pieter Feith and 
Dell’Ariccia from the EU at this round of discussions. Out of two main agenda items, 
the most sensitive agenda item was the issue of local political parties for GoI because 
it was contrary to public opinion and was politically sensitive in Indonesia. FAM 
wanted to use local political parties as its political vehicle in Aceh. GoI suggested 
that FAM propose a judicial review by the Indonesian Constitutional Court on the 
issue of local political parties. However, FAM was concerned that the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court would not allow the idea of local political parties in the 
framework of the unitary state of Indonesia (Awaluddin, 2009:177-179). 
On the second agenda item, Ahtisaari proposed to GoI and FAM a peace 
monitoring system which involved the EU and ASEAN as monitoring bodies. The 
peace monitoring system involved neutral third parties in order to monitor the 
implementation of their peace agreement in Aceh. GoI and FAM showed its positive 
signal to the peace monitoring system. Sofyan Djalil, a member of the Indonesian 
delegation, carefully reminded all parties that any hidden international agenda and 
initiatives should be opposed (Awaluddin, 2009:180). This is discussed in the next 
section.  
The final round of discussion between GoI and FAM was held between 12 and 
17 July 2005. There were three main agenda items at this meeting. Again, the most 
controversial agenda item, between the two sides, was the issue of local political 
parties. On the one side, FAM restated its position on this issue that they form local 
political parties. On the other side, GoI offered representation through the national 
political parties and assistance in manpower for the registration and verification of 
political parties. In the end, they agreed to provide an opportunity for the 
establishment of local political parties. GoI and the Indonesian Parliament passed 
Law No 12 of 2006 on the Aceh Government which allowed for the creation of local 
political parties in Aceh. Another agenda item was GoI’s offer to FAM of special 
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autonomy for Aceh. GoI and the Indonesian Parliament revised Law No. 18 of 2001 
regarding Special Autonomy for Aceh. The last agenda item was the participation of 
the EU and ASEAN as monitors of the peace agreement which had been agreed by 
GoI and FAM (Awaluddin, 2009:198-221). The EU sent its officials to this last 
round of discussions between both parties. The EU delegation did not join the 
plenary session of peace discussions. It met each party separately in order to achieve 
a common understanding between them of a monitoring mission (Ibid, p.201-221). 
Feith (2007:2) who joined the last round of meetings argued that “this situation built 
trust and developed collaboration between negotiators and monitors”. After six 
months of peace negotiations between GoI and FAM, both parties reached a peace 
agreement on 17 July 2005 (Europe, 2005b:3).          
Hamid Awaluddin, as GoI’s Chief Negotiator, and Malik Mahmud, as FAM’s 
Chief Negotiator signed, in mid-August 2005 in Helsinki, the MoU on the peace 
agreement for Aceh (AMM, 2005a:1). They were accompanied by Ahtisaari as the 
mediator of the peace talks, Erkki Tuomioja, the Finnish Foreign Minister, and 
Matthew J.L. Kirk, Ambassador of the UK to Finland since, at that time, the UK held 
the Presidency of the Council of the EU, and represented the EU (Awaluddin, 
2009:300-303).     
In September 2005, the EU, five ASEAN countries (Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Philippines and Brunei Darussalam), Norway and Switzerland assisted GoI 
and FAM with the key tasks in monitoring the implementation of the MoU. These 
were as follows (Council of the EU, 2005g:1):  
1. To monitor the demobilization of FAM and monitor and assist with the 
decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and 
explosives; 
2. To monitor the re-location of non-organic military forces and non-
organic police troops; 
3. To monitor the reintegration of active FAM members; 
4. To monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this 
field in the context of the tasks set out in points (1), (2) and (3) above; 
5. To monitor the process of legislation change; 
6. To rule on disputed amnesty cases; 
7. To deal with complaints and alleged violations of the MoU; and 




The AMM consisted of 226 unarmed monitors comprising 130 from EU 
member states, Switzerland and Norway and 96 persons from ASEAN countries. It 
was funded by collective contributions from the Council of the EU, the EU member 
states, ASEAN countries, Norway and Switzerland. The AMM’s total budget was  
15,022,621. The budget of the EU’s CFSP could provide only  9 million for the 
AMM. The rest of the funding was provided by the EU member states and non EU 
member states based on a willing and able basis (Europe, 2005d:7). Seven EU 
member states contributed  5,103,621; they were Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, 
the UK, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland. ASEAN countries, Norway and 
Switzerland as non EU member states contributed  919,000 (see Table 5.1).   
Table 5.1 
Financial Contributions from the Council of the EU; the EU Member States; 



























Source: Council of the EU (2005b:6-10).  
 
With regard to the involvement of the Commission in humanitarian and 
reconstruction efforts, the total amount of the EU’s humanitarian, development and 
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peace mission assistance in Aceh was  301,261,588 from 2004 to 2009 (European 
Commission, 2009b:4). The Commission supported the AMM through its peace 
mission assistance. The European NGOs involved themselves in the implementation 
of the Commission’s projects in the following development efforts: the humanitarian 
phase; the rehabilitation phase; and the reconstruction phase. In considering the 
humanitarian phase, many NGOs such as Aide Médicale International, Save the 
Children UK, CARE Netherlands and German Agro Action from the UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Germany and Nordic countries were involved in assisting 
victims of the tsunami in Aceh.  In considering the rehabilitation and reconstruction 
phases, NGOs and private sectors such as the EC Joint Centre and Deutsche 
Gessellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit were active in the development of 
Aceh (Ibid).  
Commission official H argued that the EU would promote its civilian mission 
in Aceh to the world as an alternative approach to solving a long civil war through 
political dialogue. This person explained that:  
After the tsunami 2004, the Government of Indonesia and FAM came to 
their senses and decided that because of the tsunami had lost so many 
lives, it would not make sense to continue fighting. We got an indication 
that both parties wanted to sit down. We helped them to sit down, we 
paid for it and we promoted the mediation at that time of ex Finish 
President Ahtisaari. On the whole, the negotiation was successful. The 
civil war ended. Aceh pulled itself together.56  
 
This person further argued that: “This was an instance of the EU getting involved in 
a war in a part of the world, doing good and leaving behind a useful foot print. I wish 
that we would be able to sell our civilian missions in Aceh, Kosovo and Bosnia”.57 
Overall, the AMM was crucial in supporting the implementation of peace in 
Aceh. The EU demonstrated to the international community that a crisis civilian 
management could be overcome if it worked closely with all conflicting parties, 
ASEAN countries, Norway and Switzerland. Moreover, in the AMM, the politico-
security cooperation between the EU and ASEAN was effective in supporting South-
East Asia as a peaceful and stable region. Next, I analyse factors which influenced 
the development of the EU’s policy on Aceh.  
                                                 
56 Q&A session with Commission official H, a public seminar, the UK, February 2010. 
57 Ibid. 
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5.3.  Analysis of the EU and ASEAN Monitoring Mission in Aceh  
 
5.3.1. The Relevant Actors in the EU’s Policy Development on the EU and 
ASEAN Monitoring Mission  
 
The EU member states and the Council of Ministers were the relevant actors 
involved in the development of the EU and ASEAN monitoring mission. The 
Commission, Ahtisaari and the CMI were related actors who had supporting and 
intervening roles in the context of the development of the EU’s policy on the EU and 
ASEAN monitoring mission in Aceh. Council official B emphasized that the Council 
of Ministers was the significant actor in the development of this EU policy. The 
mandate for the AMM was implemented by the General Secretariat of the Council of 
the EU.58 Council official B elaborated by stating:  
Some elements considered by the Council of the EU when it developed this 
EU policy. First, there was a political will within the Council. Second, the 
financial arrangements employed to support the AMM. Third, the EU 
member states achieved a common position to establish joint action. 
Fourth, the formulation of joint action within the Council of the EU was a 
crucial element at that time. The European Commission was present at that 
time to assist the Council of the EU in the implementation of a monitoring 
mission in Aceh.59 
 
Commission official C explained that the development of the EU’s policy on 
the establishment of the AMM was a collective work of relevant actors within the 
EU. This person stated that: 
Yes, it was like a combination. Once you had political will, it came down 
and let us work together. One actor is clearly the Commission and there was 
strong support from the Commissioner and good cooperation between 
RELEX and EuropeAid.60 On the other hand, there was strong support from 
the High Representative Javier Solana and strong support from the Political 
and Security Committee and Civcom.61  
 
In short, this person argued that: “The mission was more on the political track [...] It 
was decided: leave it to the Council and the Commission followed with support 
packages”.62    
                                                 
58 Interview with Council official B, 2011. 
59 Ibid. 
60 One of Directorate Generals in the Commission. 
61 Interview with Commission official C, 2011.   
62 Ibid. 
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The Council of Ministers had given the PSC a mandate to prepare and draft 
legislation and an operation plan for the EU civilian mission in Aceh. It led to the 
coordination of the development of policy on the EU and ASEAN monitoring 
mission in Aceh. It worked closely with the EU member states; the Commission; and 
related external parties such as the ASEAN countries, Norway and Switzerland. The 
EU member states, actively involved in the development of the EU policy on a joint 
EU and ASEAN monitoring mission, were the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Ireland, and several Nordic countries. The legislation papers and operation plan were 
authorized and adopted by the EU member states in the Council of Ministers. The 
report mechanism of the AMM was authorized by the Council of Ministers, 
represented by the High Representative of CFSP and the PSC. The High 
Representative of the CFSP and the PSC prepared and reported any AMM 
development to the representatives of EU member states at the Council. 
The Commission had a role to play in supporting the Council of Ministers 
through its complementary programmes, logistics and financial aid. Through the 
EU’s humanitarian and development assistance, the Commission played its role as a 
supporting actor in the implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh. With regard 
to the work of the AMM, the Commission complemented and combined its 
humanitarian and development assistance with the EU’s ESDP (Rintakoski et al, 
2006:6-7).  
Moreover, Commission official C argued that: “The European Commission 
provided support packages for the AMM”.63 This person explained that these 
packages involved programmes designed to support the economy and democracy 
within the Aceh province. The programme for democracy provided support with 
future elections; local human right courts; and civil courts within the city of Medan. 
The programme for the economy provided support for economic planning; and office 
of governor and with efforts to reintegrate former combatants.64 The Commission 
allocated  30,392,545 to its support programmes for a peace process in Aceh 
(European Commission, 2009b:4). 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 Interview with Commission official C, 2011. 
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Ahtisaari and the CMI were both an individual and a NGO who had intervening 
roles in the negotiation phase and the implementation phase of the peace agreement. 
As mediator and facilitator, they were involved actively in the negotiation process of 
the peace agreement between GoI and FAM. Ahtisaari was careful and decisive in 
translating and balancing the aspirations of both conflicting parties. He approached 
both parties and drafted the peace agreement based on his neutral position as a 
seasoned and respected mediator. He played his role as a bridge between the 
conflicting parties and the EU and ASEAN which might work together for the 
implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh. He persuaded and convinced high 
ranking officials from the Commission and the Council of the EU and representatives 
of the EU member states as to the importance of the collective action of the EU and 
ASEAN on the joint civilian mission in Aceh.    
Ahtisaari stated that: 
 
He was impressed how the EU could react professionally and quickly to his 
request to have monitors sent to Aceh. He was very grateful to 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and the High Representative Javier Solana 
because both were very supportive. Then, he needed member states, so he 
had gone to talk to member states. They had many demands actually 
because the EU asked more and more as the UN could not do everything 
and relied very much on regional actors. There was the special role as well 
that they had to assist regional organizations whether it was ASEAN or the 
African Union (CMI, 2008). 
 
In the implementation of the peace agreement, Ahtisaari’s role as the Chairman 
of the Board of the CMI was important since with regard to the dispute settlement 
mechanism he was a final decision maker for unresolved disputes. The peace 
agreement between GoI and FAM stated that the final decision on unresolved 
disputes would be taken by the Chairman of the Board of the CMI after consultations 
with the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs of the Republic of 
Indonesia and the political leader of FAM. Then, the Chairman of the Board of the 
CMI would inform the PSC. The final decision would be binding on all parties 
(AMM, 2005a:8). The participation of Ahtisaari and the CMI dealt with the dispute 
settlement activities and was supported by the RRM, the Norwegian Government and 
the Swiss Government (CMI, 2005:1).  
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 In considering the roles of various actors, I need to outline the institutional 
arrangement and legal basis for this EU policy in order to examine the way relevant 
actors interacted and how related actors were involved in the development of this EU 
policy. The institutional arrangement for the EU’s political and security policy 
towards South-East Asia was based on an inter-governmental framework and resided 
in the CFSP pillar. Title V of the Maastricht Treaty was the legal basis of the 
institutional arrangement in the CFSP pillar. The decision-making mechanism, in the 
area of CFSP, was based on consensus or unanimous decision amongst the EU 
member states (EUR-Lex, 1992b:1). The institutional arrangement for this EU policy 
was different from the institutional arrangement for a new partnership with South-
East Asia which was coordinated by the Commission with the consent of the 
Council, in the Community pillar, and was based on unanimity or a qualified 
majority mechanism for its decision-making. The EU asserted that the Community 
and CFSP pillars would coordinate and avoid their overlapping. Some revisions such 
as the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty were finalized by the EU to ensure 
the CFSP’s effectiveness (Europa, 2011a:1).       
Commission official C elaborated further on the institutional arrangement for 
the EU’s policy development for the AMM. This person explained that:  
You have in the Council various working groups. One was called Military 
Staff and they report to another working group called Military Committee. 
Then, you have a strategic planning guidance called the PSC and they 
report to the ambassadors, at the COREPER. Then, you have the Council. 
At the same time, in parallel you have the Commission on working groups 
and you have Director General, the body in the Commission that is one 
called RELEX. The Commission was represented everywhere. The 
Commissioner was Benita Ferro Walder. You have another Director 
General called Europe Aid. There was planning committee called 
Civcom.65 They all interacted.66 
 
Council official B demonstrated the process of development in the EU’s policy 
for the CSFP. This person explained that a draft of the policy was formulated at 
working group level, such as COASI (Asia-Oceania Working Party) within the 
Council of the EU. The draft of the policy was submitted to RELEX where all 
political and financial issues were drafted, discussed and scrutinized. Afterwards, the 
                                                 
65 The Committee for Planning of Civilian Crisis Management Missions. 
66 Interview with Commission official C, 2011. 
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PSC assessed the draft of the policy and agreed it. Subsequently, it would be agreed 
by the COREPER and, finally, the policy was concluded by the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council.67   
The process of the development of the EU’s policy towards Aceh started before 
the finalization of the peace negotiations between GoI and FAM. The Council of 
Ministers led the development of this EU policy. Through the EU’s support 
programmes, the Commission was responsible for supporting the Council of 
Ministers. The PSC deployed the Joint Council Secretariat/Commission observer 
mission to consider the possibility of a civilian mission in Aceh from 24 June to 2 
July 2005 (Herrberg, 2008:35). The observer mission’s report was concluded on 6 
July 2005.  
Following the above development, GoI and FAM declared their intention to 
invite the EU and ASEAN to assist with and monitor the implementation of a peace 
agreement. GoI sent invitations to the EU and ASEAN to participate in the AMM on 
12 July 2005. FAM declared, also, its support for EU and ASEAN participation in 
the AMM (Council of the EU, 2005j:3).  
Afterwards, the Council of the EU discussed the result of the observer 
mission’s assessment. The EU member states were divided into two different 
positions. On the one hand, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and France were 
supporters of the EU’s involvement in Aceh. On the other hand, all the other EU 
member states were reluctant to support the EU’s participation in Aceh because they 
did not regard Aceh as their political and security priorities. Their reasons were that 
Aceh was located in South-East Asia which, geographically, was far away from 
Europe. They were more concerned about their problems closer to home and the real 
challenges such as migration; human trafficking; and poverty issues in the Central 
and Eastern part of Europe; the African continent; and the Mediterranean region, 
(Braud and Grevi, 2005:21-22). 
The supporters of the EU’s involvement in Aceh approached the UK with the 
aim of working together to support the EU’s civilian mission in Aceh. At the Council 
of the EU, Ahtisaari and Feith persuaded the opponents from the EU member states 
to act together as a unitary actor to explain the challenges and potential of the EU’s 
                                                 
67 Interview with Council official B, 2011. 
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monitoring mission in Aceh. This opportunity would improve the EU’s profile, if the 
EU were to employ the CFSP in South-East Asia. The UK, which, at that time, held 
the presidency of the Council, was convinced by Ahtisaari’s and Feith’s explanation 
(Herrberg, 2008:34). The UK agreed to support the EU’s involvement in Aceh (UK 
Parliament, 2005a:1). The UK’s role was crucial in bridging the gap between 
supporters and opponents and uniting all EU member states (UK Parliament, 
2006:1). At the end, the Council agreed to support the EU’s involvement in Aceh. 
Commission official C added that, when they established the AMM, all of the EU 
member states supported the EU’s involvement in monitoring a peace agreement in 
Aceh. 68   
The Council of Ministers noted the report from the Joint Council Secretariat/ 
Commission’s initial observer mission to Aceh on 18 July 2005. It supported the 
final outcome of the peace negotiations between GoI and FAM. It agreed to prepare 
observers to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between GoI and 
FAM. The Council assigned related bodies, within the EU, to communicate with 
ASEAN and its member countries in order to establish a joint mission to monitor a 
peace agreement between GoI and FAM (Council of the EU, 2005a:13).  
With the PSC’s knowledge, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU 
sent, on 19 July 2005, a draft of a crisis management concept for an AMM to the 
delegations of EU member states (Council of the EU, 2005j:1). On the same date, the 
PSC invited RELEX to give advice, with regard to the legal, institutional and 
financial implications, on the possible options for a mission in Aceh. The PSC hoped 
that RELEX would provide advice at its next meeting of 26 July 2005. Meanwhile, 
the EU confirmed its involvement in monitoring the implementation of the peace 
agreement when, on 22 July 2005, it responded to a letter of invitation from GoI 
(Official Journal of the EU, 2005, Annex I:2).  
The RELEX held two meetings between 20 and 25 July 2005 to discuss the 
PSC’s request. Arising out of the RELEX meetings, the Presidency proposed to the 
delegations of the EU member states for consideration some points concerning the 
legal basis and financial budget for a mission in Aceh. The most important issues 
were the financial options for the mission in Aceh which were as follows: firstly, the 
                                                 
68 Interview with Commission official C, 2011.  
 125 
CFSP budget would cover all the mission’s financial expenses in Aceh. Secondly, 
the CFSP budget would cover partial financing and the rest of the expenses would be 
incurred by the EU member states. Thirdly, if the CFSP budget was insufficient to 
finance the mission, the Council would negotiate with the European Parliament to 
increase it further. Fourthly, the EU member states would be able to contribute on a 
voluntary basis. Fifthly, the mission would be funded by the RRM and the ALA 
programme with the Commission and EU member states agreeing a framework.  
Finally, the mission would be funded by a core CFSP budget and additional 
European Community measures with procedures and autonomous competence to 
support the main goals of the peace process in Indonesia (Council of the EU, 
2005c:8).  
There were several differences between the Commission and the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU when considering the legal basis for the budget 
affairs of the EU’s civilian mission in Aceh. Firstly, the Commission argued that the 
first stage of financial assistance for the AMM could be done through the RRM and 
the ALA programme (Council of the EU, 2005c:5). However, the Council Secretariat 
argued that the RRM and the ALA programme could not be used to finance civilian 
missions undertaken by the CFSP (Council of the EU, 2005d:1). 
The second difference in opinion between them concerned the readiness of the 
Commission to support the monitoring mission under the CFSP with direction and 
control from the PSC (Council of the EU, 2005c:5). However, the Council’s 
budgetary rules of the monitoring mission, based on Article 28.3 of the Title V 
Treaty of the EU (TEU) mentioned that: “Operating expenditure to which the 
implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged to the budget of 
the European Communities, except for such expenditure arising from operations 
having military or defence implications and cases where the Council unanimously 
decides otherwise” (EUR-Lex, 2006:23). Therefore, the CFSP budget was suitable 
for funding an ESDP mission in Aceh which would be implemented under Title V 
TEU (Council of the EU, 2005c:6).   
The third difference was over the AMM’s operational report and whether or not 
it would be provided by the Commission or the Council of the EU. Technically, the 
Commission should approve the amendment of the budget from the original plans 
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(the RRM and the ALA programme). Therefore, the lines of command, for the 
AMM, could reduce the PSC’s political control and the strategic direction. When 
implementing the ESDP, this situation could be a new precedent for the Commission. 
Consequently, the control of EU member states over the ESDP could be eroded 
because of this situation (Council of the EU, 2005c:6). The Council Secretariat 
argued that the RRM and the ALA programme were inappropriate mechanisms to 
fund security and military missions (Council of the EU, 2005d:1). At the time, the 
CFSP budget could provide  6 million for the first stage of the mission in Aceh 
(Council of the EU, 2005c:2).  
These differences led to uncertainty amongst the EU policy makers and the EU 
member states when they created and supported the AMM. The main reasons were, 
firstly, there was no clear information with regard to the concrete situation in Aceh 
and, secondly, there was no budget prediction for the AMM. The General Secretariat 
of the EU Council calculated the estimated fund, for an operation by the AMM in 
Aceh, to be  13 million (Braud and Grevi, 2005:26). This calculation was based on 
the latest field assessment in Aceh and on other experiences of the EU civilian 
missions in the world (Ibid).  
The PSC had a meeting on 26 July 2005 to work on a comprehensive plan for 
the EU monitoring mission which could be discussed and decided by the Council of 
Ministers in early September 2005. At the meeting, Solana, during the attendance of 
Ahtisaari, argued that the EU should deploy its civilian mission and that its financial 
support could be provided by the CFSP budget. The reason for this was that the final 
round of discussions between GoI and FAM was successful, which urged the EU 
member states to establish AMM as noted in a draft MoU between GoI and FAM and 
determined the stance of the EU when sending its mission to Aceh (Herrberg, 
2008:35).  
Solana discussed preparations for monitoring the peace agreement with 
ASEAN countries at the post-ministerial meeting of ASEAN and the ARF on 28 and 
29 July 2005 in Vientienne, Lao PDR (Europe, 2005b:3). In August 2005, the EU, 
advanced ASEAN countries and GoI intensified their communication in order to 
reaffirm and consult on their concrete actions for their joint mission. The EU and 
ASEAN established the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) and the Initial 
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Monitoring Presence (IMP) to prepare and collect all relevant information for the 
formulation of the policy initiative and the preparation of the operation plan. I 
discuss, in greater detail in the next section, the interactions between the EU and 
ASEAN when the TAM and the IMP was established.  
 However, at this point, it must be noted that these interactions led the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU (the PSC) to propose, to the delegations of the 
EU member states on 31 August 2005, legislative acts (Council of the EU, 2005e:1) 
and a legislative financial statement for Joint Action by the Council on the AMM. In 
the end, a legislative financial statement was based on Article 14 of the TEU which 
was indicated by way of a financial reference to the amount of money required for 
the whole duration and the conditions for the implementation of the Joint Action. 
The fund for the Joint Action was based on the will of the relevant political authority 
and the availability of commitment appropriations for the financial year (Ibid, p.4 
and Council of the EU, 2005b:3). It demonstrated financial commitment from the 
Council of the EU (2005b:1-10); contributions in kind by the EU member states; and 
bilateral contributions by non EU member states.    
On 9 September 2005, the Council of Ministers agreed to Joint Action 
2005/643/CFSP on the AMM. The PSC agreed to a draft of an operation plan for the 
AMM. Later, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU sent a draft of the 
above plan to the delegations of the EU member states for their authorization 
(Council of the EU, 2005f:1). Then, the AMM was formed on 15 September 2005. 
The Council of Ministers authorized the Presidency of the Council to make 
arrangements for the participation of Third States. These were based on Article 10 of 
Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP on the AMM and Article 24 of the TEU which stated 
that: 
“The Secretary-General/High Representative, assisting the Presidency 
may negotiate such arrangements on its behalf. Where the EU and a Third 
State have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the 
participation of these Third States in the EU crisis management 
operations, the provisions of such an agreement shall apply in the context 
of the AMM” (Council of the EU, 2005a:15).  
 
The UK, as the President of the Council, made and signed agreements in the 
form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and participating ASEAN countries 
for their involvement in the AMM (Council of the EU, 2005h:1). These agreements 
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were signed by Charles Humfrey (British Ambassador to Indonesia) and sent to 
participating ASEAN countries on 26 October 2005. These agreements explained the 
invitation for ASEAN countries to join the AMM and the status, privileges and 
immunities for the personnel deployed. These were based on the agreement between 
the EU, GoI and ASEAN countries (Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2005:1).  
Overall, the EU member states and the Council of Ministers were the relevant 
actors in the development of the EU’s policy for the AMM. The Joint Action 
2005/643/CFSP on the AMM was taken on the basis of the Council of Ministers’ 
unanimous decision. The development of this EU policy was divided into two levels 
as follows: firstly, the administrative level of policy initiation, preparation and 
implementation; and, secondly, the political level of the decision-making 
mechanism. At the administrative level, the General Secretariat of the Council of the 
EU coordinated with the Commission the formulation of the policy initiative; the 
operation plan; and the financial legislation for the monitoring mission in Aceh. 
Before arriving at the Council of Ministers, the PSC and the COREPER discussed 
the policy initiative; an operation plan; and the financial legislation. Within the 
process of this EU policy development, the PSC and the Commission had different 
approaches for financing the AMM. At the political level, the Council of Ministers 
acted unanimously to reach a joint action plan on Aceh. Led by the High 
Representative of CFSP, it prepared an operation plan and coordinated the 
implementation of the EU policy.  
The institutional arrangement of this EU policy was a basis of support for 
relevant actors to coordinate and interact between themselves in order to tackle 
political and administrative issues in the creation of AMM. It enabled the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission to have legal debates which had implications for the 
possibility of change in the line of command and for any financial contribution by 
the EU institutions and member states to the EU mission. These debates shaped the 
potential routes which the EU initiatives could take (Zito, 2000:171) particularly on 
the EU’s decision to take on the ESDP in Aceh. The institutional arrangement 
provided options for relevant actors which would have implications for the 
institutional mechanisms and the financial structures of CFSP and the Community 
pillars. For example: firstly, the change in actors’ competence would erode the 
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authority of EU member states in the ESDP; and, secondly, the financial sources for 
ESDP would become an unclear issue in fund allocation from the CFSP or the 
Community budgets. 
The Commission, Ahtisaari and the CMI were the related actors in the 
development of this EU policy. The Commission supported the implementation of 
this EU policy through such as logistics, supplementary programmes and budgetary 
supports. Ahtisaari (the CMI) had an intervening role by persuading and convincing 
the EU member states to support a monitoring mission in Aceh. He would be, also, a 
final decision maker for unresolved disputes in the implementation of a peace 
agreement between GoI and FAM. In short, the Council and the EU member states 
shared a common position with the Commission and Ahtisaari (the CMI) in 
supporting this EU policy. This demonstrated how these above mentioned actors 
(especially EU member states and the Council of Ministers) influenced the 
development of this EU policy. 
 
5.3.2. The Promotion of Interests or Values in the EU’s Policy Development on 
the EU and ASEAN monitoring mission  
 
I argue that the development of the EU’s policy on the EU and ASEAN 
monitoring mission in Aceh was driven by the promotion of the EU member states’ 
politico-security interests and the EU’s global interest with regard to the South-East 
Asia region. Additionally, the Commission promoted the EU’s humanitarian values 
in helping GoI after the tsunami disaster. It was involved in humanitarian action; 
rehabilitation; and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias Island.    
The EU institutions perceived the AMM as a means of promoting a 
combination of the EU’s interests and values. Commission official C stated that: 
“Yes, it is about political and security interest. Things are usually more complex than 
that”.69 Council official B pointed out that: “The EU promoted political and security 
interests and also values at the same time. The European Council promoted peace 
and democracy as its values in the principle of EU treaty”.70 
There are four examples which illustrate the EU member states’ politico-
security interests and the EU’s global interest in respect of South-East Asia. These 
                                                 
69 Interview with Commission official C, 2011. 
70 Interview with Council official B, 2011. 
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are, firstly, according to the research data, the UK was interested in ensuring that, 
during the period of the British EU presidency, the EU could expand its presence and 
influence in South-East Asia (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2005:26). The UK 
held the presidency of the EU from July to December 2005. Jack Straw, the British 
Foreign Secretary coordinated the Council of the EU. On behalf the EU Council 
Presidency, he welcomed the deployment of the AMM in Indonesia. He pointed out 
that a peaceful solution between two conflicting parties in Aceh would be of benefit 
to Indonesia and the people of Aceh and would be a valuable example at regional and 
international level (Europe, 2005e:5). 
An official, from the UK, explained the UK considered that the EU presence in 
the South-East Asia region had shown civilian capability/operation in Aceh, 
Indonesia. The UK wanted to see that the EU was capable of responding to the 
problem with a civilian mission, monitoring and police training. Aceh was a test case 
for the EU in the region.71 The EU member states’ interest was demonstrated by the 
realization of the EU’s role in civilian and military operations in other parts of the 
world. The AMM aimed to build a close link with the EU’s ongoing project of 
improving the EU’s role in this region. The EU member states wanted the EU to 
maintain a peaceful and stable situation in this region. Collectively, via the AMM, 
the EU could test its Civilian Crisis Management and implement a Civil-Military 
Planning Cell (Howorth, 2007:212).   
Another official from the UK explained that, through the AMM, the UK was 
involved actively in humanitarian assistance and also peace monitoring in Aceh. This 
person stated that:  
In the case of Aceh, people in the UK were very affected by the 
tsunami.[…] That also made a big difference to the way that we reacted 
when we were asked to help. I just think that people felt that Aceh had had 
enough, the Aceh people deserved better for the peace. We sent peace 
keeping missions to various places which were something we could 
contribute and part of our contribution. I know the British Ambassador 
who was in Indonesia at that time was very active.72  
 
This person further explained that: “The fact was that there had been 30 years of 
conflict and nobody really knew about it. There was pressure for a long time to do 
                                                 
71 Q&A session with a national official of the UK at a seminar in the UK, March 2010.  
72 Interview with a UK national official, Jakarta, 29 July 2010. 
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something. Yes, we were very active but it was not just us, we had many partners 
within the EU who were very keen to help”.73  
According to the UK’s official document, the UK government reported that: 
“The government fully supports the continued development of EU relationships with 
regional organizations, including with ASEAN where the cooperation on the 2005-
06 EU-led Monitoring Mission in Aceh demonstrated what could be achieved” (UK 
Parliament, 2008, Chapter 4:9). 
Secondly, as discussed previously, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Nordic countries wanted to implement the first EU CFSP/ESDP operation in South-
East Asia. The reasons were: firstly, Nordic countries were the initiators in the 
creation of a civilian aspect of the ESDP (Keukeleire and Mac Naughtan, 2008:181); 
and, secondly, the others hoped the EU could increase stability and its profile in 
South-East Asia. We can see clearly their interest in supporting the AMM through 
their real contributions in order to add the contribution for monitoring the 
implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh (see Table 5.1) to the Council of the 
EU. They were major financial and logistic donors for the operation of the AMM in 
Aceh. The peace talks between GoI and FAM, mediated by Ahtisaari and the CMI, 
were supported by financial assistance from the Netherlands Government and the 
Finnish Government (CMI, 2005b:1). Germany and France were supportive, also, of 
the development of the EU policy on Aceh particularly with regard to the mediation 
role performed by the AMM. Germany undertook to provide technical assistance 
through the EU which would promote mediation and peace building in Aceh.74 
France contributed civilian monitors for the EU’s observer mission and the AMM 
(French Embassy in the UK, 2005:1).   
Thirdly, according to the research data, the EU wanted to develop a good 
relationship with Indonesia because it was a leading actor in ASEAN and a vital 
partner of the EU in South-East Asia. The developments in ASEAN were connected 
with Indonesia. It was, also, the most populous moslem nation which had moderate 
views on Islam. Commission official H explained that: “Why we so concerned about 
                                                 
73 Ibid.  
74 Interview with a national German official, Jakarta, July 2010. 
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Aceh? Because we were helping sort out the longest civil war in the biggest moslem 
country which had strategic importance for us”.75  
The armed conflict in Aceh would affect political security and economic 
situations in Indonesia and, also, in South-East Asia. This situation could have 
crucial implications, particularly with regard to the security of shipping traffic in the 
Malacca straits; and the refugees and internally displaced people. Commission 
official B stated that:  
Aceh was important for two reasons as follows: first, it demonstrated that 
Indonesia was an incredible partner. Do not forget that Indonesia is a 
leading partner in ASEAN. […] The fact that ASEAN as a group was 
moving forward also had to do with Indonesia. Indonesian leadership is 
important. Second, ASEAN played a role in that. It improved the 
counterpart aspect of both Indonesia and ASEAN.76 
 
This person added that: “Indonesia is a crucial country because it is a dominant 
Moslem country that is fighting radicalism. We want to have stronger links with a 
moderate Moslem country. Demonstrate the other side, to dis-link between Islam 
and terrorism that is very important. Beside security interests to do with Malacca 
strait, refugees, stability of the region, it is also at that time was very important”.77 
Fourthly, the Netherlands had special interests in Indonesia because Indonesia 
was an important former Dutch colony. An official from the Netherlands qualified 
the above argument by saying that: “The Netherlands would be very much in support 
of it and also contributing to this. There is a special relationship between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia.[…] This would be a special case. The Netherlands would 
be cautious and very eager/willing to help, if Indonesian authority would be okay 
with that”.78 According to this person, there were special domestic interests on the 
part of the Dutch people and parliament to support the Dutch government in being 
pro-active in encouraging the EU to be involved in Aceh.79    
The Council of Ministers, representing the EU, demonstrated its political and 
security interests in supporting international peace and security especially in South-
East Asia. In October 2005, Jack Straw, representing the Council, explained that 
                                                 
75 Q&A session with Commission official H, 2010. 
76 Interview with Commission official B, 2011. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Interview with a national official from the Netherlands, Brussels, 31 March 2011. 
79 Ibid. 
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AMM was the first ESDP mission to be deployed in Asia and underlined the EU’s 
commitment to peace in Aceh. It was in line, also, with the European Security 
Strategy and contributed effectively to the development of CFSP/ESDP (Council of 
the EU, 2005i:12).   
The EU institutions and the EU member states had integrated their actions in 
their civilian peace mission; and in their humanitarian action and development 
programmes in Aceh and Nias Island. They divided their actions into three phases; 
humanitarian; rehabilitation; and reconstruction. The EU member states provided 
their development assistance through regional and bilateral channels. Examples were 
that the Commission, on behalf of the EU (regional channel), was the biggest 
contributor to humanitarian action, reconstruction and to the peace process in Aceh 
and Nias Island (USD 282.24 million). The EU member states such as the 
Netherlands (USD 171.60 million), the UK (USD 76.01 million), Sweden (USD 
20.72 million), Denmark (USD 18.03 million), Germany (USD 13.93 million), 
Belgium (USD 11.05 million), Finland (USD 10.13) and Ireland (USD 1.20 million) 
provided bilaterally their development assistance to GoI (European Commission, 
2009b:3 and World Bank, 2011:1).80 The EU’s humanitarian and development aid 
complemented its peace mission which promoted its values to Indonesia and South-
East Asia.  
The development of the EU’s policy on the EU and ASEAN monitoring 
mission in Aceh was driven by the promotion of the EU member states’ politico-
security interests and by a collective interest of the EU with regard to South-East 
Asia (Council of the EU, 2005j:2-3). The UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and the 
Nordic countries encouraged the EU to employ CFSP/ESDP in Aceh for the purpose 
of creating a stable South-East Asia region. The EU aimed, also, to build a good 
relationship with Indonesia as the biggest populous Moslem country around the 
globe. This meant that key member states influenced still the policy outcome of the 
EU and ASEAN monitoring mission. They persuaded other EU member states to 
achieve a joint action based on a consensus decision within the inter-governmental 
framework.  
                                                 
80 See Appendix 8.  
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All EU member states used the CFSP/ESDP to act collectively based on their 
own limited resources within the framework of the EU civilian mission. With regard 
to the CFSP/ESDP, the EU wanted to promote common EU politico-security 
interests in order to increase its profile in South-East Asia and in Asia. Also, the EU 
included partly its humanitarian and developmental values in its ESDP in Aceh 
because it aimed to preserve peace and stability in South-East Asia. These values 
played a role as well in complementing the EU’s politico-security interests. Overall, 
when developing this EU policy, the promotion of politico-security interests was the 
main influence rather than common EU values.   
 
5.3.3. Mode of Engagement between the EU and ASEAN  
The EU had employed consultations and monitoring mechanisms as its modes 
of engagement to interact with ASEAN. The PSC and the High Representative for 
the CFSP represented the EU to communicate and work with ASEAN within the 
framework of the AMM. Feith was a facilitator to bridge between the PSC, ASEAN 
countries, GoI and FAM. The EU started to engage in peace talks between GoI and 
FAM when the CMI invited the EU’s involvement in the fourth round of 
negotiations. The EU’s officials gave a presentation about the EU’s role as a 
monitoring body, if GoI and FAM achieved a peace agreement.  
At the same time, the PSC discussed the possibility of deploying an observer 
mission in Aceh. In a communication between Ahtisaari and Solana and with the 
consent of GoI and FAM, it was agreed to send an observer mission to Aceh. The 
EU, ASEAN and the CMI sent their own observer mission to Aceh on 28 June 2005. 
The observer mission aimed to assess the latest situation in Aceh; its infrastructure; 
and the facilities for a future peace monitoring mission. It consisted of twelve 
representatives from the EU, ASEAN and the CMI. There were 7 persons from the 
EU, 3 persons from ASEAN and 2 persons from the CMI (Antara, 2005a:1).  
The PSC engagement continued, by assisting GoI and FAM, to implement a 
peace agreement. The EU accepted a letter of invitation from GoI which was 
endorsed by FAM. Subsequently, the Council of Ministers gave its assent to the PSC 
to invite and talk with ASEAN in order to discuss joint action for the civilian mission 
in Aceh. As mentioned earlier, there were 5 advanced ASEAN countries interested in 
and involved in this monitoring mission.  
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Following this background, the EU and ASEAN divided their joint action into 
two phases: (1) the phase of preparation; and (2) the phase of implementation. In 
considering the preparation phase, the EU employed a consultation mechanism as its 
mode of engagement with ASEAN. In this joint mission, the EU and ASEAN agreed 
to share areas of expertise and resources. On the one hand, the EU developed the 
planning framework and the financial support for a joint monitoring mission. On the 
other hand, ASEAN countries recognized the Acehnese culture; and its religion 
(Islam) and traditions. A majority of ASEAN monitors could speak Indonesian 
language when communicating with and understanding the Acehnese people (Feith, 
2007:4-5).  
The EU, ASEAN and GoI had consultation meetings on 1 and 2 August 2005. 
The delegation of the EU, led by Feith, consisted of seven persons from the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU, the Commission, the EU Presidency and the 
CivMil Cell. There were five delegations from the participating ASEAN countries 
(Antara, 2005b:1). The meetings aimed to discuss and scrutinize the work 
mechanism and technical issues for a future monitoring mission. The representatives 
of the EU, ASEAN and GoI discussed the possibility of cooperation between the EU 
and ASEAN when monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement between 
these conflicting parties once it was signed. Meanwhile, the foreign ministers of the 
EU and ASEAN countries agreed to support a peace process between GoI and FAM 
and the possibility of deploying a joint monitoring mission between the EU and 
ASEAN in Aceh (Europe, 2005f:3).   
In the consultation meetings, the EU shared its strategy with ASEAN countries 
and GoI in order to formulate legislative papers and an operation plan for the AMM. 
In order to reach a collective position on the monitoring mission in Aceh, ASEAN’s 
5 member states and GoI included their aspirations in the EU strategy. The main 
results of their consultation meetings were, as follows: firstly, they reaffirmed their 
intention to establish the AMM. Secondly, at the same time, the EU and ASEAN 
established the joint EU-ASEAN TAM and the IMP. Their aim was to prepare for 
the EU and ASEAN civilian mission. Thirdly, the AMM planned to implement its 
mission for six months with the possibility of a further six months. The EU led the 
AMM for the first six months with Feith (Netherlands/the EU) as its Head and 
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Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek (Thailand/ASEAN) as the Principal Deputy 
Head (Council of the EU, 2005f:4-5). Feith received a mandate to lead and bridge the 
TAM and the IMP because he understood the institutional mechanisms and 
bureaucratic procedures within the EU.   
On 3 August 2005, the joint EU-ASEAN TAM and GoI visited Aceh to observe 
the latest situation there. The assessment mission consisted of 28 people who were 
18 from the EU, 6 from ASEAN and 4 from GoI (Antara, 2005c:1). The TAM aimed 
to assess the AMM’s technical and logistic needs and to map the field situation. It 
prepared the Concept of Operations for the effective deployment of the IMP which 
had not received a formal mandate from the Council of Ministers. When preparing 
logistics for the AMM, the TAM faced difficulties because Aceh was swept away by 
the tsunami. The TAM composed an operation plan in the field and sent it to 
Brussels for discussions at the PSC and finalization at the Council of Ministers. The 
development of the EU’s policy for a joint EU and ASEAN monitoring mission was 
based on the TAM’s final report which took into account the intentions and 
aspirations of GoI, FAM and ASEAN countries.  
The EU and ASEAN established the IMP as a preparatory body for a 
monitoring process in Aceh lasting from 15 August to 15 September 2005. The IMP 
followed up with a field assessment report of the TAM after the peace agreement 
was signed by both conflicting parties. The IMP would operate after the TAM 
finished its mission for a field assessment in Aceh. The IMP’s objectives were to 
build people’s confidence in the peace agreement and to create the AMM (2005b:1). 
The IMP was established within 12 days of the deployment of TAM (Feith, 2007:3-
4). The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU planned for the IMP to be 
deployed before 15 September 2005 in order to provide training for the EU and 
ASEAN monitors in the early stages of the implementation of the peace agreement. 
There were two preparation teams to support the establishment of the IMP. As 
explained previously, the first team dealt with political and budgetary affairs in 
Brussels. The second team tackled all field issues in Aceh. Arising out of this 
process, the PSC consolidated the formulation of legislative papers for the Council 
Joint Action on the AMM. 
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In practice, the IMP faced many obstacles such as the lack of financial support 
with regard to financial and technical issues, for the preliminary mission in Aceh. 
Most EU officials covered their own travel fees and accommodation costs. The EU 
member states assisted IMP members to accomplish their early mission, for example: 
Sweden and the UK contributed funds (UK Parliament, 2005a:1). Before 15 
September 2005, the IMP provided special training for the EU and ASEAN monitors 
(Council of the EU, 2005k:11) in FAM demobilization; weapons decommission; 
amnesty for FAM activists; and reintegration of former combatants 
 In considering the implementation phase, the EU and ASEAN operated their 
mission by applying a monitoring mechanism through the AMM. The AMM divided 
its tasks into three stages, as follows: (1) the stage of decommission and 
redeployment; (2) the stage of reintegration for FAM, including an amnesty for FAM 
and taking into account the human rights situation; and (3) the stage of legislation 
change.  
In the stage of decommission and redeployment, the AMM monitored the 
decommissioning and disarmament of FAM. It took three months to take possession 
of 840 weapons from FAM and destroy them in December 2005. Between September 
and December 2005, it monitored the redeployment of military troops and police 
forces from Aceh. The total number of military troops and police forces were 25,890 
people and 5,791 people respectively. The tasks of AMM were based on Articles 4 
and 5 of the MoU which focused on the security agreement (AMM, 2005b:1). 
In the FAM reintegration stage, the AMM monitored the implementation of the 
FAM reintegration process which focused only on an amnesty for FAM 
activists/combatants with regard to the human rights situation in Aceh. On 31 August 
2005, GoI gave an amnesty to all political prisoners and ex-combatants of FAM. GoI 
provided an integration fund for 3,000 people from FAM. GoI built the Aceh 
Reintegration Agency (ARA) on 15 February 2006. The ARA consisted of 
government representatives, FAM’s representatives, NGOs and academics. It aimed 
to work closely with local and national governments and international donors to form 
and implement post-conflict livelihood-projects for ex-combatants of FAM. The 
AMM monitored the works of the ARA in order to assist the FAM reintegration 
process. It considered the human rights issues for the ex-FAM members and 
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combatants. It supported the improvement in knowledge and appreciation on the part 
of civil servants and NGO activists with regard to human rights. The AMM created 
the Commission of Security Arrangement (COSA)81. COSA had regular meetings 
every week at district and provincial levels to discuss the progress of the 
reintegration process, incidents and other kinds of issues. 
With the approval of GoI and FAM, the EU extended the AMM operation was 
three times between February, June and September 2006. This extension was caused 
by the lengthy political transition process which was time consuming particularly 
when waiting for legislation on governing Aceh to come into effect and the time 
needed to process the local election in Aceh. Solana stated as follows: “I am certain 
that this extension will contribute to the further strengthening in confidence and trust 
between the two parties” (Falletti, 2006a:14 and 2006b:14).   
After the Indonesian Parliament’s revision of the Law on Governing Aceh, 
GoI, FAM and the AMM agreed to observe and secure the provincial election in 
Aceh which was scheduled for 11 December 2006 (Falletti, 2006c:12). The election 
was held in a peaceful and democratic manner. Irwandi Yusuf, FAM’s former leader, 
was elected as the Governor of Aceh.  
Furthermore, Feith declared that: “It’s not often that we can claim success at 
the end of a crisis management mission. We have shown what we are capable of, but 
it is up to the governments of the region to take the initiative” (Falletti, 2006d:14). 
Solana emphasized that: “After thirty years of armed conflict, peace and stability 
have been restored to Aceh. It’s a great success” (Ibid). He added that this collective 
mission between the EU and ASEAN was “an important new phase in the EU and 
ASEAN cooperation” (Europe, 2005c:2). In 2007, at the 30 year Commemorative 
Summit between the two regions in Singapore (Council of the EU, 2007b:3), the EU 
and ASEAN recognized AMM’s good performance. 
Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN countries took the form of an 
innovative peace monitoring mission because the two regional organizations were 
working together. The EU and ASEAN applied a pro-active monitoring mechanism. 
They were not only monitoring and providing comments for all relevant parties in the 
implementation of the peace agreement but, also, they sought contacts with all 
                                                 
81 It consisted of representatives from the GoI, FAM and the AMM. 
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relevant parties in order to solve problems as they arose and to drive the peace 
process in the right direction. They established the COSA mechanism. All parties 
agreed that COSA was a means in assisting the peace process to move forward in a 
constructive and positive way (AMM, 2006:1). 
Commission official C explained that there were positive and innovative 
exchanges between the EU and ASEAN countries when they worked together on 
establishing the AMM and monitored the implementation of the peace agreement. 
This person argued that, when it interacted with ASEAN, the EU applied 
consultation and monitoring mechanisms as modes of engagement. This person 
pointed out that:  
ASEAN’s participation emerged as a useful addition or necessity. It was in 
the air, it was also an organic process. It was understood that way and 5 
ASEAN members were willing to join. One point I would like to make on 
the mission: it was innovative. The way you interprete things conveys your 
reality. Monitoring, in theory, means that you stay outside the process. You 
are an observer. You see how things evolve and you comment. This was 
accepted as a common concept of monitoring but in reality we went a step 
further.82 
 
Council official B added that: “There were interactions between the EU and 
ASEAN, through consultation and monitoring. The EU engaged with GoI, ASEAN 
countries and the Local Government in Aceh”.83 
The AMM had implications at the local/national and regional level through its 
proactive approach in Aceh. At the local/national level, the AMM included GoI and 
FAM in the monitoring process. The AMM maintained communication with both 
parties and civil society organizations in order to build trust and confidence amongst 
stakeholders. At the regional level, the AMM was a crucial stepping stone for 
ASEAN to build a political and security community in South-East Asia. ASEAN 
could develop self-sufficiency during the negotiations on the peace process and 
implementing peace on the ground and, thereby, preserving a peace agreement 
between both conflicting parties (Feith, 2007:4-5). 
On the whole, modes of engagement had an effect on relevant actors within the 
EU. They had linked co-operatively during the development process of the EU’s 
                                                 
82 Interview with Commission official C, 2011.  
83 Interview with Council official B, 2011. 
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policy on the EU and ASEAN joint monitoring mission in Aceh. The EU’s 
implementation of consultation and monitoring mechanisms involved relevant actors 
within the EU together with ASEAN, GoI, FAM and Ahtisaari (the CMI) with the 
aim of creating the AMM and implementing the AMM’s tasks.  
In the preparation phase, the PSC and ASEAN, with the assistance of GoI, 
FAM and the CMI, worked together, in their consultation meetings in Jakarta, to 
establish the TAM and the IMP as corner stones for the creation of AMM. The EU 
and ASEAN exchanged aspirations and distributed assignments between them in 
order to assess the field situation and to fulfill the AMM’s needs. The PSC used a 
final assessment of TAM as a basis to formulate the operation plan for the Council 
Joint Action on the AMM which were to be authorized by the Council of Ministers. 
In the implementation phase, the EU and ASEAN worked together to monitor the 
implementation of the peace agreement. Ahtisaari found a solution for unresolved 
disputes between GoI and FAM. These interactions between relevant actors, within 
the EU, and other actors outside the EU had been carried out through consultation 
and monitoring in the preparation and the implementation phases. These modes of 
engagement were the modus operandi of the EU, ASEAN and other actors outside 
the EU for exchanging ideas; building a cross-actor consensus; and executing the 
agreement. The EU, ASEAN and other actors, from outside the EU, were inclined to 
adjust and aggregate their aspirations. The consultation mechanism facilitated the 
dynamic interactions of these actors and supported a pro-active monitoring 
mechanism which went further than the general concept of monitoring. The EU-
ASEAN monitoring mission was not only observing but, also, verifying and urging 
the implementation of a peace agreement in Aceh. 
 
5.3.4. The Level of Political and Security Integration within ASEAN  
At that time, within ASEAN, there was no high level of political and security 
integration because ASEAN focused more on its economic consolidation in the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and other institutional instruments for the 
ASEAN Community as a whole. I examined the latest preparation for ASEAN 
political and security integration when the EU and ASEAN cooperated on the 
monitoring mission in Aceh. I aimed to understand the way in which ASEAN 
conceived its regional political and security integration. Then, I explain the 
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relationship between the level of ASEAN’s regional political and security integration 
and the development of the EU’s policy on the EU and ASEAN monitoring mission 
in Aceh.  
In the 2000s, we were in an emerging multipolar world (Lin and Dailami, 
2011:1). The implications of the above situation were, firstly, the global powers (eg. 
the US, China and India) were not involved in ideological conflict as in the Cold War 
era. Secondly, many actors were involved in global affairs, for example, nation 
states; regional and international organizations. Power was distributed amongst many 
actors in IR. Thirdly, the scope of issues focused not only on politico-military 
matters but, covered, also, other political, economic, conflict prevention, trans-
national crimes and environmental degradation issues (CRIS, 2010:10). 
Consequently, nation states were involved in political and security engagements, if 
there were interests and resources-constraints in the region. In order to address the 
above developments, nation states consolidated and integrated their competence and 
resources within a regional organization. Political and security integration was a 
regional organization’s long-term objective and was designed to cope with the 
challenges and developments as indicated above. 
With regard to ASEAN, amongst its member states and non-member states, it 
had two main channels of political and security collaboration such as the ARF and 
the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC). The ARF was a forum for 
discussing political and security issues within the South-East Asia region in order to 
achieve stability there. It aimed to open consultation on new and common political 
and security issues which emerged as a result of a changing world. It contributed to 
preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific regions, such as confidence-building; early-
warning systems; and fact-finding (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010a:1). ASEAN worked 
together with other external partners to create a conducive and constructive 
relationship in South-East Asia.  
In 2003, the ASEAN leaders ratified the APSC based on the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II. The ASEAN leaders decided on the acceleration and realization 
of the ASEAN Community to 2015. The ASEAN leaders can relax the APSC 
blueprint beyond 2015, if ASEAN needs to strengthen its consolidation and to 
improve the overall capacity of the ASEAN countries (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009e:5). 
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The APSC is based on the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action which 
included many activities designed to realize this Community’s aims (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2010f:1). The Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) covered the 
measurement for progress between 2004 and 2010. In 2005, ASEAN countries were 
preparing still the ASEAN Charter as its legal foundation. They were formulating the 
blueprint which would cover a roadmap and a time-schedule for the realization of 
this Community in 2015.  
Based on the above explanation and as mentioned in Chapter 3 the level of 
political and security integration within ASEAN, at that time, was categorized as a 
weaker form of political and security integration. It meant that ASEAN countries 
formed a political and security cooperation based on flexible inter-governmental 
agreements such as the ARF and the early ratification of APSC. ASEAN countries 
employed the ARF as a diplomatic means to promote its political and security 
cooperation with its external partners in order to maintain regional stability in South-
East Asia. Political and security cooperation within ASEAN countries was based still 
on a state-regime. Unlike the EU, ASEAN was not a supranational organization.  
These situations had profound implications. The development of the EU’s 
policy towards the EU and ASEAN monitoring mission and the level of ASEAN’s 
political and security integration were interconnected. The Council of Ministers 
accepted a level of ASEAN political and security integration because the first EU-
ASEAN joint monitoring mission, in South-East Asia, would be able to test and 
develop further its ESDP Civilian Crisis Management (Council of the EU, 2007h:2). 
Also, a successful monitoring mission might contribute positively to the development 
of the ASEAN Security Community (Council of the EU, 2007a:2). The EU and 
ASEAN believed that the joint EU and ASEAN monitoring mission in Aceh would 
foster and improve the level of ASEAN’s political and security integration (Council 
of the EU, 2007b:3). The EU realized that it needed the involvement of ASEAN in 
order to form a legitimate joint civilian mission in this region (Council of the EU, 
2006a:18). It encouraged ASEAN contributing countries to join the AMM. The EU 
viewed ASEAN as a valuable partner in the AMM because ASEAN was a neutral 
party and could be accepted by GoI and FAM as a monitoring body.   
 143 
As pointed out by Commission official C: “The level of integration in ASEAN 
at that time was not terribly decisive, I would say, because ASEAN although you 
made progress in your level of integration with your ASEAN charter [...]. You have 
not and still have not-and maybe you do not want to-reached a level of supranational 
integration that we have in the EU”.84 This person further stated that “the question 
was always if ASEAN then which ASEAN member state would represent ASEAN 
[...]. We always said that if the boss of AMM is a European and then the deputy must 
be from ASEAN”.85 Council official B added that “the level of ASEAN integration 
was not decisive at that time”.86  
 Considering it from the side of GoI and ASEAN, according to Awaluddin, GoI 
trusted and respected ASEAN countries fully in their involvement in monitoring the 
implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh. Each of the ASEAN countries 
considered that solidarity amongst members was very high. This solidarity was 
regarded as a basis of regional integration within ASEAN. It was a philosophical 
foundation for the creation of ASEAN. The participation of ASEAN countries in the 
AMM was shown in the implementation of ASEAN’s founding.87 ASEAN agreed 
that the AMM provided a framework of cooperation between ASEAN countries to 
resolve conflicts and developed the ASEAN Security Community whilst 
strengthening EU-ASEAN politico-security ties (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005c:1).    
 In considering it from the EU’s side, the Council of Ministers understood that 
ASEAN had only the ARF as a venue in which to discuss political and security 
issues in South-East Asia. It is important to acknowledge the fact that ASEAN 
announced its future objective to establish the APSC based on the 2003 ASEAN 
Concord II. The EU took all such aspects into consideration. The EU realized that 
when, in 2005, it established the AMM with ASEAN, it was the weaker form of 
ASEAN political and security integration. In July 2005, the Council assigned related 
bodies, within the EU, to open communication with ASEAN in order to create the 
AMM. The EU persuaded ASEAN, particularly advanced ASEAN countries, to join 
                                                 
84 Interview with Commission official C, 2011.   
85 Ibid.    
86 Interview with Council official B, 2011. 
87 Interview with Hamid Awaluddin, the GoI, E-mail, 31 May 2011.  
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a collective monitoring mission. These advanced ASEAN countries were 
representing ASEAN.  
Overall, within ASEAN, the level of political and security integration reflected 
a period when such integration was less robust. Within ASEAN, the level of political 
and security integration was relevant but it was not decisive in the development of 
this EU policy. Interestingly, the EU needed the involvement of ASEAN in the 
monitoring mission in order to legitimize its actions and to increase its credibility in 
Indonesia and South-East Asia. Commission official D argued that: “The EU sees 
itself as sharing many characteristics with ASEAN as a regional institution and felt 
that a joint approach with ASEAN gave it added strength and legitimacy”.88 At the 
same time, ASEAN countries could demonstrate their ASEAN solidarity with 
Indonesia through their involvement in the AMM. Their involvement would 
contribute to ASEAN political and security integration because of their experience in 
dealing with politico-security conflicts in South-East Asia. This situation would 
develop the EU-ASEAN politico-security cooperation.  
Therefore, there was a co-operative linkage between the level of political and 
security integration within ASEAN and the promotion of the EU’s politico-security 
interests. These internal and external factors fitted with one another. This situation 
led the EU to persuade advanced ASEAN countries to participate in the joint EU and 
ASEAN monitoring mission in Aceh. The EU acknowledged the level of political 
and security integration within ASEAN when it developed the joint EU and ASEAN 
monitoring mission in Aceh. 
 
5.3.5. External Opportunities and Concerns in the EU’s Policy Development on 
the EU and ASEAN Monitoring Mission  
 
The external opportunities and concerns in the policy development of the 
AMM were categorized into the geo-political element as they linked to politico-
security issues and aimed to preserve peace and stability in South-East Asia. These 
external opportunities were the GoI’s and FAM’s willingness and readiness to 
discuss, reach and implement a peace agreement between them and the UN’s absence 
as a monitor in Aceh. There were concerns from GoI about the internationalization of 
                                                 
88 Interview with official D, the Commission, E-mail, 7 April 2011. 
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domestic affairs and international interference due to the EU and ASEAN 
involvement as monitors in Aceh. I examine these above mentioned external 
opportunities and concerns. Afterwards, I assess the way in which external 
opportunities and concerns affected the development of the EU’s policy towards the 
EU and ASEAN monitoring mission and the implication of this situation for the 
EU’s comprehensive approach towards Indonesia and South-East Asia.  
The conflict between GoI and FAM was about the lack of fulfilled promises 
which had arisen much earlier and the recognition of identities. The basic pattern of 
conflict between these parties was FAM’s insurgency movement versus GoI’s 
military response. When there were riots and civilian unrests in Aceh, GoI sent many 
police and armed forces to secure and stabilize Aceh.            
In 2004, there was a paradigm shift in outlook on the part of Indonesian leaders 
especially in the case of Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla who were 
Coordinating Ministers for Political and Security Affairs and People Welfare. On 20 
October 2004, they were inaugurated as President and Vice President of Indonesia. 
They believed that a permanent solution to the armed conflict in Aceh could be 
reached by means of a peace agreement between GoI and FAM. They shifted their 
approach on the Aceh issue from a security and military approach to a political 
approach.89 In November 2004, Yudhoyono visited Aceh on his official mission as 
the President of Indonesia. As mentioned on his presidential campaign in September 
2004, he reminded FAM that it had to end its armed conflict with GoI (Radio 
Netherlands Wereldomroep, 2004:1).  
In December 2004, the tsunami struck and devastated Aceh and Nias Island. 
Yudhoyono looked upon this situation as a human disaster and, also, as ‘a narrow 
window of opportunity’ to recall the leaders of FAM to talk and find a peaceful 
solution in Aceh. Yudhoyono explained to his aides that: “I was sure that if we could 
show to FAM that we were sincere and serious by offering a win-win solution, FAM 
will come to talk with us”(Djalal, 2008:20-21).     
Kalla discussed confidentially with Juha Christensen, his business colleague 
from Finland, the possibility of seeking a peaceful solution in Aceh (Schulze, 
2007:3). Christensen explained to Ahtisaari that it was the intention of GoI to hold 
                                                 
89 Interview with Commission official C, 2011.   
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peace talks with FAM. At the same time, with the consent of Yudhoyono, Kalla 
established informal contacts by sending his aides to meet the leaders of FAM to 
discuss the possibility of peace talks (Djalal, 2008:23). FAM showed, also, its 
interest in participating in peace talks with GoI. In pursuing FAM, Kalla (2008:82) 
explained that: 
I had been involved in Aceh since 2003. In early 2004, I visited Europe to 
try to meet the FAM leader Malik Mahmud, but did not make direct 
contact. It was only after the December 2004 tsunami that I really had 
success. In January 2005, I set up a meeting with FAM with the help of a 
number of European ambassadors. Two weeks later, with the authority of 
the President, the first meeting with FAM took place.  
 
Ahtisaari explained to Ferrero-Waldner and Solana that it was GoI’s and 
FAM’s intentions to have peace talks. Ahtisaari received positive signals from these 
EU high officials and the EU agreed to fund him as a mediator in the negotiations 
between GoI and FAM.90 The EU was committed to supporting the following 
actions, if there would be a peace agreement between these conflicting parties. 
Ahtisaari and the CMI mediated in the peace talks between GoI and FAM.  
There were crucial aspects which were of concern to GoI and FAM regarding 
the peace agreement and the international monitors in the peace talks. These were, as 
follows: firstly, GoI and FAM showed their willingness and readiness to talk and 
negotiate about a peace solution for Aceh. Meanwhile, FAM’s situation was weak 
because of GoI’s military and diplomatic pressure which led to FAM’s readiness to 
open dialogue with GoI.  
Secondly, GoI realized that after the implementation of martial law between 
2003 and 2004, FAM’s institutional and military capabilities had been weakened. 
GoI was quite cautious about international intervention which could assist FAM to 
consolidate its institutional strength and military capabilities.  
Thirdly, GoI did not want the UN’s involvement because of its previous 
experience with East Timor and following the Papua issue.91 In 1999, the UN’s 
involvement in the referendum for a peaceful solution to the East Timor conflict led 
to a majority of East Timorese voting for independence from Indonesia (UNTAET, 
                                                 
90 Interview with Commission official C, 2011   
91 The Free Papua Movement rebels wanted West Papua to be an independent state because they 
questioned the Act of Free Choice in 1969 (it was held by the UN(2012:1)) which resulted in a  
majority  of Papuans  voting in favour to integrate into Indonesia) and the issue of human right abuses.       
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1999:1). The EU was a potential option as a monitor together with ASEAN since the 
UN would not be involved in supporting the peace process in Aceh (Aspinall, 
2008:13). It is important to bear in mind that the international interference in 
domestic affairs was a sensitive issue in South-East Asia, especially in Indonesia. 
GoI was keen to select the EU and ASEAN as monitors in the implementation of a 
peace agreement with the clear understanding that there would be no 
internationalization of the Aceh issue. Commission official D stated that: “The 
Indonesian Government was not keen on the UN’s involvement following Papua. 
The EU was a nice compromise and given that Sweden was hosting many FAM 
exiles this was a significant factor and important for Jusuf Kalla”.92  
Finally, GoI and FAM showed their intentions to involve the EU and ASEAN 
to maintain their neutrality and balance as they did in their tasks as monitors in Aceh. 
Both parties’ acceptance of the EU and ASEAN, as monitors in the implementation 
of a peace agreement, was a positive signal for the involvement of external parties.  
The EU member states and the Council of Ministers viewed the above situation 
as external opportunities. GoI’s and FAM’s willingness and readiness to resolve their 
conflict by means of a peaceful solution and the absence of the UN in this peace 
process provided a possible situation in which the EU could  become involved in the 
monitoring mission. Awaluddin’s view was that the involvement of the EU and 
ASEAN as monitors was intended mainly to build trust and confidence between GoI 
and FAM in order to implement and comply with every point in the peace agreement. 
He explained some reasons why GoI selected the EU were: firstly, Ahtisaari had a 
good relationship with the EU and, secondly, Ahtisaari and Kalla believed that the 
EU’s involvement could foster confidence that both GoI and FAM would fulfill their 
promises in the peace agreement.93 Some reasons why GoI selected ASEAN were: 
firstly, Indonesia was a key player in South-East Asia. Secondly, ASEAN’s 
participation would make communication easier with ASEAN leaders in whose 
countries many FAM people were citizens. For example, Malik Mahmud holds 
Singapore nationality.94 
                                                 
92 Interview with Commission official D, 2011.  
93 Interview with Awaluddin, 2011. 
94 Ibid  
 148 
The EU considered, also, these situations which might increase its presence in 
the South-East Asia region. Interestingly, the interests of the EU member states and 
the EU itself were affected by external factors in the development of this EU policy. 
The interests of the EU member states and the EU itself were in co-operative linkage 
with these external opportunities shown in the willingness and readiness of both 
conflicting parties to resolve their conflict and in the absence of the UN from this 
process. The EU member states promoted their politico-security interests in 
preserving peace and stability in this region. The EU promoted, also, its presence in 
the region. Through the ESDP, the EU and its member states considered this as a 
positive momentum towards working together with GoI and ASEAN countries in 
order to support peace and stability in the region. The EU implemented different 
ways of promoting political and security interest by employing its combination 
strategy consisting of its civilian mission and by providing humanitarian and 
development assistance in the region.   
According to Commission official C, the EU observed the armed conflict in 
Aceh and saw a possible opportunity for its involvement in supporting a peace 
process in a modest way. The EU identified the right opportunity and came up with a 
comprehensive approach covering security, structural and developmental aspects. 
This person stated that: “Of course, we observe these conflicts and look at the 
opportunity but to say from that to project the EU as a global player is going too far. 
At least in South-East Asia, let’s be modest. If there is an opportunity and if you can 
take it up, it is okay and if you cannot take it up it is okay”.95 
In the negotiation process of the peace agreement, witnessed by Ahtisaari, GoI 
and FAM agreed to use the good services of the EU and ASEAN in a peace 
monitoring mission. Ahtisaari reminded both parties about the involvement of the 
EU and ASEAN and stated that: “Should you have such an invitation for monitors, 
we can arrange and discuss with all the 25 countries in the EU. Afterwards we can 
visit Aceh and study the field situation and make an assessment. We would require a 
full mandate from both sides. We will only operate within the framework of a 
monitoring system agreed by the parties”(Awaluddin, 2009:195). 
                                                 
95 Interview with Commission official C, 2011.  
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However, Djalil took care to raise concerns with regard to the issue of 
international interference in Indonesia’s domestic affairs and the internationalization 
of the Aceh issue which needed to be resisted as an agenda item for the international 
community (Awaluddin, 2009:180). Feith responded to the concerns of Djalil by 
referring to the concept that this mission should be approved by both parties (Ibid). 
Feith argued that: “Undoubtedly, we will have to work with TNI [Indonesian 
National Armed Forces]. We will have to rely on TNI for part of this mission” (Ibid, 
p.196).  
Awaluddin shared this view and argued that the EU delegation discussed 
operational issues and what the EU would do after the substantial points were agreed 
by GoI and FAM. The EU was not involved in the substantial dialogues between 
both parties.96 The EU carefully took into account several crucial aspects which 
could be seen as external concerns. Feith suggested that: “We will prepare a concept 
for this mission as well as a budget and legal basis so as to be able to perform this 
mission we have been given”(Ibid).  
Commission official C explained that GoI was quite careful about international 
interference in domestic issues, such as Aceh. This person confirmed that:  
I give you an example in ASEAN you have the mantra of non-interference. 
It was clear that Jakarta deployed it at that time, had to come forward with 
the message that yes, if the EU come but we do not want to internationalize 
the conflict because it is domestic issue and therefore non-interference 
from nobody. We do have to invite ASEAN and we do not want Europe to 
interfere. But at the end, you see that there was a monitoring mission.97  
 
This person further stated that: “We offer the mission. We declared publicly that this 
was not interference and this was not intended to guide Indonesian policy. It is to 
help the peace process which is underway”.98 The EU considered these external 
concerns which needed to be accommodated in its final policy on the joint 
monitoring mission with ASEAN in Aceh (Council of the EU, 2005j:2). These 
external concerns affected the development of the EU’s policy on Aceh. 
Feith (2007:3-4) indicated that the works of the AMM were included in the 
EU’s inter-regional policy aims of developing security and creating stability in 
                                                 
96 Interview with Awaludin, 2011.  
97 Interview with Commission official C, 2011.   
98 Ibid   
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South-East Asia. The EU assisted Indonesia and ASEAN through the AMM and 
post-tsunami reconstruction programmes. The AMM showed a new aspect of the EU 
and ASEAN countries’ partnership. Solana added that: “It was also the first time that 
we worked in partnership with monitors from ASEAN countries” (Council of the 
EU, 2006b:1). The EU and ASEAN could collaborate in preserving peace and in 
improving economic development in Indonesia specifically and in South-East Asia in 
general through capacity building and development aid.  
Clearly, the EU increased its visibility in its monitoring mission and desire to 
take an active role in the South-East Asia region. The EU realized that it could 
employ conflict resolution skills, diplomatic expertise and development aid in order 
to resolve conflict; to provide humanitarian assistance; and to improve economic 
cooperation with ASEAN. The EU, together with ASEAN, deployed its civilian 
mission by monitoring a peace agreement between GoI and FAM. Also, after the 
tsunami disaster, it was involved actively in humanitarian and reconstruction 
responses. Through this unique strategy, the EU could win the hearts and minds of 
people in the region.  
The willingness and readiness of GoI and FAM to resolve their conflict and the 
vacuum created by the UN’s absence in that process were external opportunities for 
the EU to become involved. At the same time, the internationalization of the Aceh 
issue and the EU and ASEAN international intervention into Indonesian domestic 
affairs were external concerns for the EU. These external opportunities and external 
concerns could combine usefully with common EU politico-security interests and 
strengthen further the EU’s role in Indonesia and South-East Asia. This situation 
allowed the EU not only to promote its politico-security interests by taking these 
external opportunities but, also, it required the EU to take into account these external 
concerns carefully in the development of its policy. The result of the AMM would 
establish the EU’s credibility on its neutrality and future relationships with Indonesia 
and ASEAN. This suggests that these external opportunities and concerns had a 
significant effect in the development of the EU’s policy towards the AMM. 
 
5.4.  Conclusion  
There are relevant factors which influenced the EU’s policy development 
toward the EU and ASEAN monitoring mission in Aceh.  These are: firstly, the EU 
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member states and the Council of Ministers were the relevant actors who were 
significant and decisive in the development of this policy. The EU member states 
were the decision-makers in this EU policy. The Presidency of the EU, at that time, 
and the contributing EU member states shaped and affected the collectiveness of the 
Council of Ministers when it decided on a final outcome of this EU policy. The 
General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (PSC) was an initiator and a coordinator 
in drafting and forming this EU policy. Solana played an important role as a guardian 
and executor of this policy. He represented the Council of the EU and the EU when it 
dealt with ASEAN, the CMI, GoI and FAM. The Commission supported the Council 
and the EU High Representative for CFSP in the implementation of this EU policy. It 
complemented the peace monitoring mission in Aceh with humanitarian assistance; 
peace building; and local governance programmes. Ahtisaari and the CMI had 
intervening roles in the development of this EU policy. They persuaded the Council 
and the Commission that they should be involved in supporting the monitoring 
mission in Aceh. They bridged, also, the negotiation and monitoring processes in the 
peace agreement between these conflicting parties.  
The institutional arrangement for this EU policy provided relevant actors with 
choices which, possibly, might erode their competence and create an unclear issue 
regarding financing sources for ESDP (eg. the funding allocation of CFSP or the 
Community budgets). It facilitated, also, the Council and EU member states with a 
framework in which to discuss, with the Commission and Ahtisaari (CMI), the legal 
and political implications of its involvement in Aceh and to start communication 
with ASEAN, the GoI and FAM in order to build confidence between them and 
prepare the AMM. Overall, relevant and related actors agreed collectively to support 
the peace process in Aceh which affected in a positive way the creation of AMM.  
Secondly, the EU member states and the Council of Ministers promoted their 
politico-security interests and their presence in the South-East Asia region. The UK, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, the Nordic countries and the General Secretariat of the 
Council of the EU implemented the CFSP/ESDP in the region as a manifestation of 
their politico-security interests. The way in which the EU promoted their political 
and security interest was to collaborate with ASEAN in monitoring the peace 
agreement in Aceh. The Commission supported the AMM, in Aceh, with 
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humanitarian and development programmes. The main objectives of the EU’s 
involvement were to develop a relationship with Indonesia as the emerging leader of 
the region; to strengthen its inter-regional ties with ASEAN; and to further its 
presence in the South-East Asia region. As demonstrated by the EU’s humanitarian 
and development programmes, common EU values were less important 
(complementary) in this case.     
Thirdly, the EU and ASEAN used consultation and monitoring mechanisms as 
their modes of engagement. With regard to the preparation phase of the AMM, there 
were two main consultations between the EU and ASEAN. The EU employed a 
consultation mechanism to take into account ASEAN’s aspirations in order to 
establish the TAM and the IMP and to formulate legislative papers and an operation 
plan for the AMM. The EU, along with ASEAN, all stakeholders and the people of 
Aceh built trust and confidence by supporting the joint mission between EU and 
ASEAN. ASEAN countries used this consultation mechanism as a means of 
promoting their aspirations to the EU with regard to the future AMM. The EU took 
onboard the ASEAN countries’ aspirations in order to form a solid mission.  
With regard to the AMM implementation phase, the EU and ASEAN used a 
pro-active monitoring mechanism as a means of overseeing the implementation of 
the peace agreement. Their common objectives were peace in Aceh and stability in 
South-East Asia. The modes of engagement incorporated the relevant actors within 
the EU, ASEAN countries, the CMI, GoI and FAM. There was a co-operative 
linkage between the modes of engagement and relevant actors. The modes of 
engagement brought the relevant actors within the EU and ASEAN closer together 
when they interacted to develop a joint monitoring mission in Aceh and to implement 
the tasks of that mission. 
Fourthly, the level of ASEAN’s political and security integration was less 
robust because, at that time, ASEAN was preparing still its political and security 
integration through the APSC. ASEAN had only the ARF as a forum in which to 
discuss and exchange ideas about political and security issues with its external 
partners in the region. The EU considered the above situation was a challenge which, 
together with ASEAN, needed to be resolved. It persuaded the more advanced 
ASEAN countries to establish the AMM. The EU needed the involvement of 
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ASEAN in the AMM because ASEAN could provide strong legitimacy and 
strengthen the role of this monitoring mission and contribute to the development of 
the ASEAN Security Community. ASEAN wanted not only to demonstrate its 
solidarity with Indonesia but, also, to gain experience in peace monitoring and peace 
building from the AMM in order to develop its own political and security regional 
integration and to strengthen its politico-security relationship with the EU.  
Fifthly, both GoI’s and FAM’s willingness and readiness to negotiate and 
implement a peace solution in Aceh and the unavailability of the UN in that process 
were external opportunities on the development of the EU’s policy on Aceh. It 
allowed the EU to take advantage of these opportunities and to become an 
international monitor in Aceh. At the same time, there were external concerns, on the 
part of GoI, such as the international interference in Indonesia’s domestic affairs and 
the internationalization of the Acehnese issue. The EU took GoI’s concerns into 
account carefully when it developed its policy and relationship with ASEAN, GoI 
and FAM. These external opportunities and these external concerns had a significant 
impact on the development of EU policy on the joint monitoring mission with 
ASEAN. They were considered seriously by the EU policy makers when they 
developed this policy because the EU was putting at risk its own credibility regarding 
the success of the AMM and its relationship with Indonesia and South-East Asia. In 
short, the AMM was the result of a co-operative connection between both conflicting 
parties’ willingness and readiness to resolve their conflict; the absence of the UN’s 
involvement; and the interest of the EU member states and the EU itself to 
implement the CFSP/ESDP in South-East Asia.  
At this point it is sufficient to note that, based on the earlier analyses and 
empirical evidence, the development of this EU policy was influenced by internal 
and external factors. This case demonstrated that the EU and ASEAN showed their 
ability to work well together on political and security matters. It meant that the EU-
ASEAN politico-security relationship developed further after the AMM completed 
its tasks successfully. It allowed the EU to establish the necessary profile in South-
East Asia. This situation gave ASEAN, also, an opportunity to further its political 
and security integration. As yet, I have not explained the development of the EU’s 




CASE STUDY OF THE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH  
AN ASEAN-EU FTA  
 
6.1.  Introduction  
 
According to Peter Mandelson (2006a:2), the EU and ASEAN economic 
relationship needs to be improved in the 21st century in order to provide both parties  
with mutual benefits such as trade in goods and services and investment. 
Consequently, the EU and ASEAN should reframe their economic cooperation which 
needs to be a comprehensive economic partnership between both parties. Their 
partnership can bring significant changes leading to mutual advantages for their 
industries and investors.  
This chapter addresses the development of the EU’s policy for the creation of 
an ASEAN–EU FTA. It aims to show that relevant factors influenced the 
development of this EU policy. This case study is different from other case studies 
because the EU failed to conclude free trade negotiations with ASEAN. This chapter 
is organized in four parts. The next part assesses the process of the EU’s policy 
development for an ASEAN–EU FTA. The third part provides the explanation of 
relevant factors affecting the development of the EU’s policy on FTA and free trade 
negotiations between the EU and ASEAN. The final part is the conclusion. 
 
6.2.  The Process of the Development of the EU’s Policy for an ASEAN–EU 
FTA 
 
In 2006, the European Commission (2006a:2-3) released its trade strategy, 
known as “Global Europe: Competing in the World”. In order to achieve mutual 
advantage in this globalization period, the EU was empowering the era of openness 
in the EU market and amongst its external partners. Indeed, the EU has employed the 
free trade system for both general and specific purposes. In general, when trading in 
goods and services, the EU pursues its key partners to liberalize their markets (Ibid, 
p.9) and treats them equally. Specifically, the EU renews its market access strategy 
to other countries by eliminating gradually trade barriers and by reforming its anti-
dumping and other trade defence instruments (Ibid, p.10-12). An inter-regional 
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approach was a means for the EU to realize these purposes by opening up the 
possibility of an ASEAN–EU FTA. 
Commission official A emphasized that ASEAN was chosen as a priority for 
the FTA because of its economic criteria; the development in the region, and the 
importance of this region in Asia. ASEAN had agreed trade co-operations with 
China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India.99 Commission official E added that: 
“ASEAN is one of these trading partners for the EU. It has a lot of activity to 
develop and there are many of barriers for the EU exporters and operators in this 
region. It is an advantage, if the EU can negotiate and deal with ASEAN”.100 The EU 
would like to develop a freer flow of goods, investments and services with ASEAN.  
The Commission facilitated and coordinated the development of the EU’s trade 
policy towards ASEAN. It worked closely with the Council and other institutions 
within the EU to form the draft of the mandate to begin negotiations on an ASEAN-
EU FTA. In the next section, I explain the internal interaction between EU 
institutions and EU member states which led to the creation of this mandate.  
However, at this stage, I outline its contents. 
In April 2007, the Council authorized unanimously its mandate to the 
Commission to negotiate five FTAs including an ASEAN-EU FTA (Council of the 
EU, 2007c:1-2), in the following terms: 
1. The EU paid its full attention to the DDA because it was still the EU’s top 
priority. It considered other trade approaches such as a FTA with third 
countries/regions.  
2. The Community had a common position: to support and develop a FTA with 
ASEAN by expanding market and economic resources, fully consistent with and 
in compliance with WTO rules. 
3. The Council supported the Commission in its commencement of free trade talks 
with ASEAN in order to build a deeper trade relationship with a progressive and 
reciprocal liberalization of trade in goods, services and other trade-related issues. 
                                                 
99 Interview with Commission official A, 2010. 
100 Interview with official E, the Commission, by telephone, 18 August 2010. 
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4.  The Council encouraged the Commission to analyze and elaborate on ASEAN’s 
political and economic facts by promoting trade relationships between both 
parties.   
5. The Council showed its interest in having a good political relationship with 
ASEAN via the negotiations of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) or the renewal of the EU political clauses within the current framework of 
agreements with ASEAN countries (Council of the EU, 2007d:3-4).    
The negotiation of an ASEAN-EU FTA began on 4 May 2007 in Banda Seri 
Begawan, Brunei Darussalam. The EU and ASEAN created the EU and ASEAN 
FTA Joint Committee as a means by which to begin dialogue (European 
Commission, 2007a:1-2). The EU wanted the two regions to conclude the 
negotiations between them within two years of their first meeting. The Commission 
employed an inter-regional approach to negotiate a FTA with ASEAN. If a deadlock 
in FTA discussions occurred in the inter-regional approach, the EU might use a 
region-to-country approach (Bilaterals, 2007:3). The FTA would cover, as majority 
elements, the economic provisions between both regions and the sustainable 
development issue would be included as an additional element. Meanwhile, the 
Commission adopted a bilateral approach in its negotiations with ASEAN countries 
in the context of PCA101 negotiations. The non-economic provisions (human rights 
and democracy elements) were covered by a future PCA with each ASEAN country 
which was willing to have it (Council of the EU, 2007c:2).    
The EU and ASEAN FTA Joint Committee held several trade negotiations 
from 2007 to 2009. However, in March 2009, they agreed to end their negotiations 
because they had not reached a compromise on several issues such as the complexity 
of the problem with regard to Myanmar; the different levels of ambition in a future 
FTA between the two regions; and, within the framework of free trade negotiations, 
the different treatments of the lesser developed ASEAN countries (Lao PDR, 
Cambodia and Myanmar).  
                                                 
101 The EU offered to Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei 
Darussalam and Vietnam a PCA which related to a FTA. On 9 November 2009, the EU and Indonesia 
signed the first PCA between the EU and an individual ASEAN country (Council of the EU, 2009c:1). 
Then, the EU signed the PCAs with Vietnam (on 27 June 2012) and the Phillipines (on 11 July 2012). 
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Consequently, the EU began to employ a different approach by implementing, 
in March 2010, the EU+x formula. This formula entails pursuing a relationship with 
one or two ASEAN countries in order to develop a FTA on the basis of a region-to-
country approach (Council of the EU, 2006c:4). The EU hopes that this formula will 
become an effective approach in order to include all ASEAN countries into a region-
to-region FTA between both parties.  
The Commission and Singapore started their FTA negotiations on 3 March 
2010 in Singapore (Falletti, 2010:15). On 5 October 2010, in Brussels, the European 
Commission (2010b:1) and Malaysia began negotiations for an EU and Malaysia 
FTA and the EU and Malaysia PCA. The EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht 
(2011:1) emphasized that: “We are negotiating FTAs with Singapore and Malaysia 
and our door is open to other ASEAN partners […]. But we are careful to keep one 
eye on the bigger game, a region-to-region trade deal”. On 27 June 2012, the 
European Commission (2012a:1) and Vietnam started negotiations for an EU-
Vietnam FTA. Additionally, the 1st and the 2nd ASEAN-EU Business Summits were 
held in Indonesia (5 May 2011) and in Cambodia (2 April 2012). De Gucht (2011:1) 
explained that the Summit aimed to achieve win-win business cooperation for 
ASEAN and the EU.  
This section has illustrated the existence of the EU’s policy of creating a FTA 
with ASEAN. As trade negotiations with ASEAN ended, the EU changed its strategy 
of negotiating a FTA with several ASEAN countries, hoping to incorporate them into 
a region-to region FTA between both regions. One clear thing is that there is still no 
ASEAN–EU FTA based on a region-to-region approach and/or a region-to-country 
approach concluded by the two regions. Next, I elaborate on the factors by 
elucidating on the attempt to create an ASEAN-EU FTA. 
 
6.3.  Analysis of the Establishment of an ASEAN–EU FTA  
 
6.3.1. The Relevant Actors in the EU’s Policy Development on the 
Establishment of an ASEAN–EU FTA  
 
The Commission and the Council of Ministers were the relevant actors in the 
EU’s trade policy of creating an ASEAN–EU FTA. Commission official E argued 
that: “The Commission has authority for trade policy. The Commission came up with 
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a Global Europe Communication to the Council in order to explore negotiations with 
ASEAN. All member states agreed to it”.  
Commission official F admitted the Commission was a key actor in the 
development of this EU trade policy. This person argued that: 
The EU had Korea, ASEAN and India, all being identified as of critical 
competitiveness with regard to FTAs. […] And we were the ones who 
were identifying particularly what was going on in the world and areas 
which were the concern of other major trading partners who would get 
more substantial access to certain markets than we would have […]. In 
terms of commercial policy, the Commission is a key actor and the one 
who is driving forward.102 
 
An official from the Netherlands added that: “The Commission is quite eager to 
negotiate this kind of agreement. It gives them a certain amount of power”.103 
Council official A recognized the importance of the Commission in the EU’s 
trade policy-making process. This person advocated that the Council (the EU 
member states) were significant actors in the development of this EU policy. This 
person argued that: “A FTA in principle is driven always by the Commission. The 
significant actors [in the Council] are actually, in practice, big member states. The 
EU member states who have most trade with ASEAN are those who are most 
concerned about who would have experienced most impact or benefit from a 
FTA”.104  
With regard to the Council, the EU member states, which had economic and 
trade links and interests in ASEAN, were significant players in convincing all the EU 
member states to have an ASEAN-EU FTA. Commission official E stated that:  
These countries were the main exporters and investors. Clearly, Germany, 
UK, France, Italy and Spain, those countries who were afraid of being 
crowded out by competition from other countries in the region: China, 
Japan, South Korea, Australia and so fort [...] The Netherlands is also 
important and a major operator in the region. All member states were on 
hold.105  
 
The EU member states’ view was that ASEAN countries had high economic 
growth and were a source of potential buyers/sellers who were important for the 
                                                 
102 Interview with official F, the Commission, Brussels, 28 March 2011.  
103 Interview with national official, the Netherlands, 2011. 
104 Interview with Council official A, 2011. 
105 Interview with Commission official E, 2010. 
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EU’s industry and services. The UK, the Netherlands, Germany and France 
continued to have strong economic interests linking them to ASEAN. They 
approached and convinced other EU member states, in the Council, to develop an 
economic partnership between the EU and ASEAN.106 
An official from the Netherlands and Commission official A acknowledged that 
relevant actors in the formulation of an ASEAN-EU FTA were the Commission and 
the Council. An official from the Netherlands argued that:  
The Commission has the right to exercise its initiative. The Commission is 
the one who makes the proposal. […] It was the Commission which was 
the central driving force in this. I also know that within the Council those 
who are the ultimate decision makers in this matter would be the Northern 
countries, including the Netherlands and that they would be in favour of 
having an FTA. But in general, trade is an exclusive competence as well 
for the European Commission.107 
 
Commission official A stated that: “In the trade area, the actors are both the 
Commission was leading because we have competence in trade matters. But behind 
the Commission there were always member states interests and positions”.108  
The Council assigned the Article 133 Committee as a special committee to help 
the Commission in the development of the EU trade policy with ASEAN. It would 
adopt and conclude trade agreement (EUR-Lex, 2010:1) between the EU and 
ASEAN based on the outcome of negotiations between the Commission and 
ASEAN.  
Apart from the relevant actors, there were related actors, who were involved in 
shaping this EU policy development, such as the European Parliament; the business 
communities; and NGOs. The European Parliament’s role was insignificant because 
it was not involved fully in the development of this EU policy. The European 
Parliament was informed by the Council and the Commission after the negotiating 
mandate had been formulated and implemented. Helmut Markov, a Member of the 
European Parliament and Chairman of the European Parliament Committee on 
International Trade, raised his concern to the Commission that the Parliament needed 
to be included in the debate on the creation of an ASEAN-EU FTA (TNI, 2009). 
Roberto Bendini, a Principal Administrator for International Trade at the European 
                                                 
106 Interview with Council official A, 2011.  
107 Interview with national official, the Netherlands, 2011. 
108 Interview with Commission official A, 2010. 
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Parliament, stated that the European Parliament’s role was only to be informed by 
the Commission about the development of this EU trade policy without any authority 
to change it.109 
The Commission involved the business communities and NGOs in the process 
of consultation when it introduced the Global Europe trade strategy to create FTAs 
with other trading partners. Pascal Kerneis from Business Europe (formerly UNICE) 
argued that the business communities agreed to the establishment of FTAs between 
the EU and its key trading partners, such as ASEAN. He explained the way that the 
business communities engaged more with the Commission in order to shape the 
outcome of the EU’s trade policy toward ASEAN and other EU’s external partners. 
Kerneis stated that:  
In the first consultation at the invitation of European Commission, we had 
responded to the Global Europe Communication earlier in the year of 
2006. We were saying, yes go out of this moratorium on WTO only, yes 
open up FTA with any partners who are ready to do so. So the 
Commission suggested that and that. And we said yes go ahead. Then, we 
gave our position as business communities at that time.110 
 
Afterwards, the business communities were involved in the seminars held by 
the EU and ASEAN to explain the provisions of a FTA, EU trade policy and any 
trade barriers to ASEAN countries. Through the above seminars, the business 
communities attempted to promote their position on an ASEAN-EU FTA. Kerneis 
explained that, after they stated their position, they were following the negotiations. 
[…] Also, he had also been part of these different seminars pushing their views.111 
However, Marc Maes, a member of the coalition of NGOs’ Seattle to Brussels 
Network, explained their obstacle in obtaining access to follow the latest progress on 
free trade initiatives in the Commission. They adhered to open consultation in the 
European Parliament in order to follow developments in these economic initiatives. 
He argued that:  
The Commission came up with this strategy and of course we were trying 
as much as we could follow the European policy. It was very difficult for 
civil society organizations to follow and look into what was going on 
inside the Commission. So we usually see proposals when they have come 
                                                 
109 Interview with Roberto Bendini, the European Parliament, Brussels, 28 March 2011. 
110 Interview with Pascal Kerneis, Business Europe, Brussels, 23 March 2011.  
111 Ibid. 
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up from the Commission and go into consultations and discussions with the 
Council and Parliament when they come out to be opened.112  
 
Maes elaborated further that NGOs faced two main difficulties with regard to 
their involvement in the development of the EU’s trade policy toward ASEAN. The 
first difficulty was following, within the EU’s institutions, the process of the 
development of the EU’s policy because it was considered at closed meetings 
between policy makers within the Commission and the Council. The second 
difficulty was the secretiveness of the draft of a negotiating mandate from the 
Council to the Commission. NGOs had little possibility to influence on the 
development of this EU policy. He argued that: 
We had given our comments to the Global Europe Strategy. We have 
denounced the aggressiveness and ambition in the strategy. There was 
very little account of the differential treatments that countries needed. We 
made comments there and then through the National Parliament, the 
European Parliament and governments, to try to influence the adoption of 
strategy by the Council and then the Parliament.113  
 
Maes explained that:  
 
Trade policy is the hardcore of European economic interest and there is not 
really much that the civil society can do about that [...]. The Global Europe 
was adopted, the Commission started working out concrete mandates for 
negotiation with countries. That process is even more closed; it is between 
the Commission and the Council only. The internal meetings on the 
proposal were completely secretive. The mandate that the Council had 
given to the Commission for this negotiation, it was a confidential or 
otherwise, it was a secret document that no one to see. There was also little 
possibility for influence there.114 
 
Kris Vanslambrouck, Asia Desk Administrator, 11.11.11115, added that: “They [the 
Commission] provided information about the progress of some negotiations. It was 
more a type of briefing, this is in the pipeline and this was being discussed, sometime 
you get very rough information. It was not detail”.116  
Based on the above explanations, there was, in practice, a need to outline the 
institutional arrangement for this EU policy in order to examine how these relevant 
                                                 
112 Interview with Marc Maes, Seattle to Brussels Network and 11.11.11, Brussels, 23 March 2011.  
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 It is a NGO which focussed on trade and development issues in South-East Asia and Africa. 
116 Interview with Kris Vanslambrouck, 11.11.11, Brussels, 23 March 2011. 
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and related actors fitted and interacted within that arrangement. To start with, on 27 
April 2005, the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the EU Trade Commissioner 
agreed to create the Vision Group on ASEAN–EU Economic Partnership. They 
consulted on the aspects of economic and development obstacles for their future 
commercial ties in the ASEAN-EU Vision Group (2006:8-10).  
Furthermore, there were significant obstacles for the EU and ASEAN trade 
relationship such as, firstly, the high-tariffs and tariff escalation applied by these two 
regions for sensitive sectors such as agriculture; manufacture; industrial sectors; and 
automotive products and its spare-parts (European Commission, 2006a:8). Secondly, 
the non-tariff barrier issues created trade distortions between the EU and ASEAN. 
On the one hand, the EU employed rigid health and safety requirements and complex 
environmental and industrial regulations for ASEAN countries. On the other hand, 
ASEAN applied different custom regulations and complex import authorizations for 
EU exporters to every ASEAN country (University Limerick and IFRI, 2006:v). 
Thirdly, the EU protected its agricultural and farming sectors with a huge amount of 
subsidy through the CAP (31.6 % of total EU budget in 2008) (European 
Commission, 2008a:1). It provided their farmers with technological training; 
production management; financial assistance; and good prices for their agricultural 
products (European Commission, 2004:6). This situation led to discriminatory 
actions in the market economy operating between the EU producers and external 
producers from ASEAN countries. Commission official G argued that: “We seek for 
an agreement and to getting away these barriers. In that respect, the bloc to bloc trade 
is considerable and is important”.117  
On 29 July 2005, the European Commission (2005:1) informed the Article 133 
Committee that the Commission and ASEAN had established a vision group in order 
to assess the possibility of an ASEAN–EU FTA. On 24 February 2006, the European 
Commission (2006c:1) reported to the Committee that the Vision Group had 
conducted two quantitative and qualitative feasibility studies to assess the economic 
advantages and impacts of an ASEAN-EU FTA. Commission official E stated that: 
“We do a feasibility study. We started with ASEAN countries between 2005 and 
2006. It was called a vision group which consisted of 11 high ranking officials, one 
                                                 
117 Interview with official G, the Commission, Jakarta, 17 July 2009. 
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from each ASEAN country and one from the Commission. They were in charge to 
look into the possibility and benefits of the EU and ASEAN FTA”.118  
The EU member states were concerned about the following two main issues 
regarding future economic cooperation with ASEAN. These were: firstly, there could 
be a potential conflict between their economic interests and common EU values. 
Several key EU member states indicated that their business communities and 
industries would like to ensure that an ASEAN-EU FTA reflected their economic 
interests. Secondly, the EU trade policy options were multilateral and regional routes 
(European Commission, 2006c:1).  
On 28 April 2006, there was a full meeting of Committee 133 members. The 
UK suggested that the Commission should not lose its priority to the Doha round 
negotiations (European Commission, 2006d:1). Sweden and Denmark advised that 
the Commission could go ahead with an ASEAN-EU FTA so long as it was in line 
with the Doha round negotiations. In the end, the Committee agreed to focus not only 
on the Doha round negotiations but, also, to start possible negotiations for a FTA 
with ASEAN (Ibid).  
On 9 June 2006, the Commission presented the Vision Group report to the 
Committee 133 members. Sweden welcomed the report which demonstrated the 
positive signals from the report’s possible outcomes and ASEAN’s responses. 
Sweden argued that there was a strong economic case for an ASEAN-EU FTA and 
this needed further discussion. The UK and the Netherlands reminded the 
Commission to maintain its focus on the Doha round negotiations. The Netherlands 
advised the Commission to be careful on how to convey its position to the public. It 
suggested that the EU’s focus was not only on the Doha round negotiations but, also, 
on the attempt to create a FTA with ASEAN. Germany reminded the Commission 
that all EU efforts, regarding FTAs, would be observed closely by European 
industry. In order to reach a quick outcome for an ASEAN-EU FTA, Hungary 
advised the Commission to learn from the slow negotiations on the EU-Mercosur 
partnership and to open the possibility of having bilateral negotiations with ASEAN 
countries. In responding to all these questions, the Commission argued that DDA 
was a priority for the EU with the open possibility of creating a FTA with ASEAN. 
                                                 
118 Interview with Commission official E, 2010.  
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On further discussions about an ASEAN-EU FTA, the Commission explained that it 
would inform the Council about any developments on this issue and maintain 
communication with ASEAN. On the regional and bilateral approaches, the 
Commission argued that the EU needed to be innovative by combining the two 
approaches in order to find a pragmatic way which best served its economic interests 
and to take into consideration the political sensitivities in the EU and ASEAN 
relationship (European Commission, 2006f:1-2).         
A few months later, the Commission re-emphasized the EU’s need to create an 
economic cooperation with its external partners (Bilaterals, 2007:1-2). On 13 
November 2006, the Council showed its support for the Commission to launch FTA 
negotiations with ASEAN, India and South Korea. The Council requested that the 
Commission submit proposals for the negotiating mandate so that it could discuss 
them (Ibid). The Commission formed its draft for a FTA based on the Vision 
Group’s report and its Global Europe communication strategy. On 8 December 2006, 
the Commission submitted its recommendation to the Council seeking its authority 
for the Commission to negotiate a FTA with ASEAN (Council of the EU, 2006c:1).   
Meanwhile, civil society organizations and business groups were involved in 
the consultation meeting with the Commission on 12 December 2006. These non-
state actors were Tradewatch; UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employer’s 
Confederations of Europe); South Centre; International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD); and Eurocommerce.  
The civil society organizations and business groups had different views on the 
ASEAN–EU FTA. Tradewatch proposed that the Commission avoid a WTO plus 
arrangement119 and a liberalized market approach towards ASEAN. The ASEAN-EU 
FTA might devastate the economies of developing countries in South-East Asia 
because of their relatively low competence capacity and different level of economic 
capacity as compared to the EU. Tradewatch suggested that, in its economic 
cooperation with ASEAN, the EU had to consider environmental aspects and 
sustainable development. The South Centre added that the EU’s aggressive approach 
would make developing countries face difficulties in their development. In their 
                                                 
119 It covers trade in goods and services, IPR, government procurements, cooperation on trade-related 
issues, sustainable development concerning labour and environmental issues, sanitary and phyto-
sanitary issues, investment and dispute settlement mechanism (Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005:5).  
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economic cooperation with ASEAN, the EU could adopt a collaborative approach in 
trade and development rather than an aggressive approach. ICTSD reminded the 
Commission that trade liberalization in developing countries would not be effective 
without trade concessions and economic compensations (European Commission, 
2006b:1-2). 
In contrast, the business communities, represented by UNICE and 
Eurocommerce, had a strong economic interest in an ASEAN-EU FTA (European 
Commission, 2006b:1-2). UNICE argued that a FTA between the EU and ASEAN 
should include every dimension in trade and investment (Ibid). In its strategy on the 
EU approach to FTA, UNICE (2006:1-4) emphasized that the EU’s new generation 
of FTAs with third countries/regions should be based on economic criteria; the 
principle of reciprocity with new partners; broad coverage in goods, services and 
investment; the elimination of non-tariff barriers; and the inclusion of WTO plus 
issues. Additionally, Eurocommerce (2007:2-3) emphasized its support for the 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers in ASEAN, stressed its encouragement to 
assess the sustainable impact of a FTA; and its commitment to corporate social 
responsibility. Overall, the Commission considered their different comments and 
included them in its communication paper to the Council and which were noted in its 
discussion with the Council.      
On 19 December 2006, the Commission presented to and discussed with the 
Article 133 Committee a policy initiative on an ASEAN–EU FTA (European 
Commission, 2006e:1). The UK, France and Denmark raised the question of the 
potential impact, such as in the area of sustainable development, of a FTA on the 
least developed countries in South-East Asia. Italy raised the question of the legal 
basis for a negotiating mandate regarding a FTA with ASEAN since it went beyond 
trade issues (eg. sustainable development). Italy reminded the Commission to 
confine a mandate to economic issues and to clarify the EU’s objectives. The UK and 
Sweden raised the question of how the Commission would coordinate a regional 
approach for a FTA and a bilateral approach for a PCA with each ASEAN country. 
Belgium, Spain, Slovenia and Hungary were more concerned about whether or not 
the EU and ASEAN free trade negotiations could be concluded within two years. In 
responding to all these questions, the Commission agreed to the question of 
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sustainable development in the draft of the negotiating mandate. On the question of a 
legal basis, the Commission was aware that the draft of the negotiating mandate 
would be a collective agreement (Ibid, p.1-4). It would work with the Council on that 
issue. On the question of a regional and bilateral approach, the Commission would 
discuss the matter with ASEAN. With regard to the time frame of the negotiations, 
the Commission explained that, based on the Council’s approval, the ASEAN and 
EU free trade negotiations would be started in early March 2007 (Ibid, p.3).     
The Article 133 Committee and the Asia Oceania Working Party of the Council 
of the EU examined the drafts of negotiating mandate in order to achieve a common 
position on this issue before they submitted it to COREPER (Council of the EU, 
2007d:1) On 3 and 18 April 2007, COREPER discussed the trade aspects of these 
drafts of a FTA. COREPER examined drafts of the negotiating mandate and 
recommended that the Council approved it (Ibid). On 19 April 2007, COREPER 
proposed the final draft to the Council and the representatives of the EU member 
states in order to adopt the conclusion concerning the negotiating mandates for FTAs 
with countries of ASEAN, India and South Korea (Council of the EU, 2007e:1). The 
Council shaped and decided the final conclusion of the negotiating mandate of the 
FTA with ASEAN. In order to achieve a common trade policy, the EU member 
states tried to reach a consensus without employing a formal vote (Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis, 2010:285). The Council gave the Commission a negotiating mandate. The 
Commission conducted negotiations with ASEAN based on the negotiating mandate. 
When the Commission and ASEAN achieved a FTA, the Council, by a qualified 
majority decision, might adopt or cancel a trade agreement (EUR-Lex, 
2001:C80/16).  
On 23 April 2007, the Council released its negotiating mandate to the 
Commission in order to establish an ASEAN–EU FTA (Council of the EU, 2007c:1). 
The European Commission (2007b:1) informed the Council on developments in its 
free trade negotiations with ASEAN through the Article 133 Committee. The 
Council kept an eye on free trade negotiations between the Commission and 
ASEAN. Council official A argued that: “The Council of the EU agreed to let 
Commission try to negotiate a FTA […]. The Council would follow as it were at a 
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distance the progress or lack of progress in the negotiations between the Commission 
and ASEAN”.120  
According to this person, the member states would inform the Commission 
that, “They want you to focus on a particular point but on the another point, you give 
a lee way for negotiations. But in the end, it is the Commission that is in charge”.121 
The Commission communicated informally with the Council and several interested 
member states before the negotiations were concluded. Council official A stated that: 
“In last phase of negotiations, the Council is kept on board informally and especially 
those few member states who have real concerns on this and that point. And the 
Commission keeps them briefed informally on what happens by small off the record 
meetings”.122  
 The institutional arrangement in (and the legal basis for) the EU’s trade policy 
provided a flexible mechanism for the Commission to combine, with the Council’s 
consent, economic and sustainable development issues in the EU’s negotiating 
mandate. This situation went beyond the Community’s internal power, as mentioned 
in Article 300 of the TEC (EUR-Lex, 2001:C80/16). In order to avoid violation of 
the TEC, the Council would frame the legal relationship between trade provisions 
and the PCA (non-economic provisions) for relevant countries before the conclusion 
of trade negotiations between the EU and ASEAN (Bilaterals, 2007:4).  
The institutional arrangement in the EU’s trade policy provided, also, a 
framework which assisted the political and economic debates between the 
Commission and the Council regarding political economy (trade regulations and 
social concerns) and the selection of the approach which the EU took to deal with 
ASEAN. It was different from institutional arrangements for a new partnership with 
South-East Asia and the EU policy on Aceh because it allowed the Commission, 
with the consent of EU member states, to coordinate and lead the policy formulation. 
Meanwhile, the institutional arrangement for a new partnership with South-East Asia 
demonstrated a shared competence between the Commission and the Council. The 
institutional arrangement for the EU policy on Aceh illustrated that the Council led 
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and coordinated policy development with complementary support from the 
Commission.    
Based on the above explanation, the Commission and the Council were relevant 
actors who influenced significantly the development of the policy on the 
establishment of an ASEAN–EU FTA. The Commission had an initial right to 
propose and coordinate the institutional arrangement of this EU policy. The Council 
gave a negotiating mandate to the Commission. With regard to the Council, key 
member states such as the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France, which had an 
economic relationship with ASEAN, were involved actively in the development of 
this EU policy. They shaped the outcome of the Council’s negotiating mandate.  
The business communities presented their position to the Commission 
concerning the Global Europe communication strategy. The business communities 
were a supporter of an ASEAN-EU FTA. It provided advice on trade strategy; 
targeted countries/regions; and proposed trade measures to the Commission (UNICE, 
2006:1-9). The Commission took on board the business communities’ advice when it 
prepared for further discussions with the Council about a draft of the EU’s trade 
policy towards ASEAN. Meanwhile, the business communities participated in 
various seminars organized by the EU and ASEAN and conveyed their positions on a 
future FTA, EU trade policy and on non-trade barriers to ASEAN countries.  
However, compared to the Commission and the Council, the roles of the 
European Parliament and NGOs were less significant in the development of the EU’s 
trade policy towards ASEAN. They were not involved deeply in the establishment of 
an ASEAN-EU FTA. The Commission and the Council informed the European 
Parliament only about the conclusion of the negotiating mandate and the final 
outcome of the trade negotiation with ASEAN. The NGOs were involved only in the 
consultation of the intention of the Commission to create a FTA with ASEAN. They 
faced difficulties in following the latest progress in the development of this EU 
policy. To some extent, they disagreed with the EU’s aggressive approach on 
economic cooperation which was based on a WTO-plus arrangement. They agreed to 
approach ASEAN with a collaborative economic cooperation which would provide 
an opportunity for developments in ASEAN countries. The divergent views on an 
ASEAN-EU FTA between relevant actors (the Council and the Commission) with 
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support from the business communities and other related actors (European 
parliament and NGOs) eroded the EU’s position of acting as a unitary group. 
Overall, these actors (particularly the Commission and the Council) shaped, 
determined and decided upon the policy outcome. 
 
6.3.2. The Promotion of Interests or Values in the EU’s Policy Development on 
the Establishment of an ASEAN–EU FTA 
 
 I argue that the establishment of an ASEAN–EU FTA was intended to promote 
the economic interests of the EU member states and the Commission in their dealings 
with ASEAN. At the same time, the Commission, to some extent, shared common 
EU values with ASEAN in order to create an ASEAN–EU FTA. The economic 
interests of the EU member states and the Commission were more important than 
common EU values. 
Mandelson (2006b:3) argued that: “The European Commission has proposed a 
new generation of FTA to major growing markets, such as ASEAN, India and South 
Korea. This policy has attracted strong support from European business and industry 
because Europe’s companies know that their competitiveness depends on access to 
these rapidly expanding markets”. He added that: “Members of ASEAN see bilateral 
trade negotiations with the EU first as a means of increasing their access to our 
markets, creating opportunities for growth and development in their countries” (Ibid, 
p.5).  
The EU and its member states wanted to extend greater market access to the 
dynamic ASEAN market. The EU’s investors sought a stable and growing region in 
which to invest their capital. These interests were expressed, also, by European 
business at the consultation meeting with the Commission and in other seminars on a 
future FTA and EU trade policy to ASEAN countries. Council official A explained 
that the EU member states emphasized their interests to the Commission in their 
discussion with the Article 133 Committee on the draft of a negotiating mandate.123 
According to Commission official A, the reason was that: “At the end the one that is 
making trade with any country are companies that belong to one or more member 
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states”.124 The Commission believed that an ASEAN–EU FTA might boost the EU 
economic fortunes. Therefore, it consolidated economic interests of the EU member 
states and European business into the draft of a negotiating mandate for a FTA with 
ASEAN. 
The Council affirmed the EU’s economic interests by launching free trade 
negotiations with ASEAN. It mentioned this issue in its Guidelines on the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia. The UK initiated the idea of the guidelines 
during its presidency of the EU at the end of 2005. The Council adopted the 
guidelines on 20 December 2007. The basic foundation of the guidelines was that the 
EU had crucial interests in dynamic change in the East Asia region (including in 
ASEAN). There were prospects and risks for the EU in the context of political, 
security and economic affairs in the region (Council of the EU, 2007f:2-4). The EU 
hoped that an ASEAN-EU FTA might increase its trade activities and minimize its 
trade deficit against ASEAN countries (Camroux, 2009:67) and the rest of Asia. 
Council official A confirmed that:  
Our policy was indeed driven by the interests of the EU which, in principle, 
look sometimes like free trade block actor on a world scale, as you know, 
which means abolishing as many thresholds for goods and services as 
possible in principle it should be like that. There at least the Commission 
drove the policy and of course member states have industry and agriculture 
which is where protectionism comes in.125 
 
The trade pattern between the EU and ASEAN improved significantly from  
117,242 million in 2000;  128,282 million in 2006; and  135,285 million in 2008 
(trade amounts in Tables 6.1 and 6.2). However, the EU received still trade deficits 
against ASEAN of around  30 billion between these years. ASEAN is one of the 
EU’s main trade partners. ASEAN is in the 6th position as an EU trade partner with a 
total trade percentage around 4.6 % in 2008 (see Table 6.2). The EU is the second 
main trading partner of ASEAN with a total trade percentage of around 11.8 % in 
2008 (see Table 6.3). The EU sees many economic benefits and opportunities as 
outcomes of its relationship with ASEAN. The EU has exported industrial and high-
technology products to ASEAN, such as aircrafts; engines; medicine; railway 
equipment; computers; industrial machines; ships; electronic spare-parts; and 
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circuits. The main products, which the EU imported from ASEAN, were raw 
materials and manufactured articles such as wood; paper; rubber; leather; crude 
materials; energy; furniture; and textiles (Eurostat, 2007a:1 and  see Table 6.1) 
 
Table 6.1  
Main Merchandises Trade between the EU and ASEAN, 2000 & 2006   
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Table 6.3  
ASEAN Main Trade Partners, 2008 











Source: ASEAN Merchandise Trade Statistics Database (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009b:1). 
 
The UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France were the EU member states 
concerned with an ASEAN-EU FTA. With regard to economic interests, there were 
two examples which indicated that these EU member states were interested in 
ASEAN. These were: firstly, the EU member states were the main exporters to and 
importers from South-East Asia since 2000. In 2006, Germany, France and the UK 
were still the main exporters from the EU to ASEAN with respective total amounts 
of  14,485 million,  6,755 million and  6,525 million (see Table 4.1).  In the same 
year, the Netherlands, the UK, Germany and France were still the main EU importers 
from ASEAN with respective total amounts of  16,156 million,  15,292 million,  
14,833 million and  7,003 million (Ibid).  
Secondly, from 2001 to 2010, the EU was the biggest foreign investor in 
ASEAN and the total amount of the EU’s investment was USD 106,249 million (see 
Table 6.4). Many EU investors were attracted by the current situation in South-East 
Asia. ASEAN countries reformed their domestic regulations to be a friendly 
investment area for foreign investors. ASEAN accelerated its regional integration 
project in order to create a single market. The South-East Asia region attracted 
foreign investors because of its huge markets; cheap labour; and political stability. 
They were interested in investing their funds in various economic sectors such as 
manufacture; infrastructure; oil and refineries; banks; tourism; foods; medicines; and 
textiles. From 2005 to 2007, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, France were 
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Source: Data complied from the ASEAN Secretariat (2009a:128 and 2011a:1).  
 
In the light of this trade and investment development, Commission official A 
argued that:  
Out of the 27 member states there were some who were involved in 
ASEAN, such as the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands. The big 
member states have strong special commercial interests in the region. They 
clearly supported a FTA with ASEAN. They were conscious of the fact 
that ASEAN was opening out to other competitors who would be 
disadvantaged if they did not have an agreement themselves. They were 
very keen on having an agreement that allowed them to maintain a 
presence in the region and may be to improve it.126 
 
At the same time, the Commission represents the economic interests of the EU 
business communities. Business Europe supports the EU’s trade initiative with 
ASEAN in order to expand further the economic opportunities for European business 
and industries. Kerneis elaborated on the promotion of interests and values through a 
FTA by saying that: “For me the EU is also doing two different things. You have 
PCA where you put everything but trade, such as democracy, human rights and so on 
which is important. We are business, what we are interested in doing is a FTA. So, 
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their obviously common visions and values are important; but I mean Asia does not 
have a common culture with Europe”.127  
The Commission received, also, aspirations and comments from NGOs and the 
European Parliament who warned the Commission of the vulnerability in promoting 
only economic interests and in paying too little attention to sharing common EU 
values with ASEAN. They reminded the Commission also of the danger for FTAs 
for the least developed countries in South-East Asia and for small and medium 
enterprises in the EU. This situation might marginalize them from regional and 
international market economies. Maes argued that: “It was purely of economic 
interest. And there were no big trade agreement with ASEAN countries yet. ASEAN 
countries are also an important market and are also quite protected. This trade 
agreement is an opportunity to lower their protection and to get more active in these 
countries”.128  
Vanslambrouck admitted that: “In the policy paper [Global Europe strategy], 
you can see human rights and so on are still there but that they become a footnote 
and less important compare to economic and commercial interests […]. The Global 
Strategy was a turning point in changing this European mindset toward a more 
economic and commercial interest”.129  
Markov reminded the Commission that: “Trade not only fulfils the economic 
aims but that trade is also responsible for development. Trade has tasks for social, 
environmental, human rights and development issues. The Commission all the time 
is only focusing on the economic part, therefore a FTA” (TNI, 2009). He questioned 
the EU’s common interest in ASEAN and its Global Europe strategy that:  
Global Europe is saying the interest of the big European companies. I think 
we have much more to debate as to whether it is the production companies 
or trading companies […]. Then, whether the interest of the EU is only in 
the big companies or do we consider the needs of small and medium 
enterprises of regional production. I think the Global Europe strategy is 
absolutely the wrong strategy. Therefore, we will never have success with 
it (Ibid).  
 
Bendini explained that the European Parliament had a balanced a view on the 
EU’s trade policy; i.e. a balance between the promotion of economic interest and 
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values. The concern of the European Parliament about the promotion of common EU 
values to a third party was greater than in other EU institutions. He explained that: 
“There is certainly a strong interest in these values. I would not be surprised if the 
European Parliament keeps discussing and talking on these elements, more so than 
the Council or the Commission. It is typical or a sort of brand of how the European 
Parliament works”.130 
An official from Germany stated that:  
In terms of promoting values and interests, it is a mix. One of the core 
aspects of the EU and ASEAN relationship is certainly trade. Efforts to 
promote the trade relationship focused on a region-to-region FTA and then 
opted for the bilateral path as an intermediary option. In Germany, the 
interest in an FTA is very high. […] For German industry and exporters are 
very strongly interested in that. [...] The German government has tried to 
keep trade high up on the EU and ASEAN agenda.131 
 
This person continues by saying that: “In the trade area, it would be difficult to 
argue on the basis of values, it is very much driven by economic interests. […] 
Economic interests, the need for growing export markets but also investment 
opportunities for European companies are key drivers. Basically, they invest in 
South-East Asia in order to produce a market in India and China”.132 
The UK government and its parliament stressed that the government should 
pursue an ASEAN-EU FTA in order to assist its business community in commercial 
activities throughout the South-East Asia region. David Miliband, a former British 
foreign secretary stated that: “Our trade negotiations are done by the EU. We are 
always trying to promote open trade”.133 An official from the UK emphasized that: 
“We are very strong defenders of FTA. So, we pursue FTA where we can around the 
world because we do think it is a valuable way to ensure there is free trade […] Part 
of the government’s job is to make it easy for the business community to do 
business”.134 The UK Parliament (2005b:5) added that: “The UK has historically 
been a significant trading partner in the region, and we detected a considerable 
amount of goodwill towards the UK and willingness to continue that relationship”.   
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132 Ibid. 
133 Interview with David Miliband, Edinburgh, 26 October 2011.  
134 Interview with national official, the UK, 2010. 
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An official from the Netherlands added that: “The Netherlands, in general, are 
pro free trade. […] We do not want to protect our market. We are quite in favour of 
this […] With ASEAN, from the Netherlands point of view, it would be mutually 
beneficial. ASEAN is not a threat for the Netherlands”.135 This person argued that: 
“FTA is very clear. It is about economy and trade […] the fact that there is a link. 
We cannot have an FTA unless we also have an agreement which is based on the 
promotion of values”.136 This official explained that the EU tried to create a balance 
between the economic interests and common EU values in its trade agreement with 
regard to ASEAN. This person stated that: “We really cannot have a trade agreement 
without having an agreement which deals with human rights, rules of law, fighting 
terrorism and many other elements”.137 
Commission official E explained what had reflected on any FTA or PCA which 
the EU had employed with ASEAN. The EU pursued a FTA with ASEAN on an 
inter-regional basis. The EU had sought, also, a way to achieve PCAs with every 
ASEAN country on a bilateral basis. This person argued that: “When it comes to 
FTA, it is about trade and investment. That is why PCA is important. When we talk 
about human rights and democracy, it is clear in PCA. The policy is clear as you 
know we do not sign FTA without PCA. PCA is an overarching agreement that 
covers everything, human rights, education and development. FTA covers trade and 
investment”.138 The Commission did not sign any PCA with ASEAN countries when 
it attempted to create an ASEAN-EU FTA. It showed that the Commission paid more 
attention to the FTA than the PCA.   
There were different views to consider as to whether or not an ASEAN–EU 
FTA was promoting purely economic interests and/or combining economic interests 
and common EU values. On the one hand, most EU institutions, member states and 
the business communities agreed that the FTA, which would be promoted to 
ASEAN, was a mixture of economic interests and common EU values. On the other 
hand, NGOs and the European Parliament believed that, largely, an ASEAN-EU 
FTA was promoting the EU’s economic interests and minimizing the importance of 
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socio-environmental sustainability and labour/human rights issues. It would make the 
EU lose its credibility since, in an ASEAN-EU FTA, it focused only on economic 
interests. 
Commission official F argued explicitly that, obviously, the EU promoted its 
economic interests. This person stated that: “It was both a combination of the two but 
clearly economic interests because ASEAN has a large population and it is a growing 
economic region. Both sides have an economic interest, ASEAN clearly has an 
economic interest in the EU. […] So there are economic interests and also political 
interests within the European Commission”.139 At the same time, in the context of an 
ASEAN–EU FTA, the Commission has accommodated the social and developmental 
concerns of the European Parliament and EU’s non-state actors.  
The way, in which relevant actors were promoting and shaping the economic 
interests and common EU values, impacted on the outcome of the EU’s policy. The 
Council was dominated by key member states who wanted to establish an ASEAN–
EU FTA. These member states promoted their economic interests to other member 
states in order to shape the Commission’s negotiating mandate. To some extent, key 
EU member states encouraged the Commission to share, through an ASEAN-EU 
FTA, a minimum of EU common values with ASEAN. The Commission was 
accommodating the economic interests of key member states and the business 
communities within the EU. It included, also, in its negotiating mandate the 
aspirations of the European Parliament and NGOs concerning common EU values, 
such as sustainable development and labour/human rights. It faced a difficult 
situation when attempting to find a balance between the promotion of the economic 
interest of key EU member states and of the business community within the EU and 
the common EU values implicit in its overall position on an ASEAN–EU FTA.  
Overall, there were several reasons as to why the economic interests came 
before common EU values. Firstly, the key EU and northern countries demanded that 
the Commission improved the external competitiveness of European business against 
EU competitors in South-East Asia by gaining market access and reducing trade 
barriers. Secondly, the Commission focused more on a region-to-region FTA rather 
than a bilateral PCA with each ASEAN country. Thirdly, the Commission gave more 
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access to the business community to shape the establishment of an ASEAN–EU 
FTA. This showed that economic interests took precedence over common EU values.  
 
6.3.3. Mode of Engagement between the EU and ASEAN  
The Commission had implemented consultation and negotiation mechanisms as 
its modes of engagement to create an ASEAN–EU FTA. At the start, the 
Commission employed a consultation mechanism with ASEAN by establishing the 
Vision Group on the ASEAN–EU Economic Partnership. The Commission and 
Vietnam led the Vision Group which submitted its report to the consultation meeting 
between ASEAN Economic Ministers and the EU Trade Commissioner (ASEAN-EU 
Vision Group, 2006:1). Vietnam was elected as a coordinator of ASEAN countries 
on an ASEAN-EU FTA because, previously, it had been appointed as ASEAN’s 
coordinator on TREATI with the EU (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004b:73-74). 
Ignacio Garcia Bercero, the European Commission’s Director of Development 
and Management of Trade Relations with South-East Asia, stated that: 
“Commissioner Peter Mandelson and ASEAN trade ministers decided to set up a 
group of senior officials to reflect on the possibility of a comprehensive FTA 
between the EU and ASEAN” (TNI, 2009). Commission official F added that “there 
was a vision group [...] that was leading up to the FTA”.140 Bercero stated that: “This 
resulted in the production one year later of a report […]. It is included some 
recommendations about what a FTA between two regions could represent. On this 
basis we went to the member states, we had member states give us an authorization 
to negotiate this FTA. We obtained this authorization in April 2007. On that basis we 
started negotiations with ASEAN, Korea and India” (Ibid). 
After the EU’s negotiating mandate came out, the Commission employed, at 
this stage, a negotiation mechanism to create an ASEAN–EU FTA. The ASEAN 
Secretariat official A explained the way in which negotiation worked when both 
parties held ASEAN and EU free trade negotiations. This person stated that: 
The Commission negotiated on behalf of the EU but on the ASEAN side, 
individual ASEAN governments sent their representatives. […] The way 
of negotiation took place at the level of official. ASEAN got its common 
position before they could negotiate with the EU. […] The Joint 
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Committee reported to the ASEAN Economic Ministers and EU Trade 
Commissioner consultation.141  
 
At the beginning of the negotiation process, the EU had wanted to exclude 
Myanmar, Lao PDR and Cambodia because they were the least developed countries 
which had received special treatment from the EU. Additionally, the EU did not want 
to have an economic relationship with Myanmar because of its political repression 
and because the military regime had committed human rights violations against Suu 
Kyi and the Myanmar people. The UK and the Netherlands led all EU member states 
in their opposition to the participation of Myanmar in the ASEAN and EU free trade 
negotiations (Falletti, 2007a:14). Consequently, Myanmar, Lao PDR and Cambodia 
were not included in the EU’s negotiating mandate for free trade negotiations with 
ASEAN.  
However, ASEAN did not agree to the EU’s request on account of ASEAN 
being a single regional block. Myanmar was a member of ASEAN (Europe, 
2007a:12). Ong Keng Yong, the ASEAN Secretary General said that: “It is 
understood that the ten members of ASEAN are holding discussions with the EU. No 
one will be excluded from this process” (Falletti, 2007b:11). At the end, the 
Commission agreed to treat ASEAN as a single regional block and to discuss, 
between both parties, only the trade aspects of FTA. However, the EU did not want 
to sign a final FTA, if Myanmar were to be included in it (Europe, 2007b:9).   
The EU and ASEAN FTA Joint Committee met seven times between 2007 and 
2009 to discuss an ASEAN–EU FTA. The first meeting of the Joint Committee was 
held on 19-20 July 2007 in Da Nang, Vietnam. The European Commission (2007c:1) 
and ASEAN discussed the modality; the work programme; and the time table for the 
ASEAN-EU free trade negotiations. ASEAN stated that they focused usually on 
trade in goods and services and investment. In the Cooperation Chapter, ASEAN 
negotiated IPR and competition policy. Previously, ASEAN had never negotiated a 
public procurement in each FTA. The Commission and ASEAN did not reach a 
common agreement with regard to the elements for negotiation because of their 
different approaches to trade negotiations. They agreed to form working groups 
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based on the architecture of the FTA where they could elaborate on each element in 
detail (Department of Trade Negotiations Thailand, 2007a:1).    
 The second meeting of the EU and ASEAN FTA Joint Committee was held on 
22-23 October 2007 in Singapore. The Commission and ASEAN agreed to discuss 
trade in goods and services, investment and cooperation (Department of Trade 
Negotiations Thailand, 2007b:1). ASEAN countries were reluctant to use the Vision 
Group report as a reference point to an ASEAN-EU FTA because it was an academic 
paper and Ministers had not approved it as a foundation of an ASEAN-EU FTA 
(European Commission, 2007d:1-2). They agreed to adopt a report of the Joint 
Committee to the Economic Ministers; the work programme; and a time schedule for 
free trade negotiations. However, ASEAN wanted still to exchange views on areas 
covered by an ASEAN-EU FTA rather than start negotiations on these areas 
(European Commission, 2007e:1).    
The third meeting of the EU and ASEAN FTA Joint Committee was held on 30 
January–1 February 2008 in Brussels (European Commission, 2008b:1). The 
Commission planned to communicate to every ASEAN country as to how they 
pursued their position within the FTA provisions and to make clear their level of 
ambition regarding the creation of an ASEAN-EU FTA.142 The European 
Commission (2008c:1-2) proposed several elements to be included at the next 
meeting such as trade in goods and services; non-tariff barriers; competition; public 
procurement; IPRs; customs facilitation; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; rules 
of origin; sustainable development; and dispute settlement mechanisms. However, 
ASEAN raised its concerns about several proposed elements such as IPR; 
competition; public procurement; and sustainable development on which, previously,  
it had never negotiated in each FTA (Department of Trade Negotiations Thailand, 
2008a:1).  
The fourth meeting of the EU and ASEAN FTA Joint Committee was held on 
16–18 April 2008 in Bangkok, Thailand (European Commission, 2008d:1). The 
European Commission (2008e:1) and ASEAN discussed all elements of the ASEAN-
EU FTA except public procurement and competition. They had their differences on 
several elements of the ASEAN–EU FTA such as IPRs; sustainable development; 
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trade in services; and establishment of a settlement to disputes. ASEAN addressed 
the Commission on the issue of the different level of development between them. 
ASEAN wanted the Commission to consider and treat the liberalization of trade 
differently. The Commission was concerned about the slow process of the ASEAN-
EU free trade negotiations because of their differences on several issues (Department 
of Trade Negotiations Thailand, 2008b:1).  
The fifth meeting of the EU and ASEAN FTA Joint Committee was held on 
25–27 June 2008 in Manila, the Philippines. The Commission and ASEAN had still a 
similar situation to that of previous meetings where there had been different views on 
IPRs; sustainable development; trade in services; and the establishment of a 
settlement to disputes. ASEAN was concerned about the complexity of the IPR and 
trade in service proposals from the European Commission (2008f:2). ASEAN was 
reluctant to include sustainable development in the ASEAN–EU FTA. The 
Commission assured ASEAN that the ASEAN–EU FTA would not have a negative 
impact on society and the environment. In the end, several ASEAN countries did not 
agree to negotiate with the Commission on competition policy and public 
procurement (Department of Trade Negotiations Thailand, 2008c:1).   
The sixth meeting of the EU and ASEAN FTA Joint Committee was held on 
15-17 October 2008 in Hanoi, Vietnam (European Commission, 2008g:2). The 
Commission and ASEAN focused still on the technical barriers to trade and the 
implications of technical regulations. There was no major progress on trade 
negotiations between ASEAN and the European Commission (2008h:1). The EU 
continued not to involve Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar in the proposed FTA 
because they were the least developed countries. Moreover, the EU was concerned 
about human right violations and the undemocratic regime in Myanmar (Torres, 
2008:1).  
The seventh meeting of the EU and ASEAN FTA Joint Committee was held on 
4-5 March 2009 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The main agenda of this meeting was to 
discuss frankly, between the two parties, the next direction in the ASEAN-EU FTA. 
This meeting was held in closed format (European Commission, 2008i:2). The EU 
pointed out the various obstacles in the negotiations as mentioned at the Joint 
Committee’s previous meetings. ASEAN wanted the Commission to consider it as a 
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regional block which involved all ASEAN countries in their free trade negotiations 
(Ibid). Consequently, the European Commission (2011a:2) and ASEAN agreed to 
have a pause in their free trade negotiations.  
In their free trade negotiations, the EU and ASEAN held different positions on 
crucial issues.  In considering the question from an EU perspective, the EU wanted to 
exclude Myanmar from the ASEAN block because the government authority, in 
Myanmar, represented a repressive military regime and had committed human rights 
violations against its people. Then, the EU offered a WTO plus arrangement to 
ASEAN for their future FTA. Finally, the EU excluded Cambodia and Lao PDR 
from the process of free trade negotiations because they were not ready to join an 
ASEAN–EU FTA (Europe, 2007c:16).  
The responses from the ASEAN side were that, firstly, the EU had to include 
Myanmar, Cambodia and the Lao PDR in the process of free trade negotiations 
between the two regions. ASEAN wanted to negotiate with the EU on the basis of 10 
countries. The ASEAN Secretariat official A stated that: “The political factor is also 
one reason. The Myanmar factor is given the EU position on Myanmar. The EU at 
some stage in the negotiation realized that they were not going very far. They also 
wanted to pursue a plurilateral approach, may be they would do three or four first. 
But ASEAN is 10 or nothing”.143 
Secondly, as yet, most ASEAN countries were not ready to adopt and apply a 
WTO plus arrangement because of their different levels and capacities in economic 
development which would affect adversely their response to such an arrangement. 
ASEAN countries were divided on the question of the WTO plus arrangement. On 
the one side, most ASEAN countries did not want still to liberalize their economies 
fully as requested by the EU. Malaysia did not want to include public procurement in 
free trade negotiations. Thailand released rigid regulations for FDI during the period 
of the ASEAN and EU free trade negotiations. Indonesia had a problem with the EU 
when it prohibited Indonesian airlines from landing at EU airports. On the other side, 
Singapore and Brunei Darussalam were very attracted by the prospect of an FTA 
offered by the EU. Vietnam and the Philippines looked positively at the proposed 
ASEAN-EU FTA (Falletti, 2008:10-11).  
                                                 
143 Interview with the ASEAN Secretariat official A, 2010. 
 183 
Thirdly, ASEAN pursued the EU to allow Cambodia, Myanmar and Lao PDR 
to enter the process of free trade negotiations because, in the long term, a future FTA 
could cover economic and development cooperation between the two regions. 
ASEAN requested that the EU preserved a different treatment for Cambodia, 
Myanmar and Lao PDR in a proposed FTA because they remained the least 
developed countries (Europe, 2007c:16). The ASEAN Secretariat official A asked 
the question: “When you negotiate with a Group of 10, countries like Lao PDR and 
Cambodia who are recipients of the Everything But Arms (EBA)144, what benefits do 
they see in further negotiations with the EU? If they are not keen to do anything 
because they already have everything under EBA, they see no need to do anything 
further”.145  
The ASEAN Secretariat suggested Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar 
concerning their long term advantage in being part of a joint ASEAN-EU FTA rather 
than the EBA. The ASEAN Secretariat official A explained that: “We also tell Lao 
PDR and Cambodia that EBA is a short term agreement until 2015. But the ASEAN-
EU FTA is long term. You would need to concretize or integrate what you have from 
EBA into an ASEAN-EU FTA, so as to prolong or make more certain the benefits 
that you would get from EBA”. 146 
After two years of ASEAN and EU trade negotiations, the EU and ASEAN 
decided to put them on hold due to a different stance between them. Commission 
official E mentioned that:  
We started negotiating further on tariff concessions, services, rules and the 
top down process, we did not negotiate on the substance because all 
negotiations where on the process, how to move forward, how to exchange 
agendas, on whether they were keen on the agenda or not, on the 
negotiation, themselves for almost two years from July 2007 to March 
2009 when we suspended the negotiation. In March 2009, the EU and 
ASEAN FTA Joint Committee agreed to put the negotiations on hold 
because we were not making progress.147 
 
The EU used consultation and negotiation mechanisms as the modes of 
engagement in its interaction with ASEAN on the establishment of an ASEAN–EU 
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FTA. Commission official F confirmed that: “Clearly what we want to do was to 
understand ASEAN’s thinking and to understand how ASEAN would see a FTA 
with the EU. We want to make it very clear that for us it would have to be very 
comprehensive”.148 The EU’s policy toward the establishment of an ASEAN-EU 
FTA was influenced by a negotiation mechanism related to the Global Europe 
communication. Commission official A argued that there had been a shift in EU 
policy which had focused previously on consultation to negotiation.149 Commission 
official E stated that: “We really choose negotiation with ASEAN because the Global 
Europe communication led to a change of strategy in 2006”.150 
The Council shared similar perspectives with the Commission on the way the 
Commission pursued ASEAN to create an FTA between them. Council official A 
stated that: “We would announce to the Council that we are having informal talks 
with the ASEAN Secretariat, on what are the issues and whether we feel a FTA 
would possible cover them […]. Once we have this general outline, it usually takes a 
few rounds. In difficult cases it would take many rounds or even also possibly not 
come to an agreement at all”.151 
Maes explained how the Commission applied consultations and negotiations 
with ASEAN in order to form a FTA. He elaborated that: 
The parties consulted each other as to whether the level of ambition was 
there […]. They had to find out first what they really had to offer and to 
ascertain their demands and put on the table a proposal of market 
liberalization. The Commission discussed and checked how far ASEAN 
countries could go with this and in which sectors […]. Then, it formulates 
a proposal for its partner. They go many rounds before they really go to 
the target.152  
 
In the light of the ASEAN and EU free trade negotiations, Charles Santiago, an 
ASEAN parliamentarian, argued that there was a lack of transparency and 
accountability in these negotiations. According to Santiago, the ASEAN negotiator 
told NGO activists in March 2009, in Malaysia, that: “In the case of IPR, they are 
exchanging views. This is ASEAN’s feeling and the EU says that it has its own 
                                                 
148 Interview with Commission official F, 2011. 
149 Interview with Commission official A, 2011. 
150 Interview with Commission official E, 2010.  
151 Interview with Council official A, 2011. 
152 Interview with Maes, 2011. 
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ideas. They had found out the following day that the EU had already given a paper to 
ASEAN saying this was the IPR requirement that we wanted from ASEAN. The 
level of transparency in the scale of one to ten is zero” (TNI, 2009). Santiago added 
further that “we have made many attempts to discuss or even to find out from our 
own governments about what has been negotiated in the agreement [...]. We would 
not get anything concrete from our governments as to what exactly is being 
negotiated”.153 
A NGO activist explained that, at the GoI and ASEAN levels, there was a lack 
of involvement in and small access for NGOs in trade negotiations such as the 
ASEAN-EU free trade negotiations. NGOs had difficulty in obtaining a draft of 
ASEAN-EU FTA. They monitored, from the media, the latest developments on trade 
negotiations. They thought there was a complex and less integrated bureaucratic 
system within the ASEAN Ministries countries and in the ASEAN secretariat.154 
Consequently, Southeast Asian NGOs, with the support of trade campaigners from 
Europe, established the EU-ASEAN FTA Campaign Network (2008:1) and held 
protest rallies in several ASEAN countries about the lack of transparency in the 
ASEAN-EU free trade negotiations and requested the involvement of NGOs in these 
negotiations. The European NGOs supported the Network (111111, 2008:1) through 
information sharing and coalition building. As they observed developments in those 
activities, the European NGOs provided analyses on both the creation of the EU 
negotiating mandate and the negotiations for an ASEAN-EU FTA for Southeast 
Asian NGOs. They helped Southeast Asian campaigners to cooperate with another 
coalition of NGOs and to communicate with members of the European Parliament on 
FTA issues.155    
Markov admitted that there was a lack of transparency with regard to the 
negotiating mandate for the Commission. He argued that: “Member states gave a 
mandate. The interests of member states are however very different because trade is 
in fact a European matter not a matter for member states. Then, you debate, 
negotiate, get a result and present it to the member states. You are acting sometimes 
                                                 
153 Interview with Charles Santiago, a Malaysian Parliamentarian from the Democratic Action Party, 
Skype, 2 February 2012. 
154 Interview with a NGO activist from South-East Asia, E-mail, 23 December 2011. 
155 Interview with Vanslambrouck, 2011.  
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very freely within the scope of the mandate. The mandate is not transparent” (TNI, 
2009).   
Consultation and negotiation had an impact on the way in which the EU and 
ASEAN formulated a foundation report, in the Vision Group, and the outcome of 
ASEAN and EU free trade negotiations. In the consultation period, the Vision Group 
was a means of exchanging views and formulating a report between the two regions 
which led to the creation of an ASEAN–EU FTA. These regions reached a common 
view and a better understanding of the future ASEAN–EU FTA. This was reflected 
in the Vision Group report. The Commission and the Council used the report to 
develop a negotiating mandate for opening negotiations with ASEAN.  
However, there were some differences between the EU and ASEAN which led 
to deadlock in their trade negotiations. On the one side, the EU could not 
accommodate ASEAN’s aspirations to include Myanmar, Lao PDR and Cambodia in 
the framework of an ASEAN–EU FTA. It hoped ASEAN could accelerate the 
completion of an ASEAN-EU FTA. On the other hand, ASEAN could not meet the 
EU’s aspirations with regard to the exclusion of Myanmar, Lao PDR and Cambodia 
from an ASEAN–EU FTA and the level of expectation with regard to the WTO plus 
arrangement. ASEAN wished to discuss the elements of an ASEAN-EU FTA further 
with the EU. Then, NGOs and the European Parliament criticized the Commission 
and ASEAN because of a lack of transparency in their negotiations. Overall, the EU 
and ASEAN could form collectively a Vision Group report through a consensus 
building mechanism. However, during the course of the negotiation period, they 
ceased their interactive bargaining on the ASEAN–EU FTA.  
 
6.3.4.  The Level of Integration within ASEAN  
The process of regional integration, within ASEAN, is still ongoing from 2007 
to the present day. Between 2007 and 2010, ASEAN’s regional integration had 
advanced from its early inception, in 2003, when it focused on the implementation of 
AFTA. ASEAN has been persuading for the creation of a common market for its 
regional economic integration within the ASEAN Community.156 I explain the 
                                                 
156 According to Balassa and Cuyvers (see Chapter 3), the establishment of a common market is the 
third stage of regional economic integration after the creation of custom union and a free trade area 
within a region.  
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development of the ASEAN Community as pillars of ASEAN’s regional integration 
and the way in which the ASEAN Charter supports the realization of the ASEAN 
Community. Then, I examine the effect of the level of ASEAN regional integration 
on the development of the EU’s policy towards the creation of an ASEAN–EU FTA.  
ASEAN countries recognized that ASEAN needed to pursue its regional 
integration in order to tackle regional and global challenges in an effective way. 
They agreed to form an ASEAN Community. There are reasons as to why ASEAN 
countries realized that they should build an ASEAN Community. These were:  
firstly, they needed to develop a comprehensive approach to the regional integration 
of ASEAN which has focused not only on regional economic integration but, also, on 
the political and socio-cultural aspects of cooperation. They wanted to preserve 
regional security in South-East Asia. Secondly, the Asian financial crisis had 
provided a valuable lesson for ASEAN countries on how to build a regional 
framework in order to respond to any potential crisis in the future. Thirdly, ASEAN 
countries wanted to improve intra-trade and investment within ASEAN covered by 
AFTA and the ASEAN Investment Area (OECD, 2007:2-3). This situation aimed to 
reduce the economic and developmental gap which existed between different 
ASEAN countries. Fourthly, ASEAN countries wanted to implement open 
regionalism to attract ASEAN’s external partners to engage with ASEAN. 
(Yudhoyono, 2005:1).    
The establishment of the ASEAN Community started in 2002. The leaders of 
ASEAN met on 4 November 2002 at the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Phen, 
Cambodia. They declared that the Phnom Penh Agenda for a Community of 
Southeast Asian Nations was a step towards the integration of ASEAN. The Summit 
covered the following main issues: firstly, the implementation of an economic 
development programme for the Greater Mekong sub-region157 was a way to speed 
up ASEAN integration. Secondly, the promotion of tourism was important in making 
ASEAN a single tourist attraction. Thirdly, it was to build a solidarity of peace and 
security in South-East Asia. Fourth, ASEAN considered the AEC as a final 
destination for its economic integration (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002d:1). In 2003, the 
ASEAN leaders finalized the formulation of the ASEAN Community. The ASEAN 
                                                 
157 It consists of Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar and Lao PDR.  
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Community includes essential parts of the ASEAN Vision 2020158; the Hanoi Plan of 
Action (1999–2004)159; the IAI; and the Roadmap for Integration of ASEAN 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2003e:1).  
The ASEAN leaders launched the ASEAN Community on 7 October 2003 at 
the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia. ASEAN countries agreed to the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II which consisted of the agreement to build, in 
2020, the ASEAN Community (the APSC; the AEC; and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community (ASCC)). The strategies and objectives of the ASEAN Community  
were translated into detailed programmes known as the VAP which ASEAN 
countries  implemented from 2004 to 2010 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004c:4-5).  
The ASEAN countries agreed to bring forward the year for the realization of 
the ASEAN Community from 2020 to 2015. On 13 January 2007 at the 12th ASEAN 
Summit in Cebu, Philippines, they declared the Cebu Declaration on the 
Establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007b:1). 
Later, on 1 March 2009,  the Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the 
ASEAN Community (2009–2015) was launched at the 14th ASEAN Summit in Cha-
am, Thailand (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009e:1-2). This roadmap revised the 2009 VAP 
which consists of blueprints for each ASEAN Community.     
To support the process of regional integration within ASEAN, the ASEAN 
leaders signed the ASEAN Charter on 20 November 2007 at the 13th ASEAN 
Summit in Singapore (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007c:1). It came into force on 15 
December 2008. ASEAN leaders agreed to adopt the Charter after the 14th ASEAN 
Summit in Thailand (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009f:1). The Charter, as a legal 
personality, strengthens ASEAN’s capabilities and resources in order to meet its 
challenges and goals. The birth of the Charter has transformed this regional 
organization from a loosely-organized organization to a solid regional inter-
governmental organization. The Charter reflected a new political commitment of 
ASEAN countries to integrate and to establish the ASEAN Community (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2008b and 2008c:1-5). 
                                                 
158 It aims to achieve a deeper economic integration through AFTA and the ASEAN Investment Area 
in 2010, the development of sub-regional cooperation, the important role of business groups and the 
enlargement of cooperation with ASEAN’s external partners.  
159 It aims to reduce the development gap between old and new ASEAN countries. 
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Solana stated that: “We see this regional association as the beginning of 
something big” (Europe, 2007d:2). He pointed to the realization of the AEC in 2015 
and to the ratification of an ASEAN Charter as the emergence of ASEAN as one of 
the important regional organizations in the world (Ibid). At the commemorative 
summit on the 30th anniversary in the EU and ASEAN relationship, the EU 
emphasized that it supported the ratification of the ASEAN Charter as a foundation 
for an effective structure to realize the ASEAN Community in 2015 (Europe, 
2007c:16). Miliband argued that: “The regional institution is going to be more 
important in the 21st century than people realize […]. I think in Asia, you can see that 
developing as well. […] I think ASEAN is right for developing a stronger regional 
structure”.160 
The realization of the ASEAN Community is still ongoing. The above situation 
came about when the Commission and the Council developed the EU’s policy for an 
ASEAN–EU FTA. The EU realized that the political and economic aspects of 
cooperation could not be sustained, if ASEAN did not have internal coherence and 
solidity as a regional organization. ASEAN consolidated its structure, strategy and 
resources in order to reach its regional integration in 2015 which I refer to as the 
ASEAN’s developmental transformation.  
Mandelson understood that ASEAN was one of the emerging markets in the 
world. The EU approached ASEAN to establish a FTA and to share the EU’s 
experience of regional economic integration. However, ASEAN did not follow the 
EU’s integration model (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006b:1). Mandelson (2006b:4) argued 
that: “With ASEAN and Andean countries, our goal is to reach agreement not with 
individual countries but with regional groupings who want, in their own ways, to 
draw the lessons of Europe’s successful experience of economic integration”. He 
explained that the EU could assist ASEAN countries to integrate their various trade 
regulations in a common market. He stated that “the ten countries of ASEAN have 
more than 30 FTAs among themselves [...]. The prospect of an EU-ASEAN bilateral 
trade agreement is one of the strongest incentives to replace that complexity with a 
more unified market; replacing thirty sets of rules with one” (Ibid). 
                                                 
160 Interview with Miliband, 2011. 
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Commission official A argued that the level of integration within ASEAN was 
one of criteria in the EU’s communication to choose ASEAN as a priority for FTA 
because of its own regional integration process which was on going.161 Commission 
official F stated that the level of integration within ASEAN was a crucial factor to be 
considered by the Commission when it created its policy for a FTA with ASEAN. 
This person stated that: “It was very important. I think that if ASEAN itself have 
been working on the establishment of the AEC that would indicate that they would 
want to deepen their integration”.162 This person added that “In the EU, there is one 
custom border once goods enter they can move freely through whole of it. […]We 
want to ensure that ASEAN is moving in that kind of direction”.163 
Council official A argued that: “The level of integration in ASEAN was of 
course crucial, when we decided to start the creation of an ASEAN-EU FTA. 
ASEAN was unfortunately not integrated enough was the main reason why we 
pulled out of the FTA”.164An official from the Netherlands admitted the relevance of 
the level of integration by saying “I think so, we must have thought that it would be 
possible […]. The EU prefers to have agreement with either bigger countries or a 
block of countries rather than an individual country”.165  
In the process of the ASEAN and EU free trade negotiations, ASEAN had a 
different level of ambition from the EU in the context of the coverage of economic 
sectors and the completeness of the ASEAN–EU FTA. The EU proposed to ASEAN 
a FTA based on the WTO plus arrangement which was ambitious in its economic 
areas and high level of liberalization. An official from the Netherlands argued that: “I 
do know that the EU has quite a high standard as well and that our trade agreement is 
very ambitious.” 166  
However, ASEAN countries had a different expectation with regard to the 
proposed FTA because of their economic capability and capacity to respond to the 
EU’s offer. An official from the Netherlands argued further that: “The interests 
among ASEAN member states on the issue of trade were very diverse and so the 
                                                 
161 Interview with Commission official A, 2010. 
162 Interview with Commission official F, 2011. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Interview with Council official A, 2011.  
165 Interview with national official, the Netherlands, 2011. 
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level of integration was not yet high enough to actually have an agreement like 
that”.167 This person summarized that “we wanted and thought that we could have a 
region to region agreement […]. I think we had assumed that it would be possible; 
but probably it might turn out that it was not possible”.168  
Jan-Willem Blankert, a Special Advisor on the EU and ASEAN relationship 
from the EU’s delegation to ASEAN, stated that: “As for the FTA talks between the 
EU and ASEAN, I think the EU wanted too much at once, we were too ambitious. 
[...] ASEAN was trying to keep it fairly simple” (Sohn, 2010:13). Commission 
official G added that “the two blocs have not been able to agree and even continue 
negotiations for FTA between the two”.169 
Other reasons why they had a different level of ambition for a FTA were that, 
firstly, ASEAN countries were consolidating themselves still in their regional 
integration and secondly, that ASEAN countries had a different level of economic 
development among them. Some developed ASEAN countries were ready to sign up 
for the ASEAN–EU FTA. However, most ASEAN countries were not ready to 
liberalize their national economies to the EU. Consequently, ASEAN proposed a 
selective FTA to the EU which was based only on trade in goods, selective services 
and investment. A selective FTA has been applied by ASEAN when it establishes 
FTAs with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. 
Commission official F argued that: “There is a concrete basis on which we want to 
negotiate a FTA. That would be a reflection of mutual understanding and expectation 
from both sides. I think ASEAN did not see it to be quite such a firm basis for 
discussion. So once we were discussing details of the FTA, then it would become 
clear that both parties had different expectations”.170 
The Commission realized that the level of ASEAN’s regional integration had to 
be developed still. It was seeking a way to promote its experience of regional 
integration as a lesson to be learnt by ASEAN. Commission official F stated that: 
ASEAN was one of the regional bodies which we saw developing in a 
similar way to the EU. […] We could support ASEAN because we had 
done similar things in the past. We had encountered a number of issues 
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and difficulties that we expected ASEAN would encounter at the same 
time. We thought that a FTA to some extent would provide a basis for 
trade and cooperation that encompassed the idea of both sides working 
together on economic integration. 171 
 
Recently, De Gucht explained that the EU planned to use a common backbone 
for its FTA with each ASEAN country. After the EU concluded these negotiations 
with each ASEAN country, the AEC would be implemented in 2015. At that time, it 
is appropriate for the EU and ASEAN to shift their economic relationship based on 
inter-regional approach (Dewi, 2011:1). To meet this objective, the Commission 
assisted ASEAN’s regional integration with the realization of AEC. The Commission 
and ASEAN had concluded the APRIS I172 and II173 programmes. The EU funded 
these programmes with a total amount of  10 million (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2011c:1). The APRIS II programme focused on the development of the AEC, 
standards and conformance; customs and trade facilitation; investment capacity 
building for the ASEAN Secretariat; and the strengthening of TREATI and the 
Regional EU and ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI)174 (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2010c:1).  
In 2011, the Commission and ASEAN shifted their joint programme from 
APRIS to a new ASEAN economic integration support programme. In 2012, they 
launched formally their joint programme known as ASEAN Regional Integration 
Support by the EU (ARISE) (Council of the EU, 2012b:1). ARISE mainly supports 
ASEAN in order to achieve the AEC. The EU supports ASEAN integration by 
assisting the realization of trade related elements in the AEC with the EU-ASEAN 
Enhancing ASEAN FTA Negotiating Capacity Programme. The EU strengthens the 
technical expertise and capacity of ASEAN negotiators in the process of trade 
negotiations and raises public awareness about their FTA within South-East Asia 
(EU and ASEAN, 2011:3-4).   
The regional integration, within ASEAN, was still in progress when the EU 
developed its policy on the creation of an ASEAN-EU FTA. ASEAN focused on the 
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development of its Community and especially on the AEC. The EU viewed the level 
of regional integration within ASEAN as the external factor which needed to be 
taken into account in its trade policy toward ASEAN. The EU’s economic interest 
and the level of integration within ASEAN were in tension because the latter was 
continuing to develop. Consequently, within ASEAN, there was a low level of 
ambition because ASEAN was continuing to work on the development of its regional 
integration and was narrowing the development gap between its countries. The EU 
had an economic interest in establishing a region-to-region FTA with ASEAN in 
order to gain market access and improve the investment flow in South-East Asia. The 
EU wanted a comprehensive FTA with ASEAN because of its own economic 
ambitions and ASEAN’s economic importance. However, ASEAN wanted a 
selective FTA with the EU. The EU and ASEAN had different levels of expectation 
for an ASEAN–EU FTA. Therefore, they put on hold their free trade negotiations. 
The level of regional integration within ASEAN became gradually an important 
factor in the development of this EU policy. An integrated ASEAN would be more 
attractive to the EU because ASEAN would be more solid and cohesive as a regional 
organization. ASEAN could improve its economic development and achieve a single 
market. The regional integration within ASEAN could assist in the creation of an 
ASEAN–EU FTA on a region-to-region basis. This situation would create a co-
operative linkage between the EU’s economic interests and the regional integration 
within ASEAN. The EU assisted further in the process of regional integration, within 
ASEAN, through initiatives such as the ARISE. The level of regional integration 
within ASEAN deserves to receive more attention because it affects the EU’s 
economic interest. 
 
6.3.5. External Pressures and Opportunities in the EU’s Policy Development on 
the Establishment of an ASEAN-EU FTA  
 
In this section, the method of analysis is slightly different from that of previous 
sections because of the complex relationship between the external pressures and 
opportunities in the development of the EU’s policy for an ASEAN–EU FTA. The 
pressures and opportunities were threefold: firstly, the deadlock in the WTO Doha 
Round negotiations at the multilateral level; secondly, the significant role of ASEAN 
in an evolving regional architecture of East Asia cooperation at the regional level; 
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and, thirdly, the inclusion of Myanmar in the ASEAN and EU free trade negotiations 
at the bilateral level. These pressures and opportunities were associated with the 
external political economy element. I elaborate upon these pressures and 
opportunities. Then, I explain the implication of the above circumstances for the 
development of this EU policy.  
 
a. A Deadlock of WTO Doha Round Negotiations 
  
At the multilateral level, the WTO began the Doha Round of negotiations in 
November 2001 in Doha, Qatar. These trade negotiations aimed to reduce tariffs on 
agricultural and industrial goods; to eliminate farm subsidies; and to liberalize trade 
in services. The Doha Round negotiations were divided into two clusters of 
discussion; the first cluster was concerned with trade in agricultural and farm goods 
and the second cluster was concerned with trade in industrial goods or non-
agricultural market access (NAMA). In the first Doha Round talks, the majority of 
trade ministers were confident that trade liberalization would promote economic 
growth and development in both developed and developing countries.  
However, in 2003, trade negotiators failed to reach a common view at the WTO 
meeting in Cancun, Mexico. There were crucial differences between developed and 
developing countries, both on agricultural and farm subsidies for farmers in the EU 
and USA and on the inclusion of the Singapore issues175 within the Doha Round 
negotiations. Developing countries criticized the Singapore issues because, in 
developing and least developed countries, they would have a negative impact on 
people who did not have the capability to deal with these issues (WTO, 2003:1).  
The next WTO (2004:1) Doha Round meeting was in 2004 in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The EU, USA and Japan agreed to remove tariff barriers and some 
subsidies such as agricultural export subsidies and trade distorting subsidies. 
Developing countries agreed to eliminate tariffs on imported manufactured products 
but still reserved the right to secure selected important industries. Afterwards, the 
WTO (2005:1) Doha Round talks continued in 2005 in Hongkong. All WTO 
members failed to achieve a final DDA. However, the developed countries agreed to 
set a quota and tariff free imports from the least developed countries and to eliminate 
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agricultural export subsidies in 2013. The next WTO (2006:1) Doha Round talks 
were held in 2006 in Geneva. However, these failed to agree on modalities for trade 
in agriculture and industrial goods. The WTO conference agreed to suspend the Doha 
Round negotiations.  
The 2008 WTO (2008b:1) Doha Round talks were held in Davos, Switzerland. 
The developed and developing countries still had differences on agricultural tariffs 
and subsidies. The EU and USA did not want to eliminate their agricultural tariffs 
and farm subsidies. Consequently, developing countries did not wish, also, to 
liberalize their industrial products and services. In October 2008, the global financial 
crisis hit the major economies which made national governments pay attention to 
saving their own industries. They tended to employ trade protectionism (UNCTAD, 
2010:9). For years, this global situation deepened significantly the deadlock in the 
WTO’s Doha Round negotiations.  
In November 2009, the WTO (2009:1) Doha Round meeting was held in 
Geneva. The developed and developing countries still continued to disagree on 
agricultural and NAMA; trade in services; trade facilitation measures; and the 
removal of tariffs and agricultural/farm subsidies. This uncertain situation continues 
until the present day and it remains unclear when the Doha Round negotiations will 
be concluded. Consequently, countries and regional organizations searched for a 
modality to establish an economic relationship between them. Mandelson released 
the Global Europe communication in order to expand the scope of EU trade strategy 
by pursuing bilateral and regional trade co-operation, such as a FTA (European 
Commission, 2006a:8). 
 
b. The Crucial Role of ASEAN in Wider East Asian Cooperation 
At the regional level, most countries in the East Asia region realized the need 
for regional cooperation in order to respond to common challenges such as the Asian 
financial crisis and the preservation of stability in the region. There was a need to 
create a bridge between ASEAN and countries in North-East Asia. ASEAN’s role 
has been pivotal in the East Asia cooperation. ASEAN is the main actor and in the 
driving seat in realizing East Asia cooperation such as the ASEAN+3 cooperation 
and the EAS.  
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The ASEAN+3 cooperation is a regional entity consisting of the ASEAN 
countries together with China, Japan and South Korea. The ASEAN+3 cooperation 
focuses on cooperation in the political and security spheres and in the economic and 
the socio-cultural spheres. In the political and security sphere, the scope of 
ASEAN+3’s cooperation tackles transnational crime and counter-terrorism. In the 
area of economic cooperation, ASEAN+3’s focus is on trade facilitation; financial 
and monetary cooperation; and food and energy security. In socio-cultural 
cooperation, ASEAN+3 deals with culture and arts; poverty reduction; 
environmental protection; and disaster management and development (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2011d:1).  
The EAS is an open forum for the exchange of views of East Asian leaders. It 
aims to foster community-building within the East Asia region and to support the 
ASEAN Community as an integral element in the evolving regional architecture 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2005b:1-2). It agreed to work collectively on various political, 
economic and socio-cultural issues at the regional and global levels.176 The 
participants in the first EAS were ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, 
India, Australia and New Zealand. The EAS expanded its membership by inviting 
Russia and the USA to start their involvement at the sixth Summit in November 
2011.     
With regard to the EAS, the leaders of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea 
took the preliminary step in creating EAS when, in 1997, they agreed to meet and 
form the ASEAN+3. There is an understanding amongst the ASEAN+3 member 
states that the ASEAN+3 is acknowledged as a means of establishing the East Asian 
cooperation. Consequently, the ASEAN+3 is preserved by participating member 
states. ASEAN+3 member states agreed to establish an EAS and the ASEAN+3 as 
separate entities. They believed that the EAS would complement the ASEAN+3 
rather than undermine it. The ASEAN+3 and the EAS affect and intertwine with 
each other. The reason why they came up with this idea was that some ASEAN 
countries were concerned about the decline of ASEAN’s role in East Asian 
cooperation, if an EAS were greater than the ASEAN+3 (Stubbs, 2002:448 & 453).  
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The importance of East Asia emerged because of its dynamic economy and the 
potential of its huge markets such as in regional trade in goods; FDI; and the rising 
demands of middle income population. East Asia is a large economic region because 
it accounts for a quarter of world GDP and is nearly half of the world’s population. 
In 2008, total GDP of participating EAS countries was USD 13,963,737 million. 
Total population of East Asian countries was 3.242 billion people. In the same year, 
the world GDP was USD 60,587,016 million and the world population was 6.692 
billion people. In 2008, 23.05 % of world GDP was produced by those countries 
participating in the EAS.177 The percentage of population of participating countries 
in EAS was 48.44 % of the world’s population.  
In 2009, total GDP of participating EAS countries was USD 14,769,889 
million. Total population of East Asian countries was 3.270 billion people. In 2009, 
the world GDP was USD 58,259,785 million and the world’s population was 6.775 
billion people.178 In the same year, the GDP percentage of participating EAS 
countries was 25.35 % of the world’s GDP. The population of participating EAS 
countries was 48.26 % of the world’s population.  
All EAS participating countries enjoyed FDI inflows because the total amount 
of FDI improved significantly from USD 254,081 million (2006) to USD 369,241 
million (2008). Trade and business activities increased significantly which created 
many jobs for people living in this region. The amount of FDI outflows rose from 
USD 202,210 million (2006) to USD 362,811 million (2008).179       
ASEAN plays a crucial role as the regional organization shaping and driving 
the East Asian cooperation. The ASEAN+3 and the EAS are two modalities where 
ASEAN is a focal point amongst East Asian countries. ASEAN employs three 
requirements for participating countries to join the EAS. These are: firstly, the 
participating countries should sign the ASEAN’s TAC. Secondly, the participating 
countries have to become external partners of ASEAN. Thirdly, the participating 
countries should have essential cooperation with ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2005a:1-2).  
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ASEAN has become more attractive to its external partners because it has a 
central role in various regional initiatives in East Asia particularly in the case of the 
establishment of the East Asia cooperation. ASEAN has the authority to accept an 
external partner to be a member of the East Asia cooperation. The East Asia 
cooperation aims to develop economic integration amongst its member states and 
create regional stability in East Asia (Taib, 2006:90). Given these circumstances, it 
could be an economic opportunity for the EU to further its engagement with East 
Asia. An ASEAN–EU FTA could serve as a stepping stone by which the EU might 
develop a deeper economic partnership with ASEAN and the EAS.        
 
c. The Inclusion of Myanmar in the Process of Free Trade Negotiations 
Myanmar achieved its independence from the UK in 1948. It has been ruled by 
a military dictatorship since 1962. In 1988, there was a coup carried out by the 
military. The military formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
which is known currently as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). 
SPDC is the highest policy and decision-making institution in Myanmar. In May 
1990, SLORC had a general election. The National League for Democracy (NLD), 
led by Suu Kyi, won most of votes in this election. It achieved 82 % of the seats in 
the Burmese Parliament. However, the military regime did not give its power to her 
and the NLD. The military regime arrested Suu Kyi and her followers. The regime 
implemented an authoritarian government such as forced labour; extra judicial 
killing; and human rights violations against minority ethnic groups (Karen, 
Rohingnya and Shan populations) (European Commission, 2007f:5).   
The international community called upon the military regime to release Suu 
Kyi and its political prisoners. It requested that the military regime demonstrate an 
appreciation of human rights. The military regime has not listened to the concerns 
and pressures of the international community. The EU and the USA have not 
recognized the military regime as the legitimate government of Myanmar. They have 
applied political and economic sanctions to the military regime. 
Since 1990, the EU has imposed on the military regime its sanctions such as the 
embargo on weapons; the suspension of security and defence ties; the embargo on 
development assistance except for the case of humanitarian aid; the restriction on 
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immigration for elites and government officials and their families coming to the EU; 
and the suspension of EU official visits to Myanmar. All these sanctions were 
included in the Council common position on Myanmar No. 96/635/CFSP on 28 
October 1996. The EU revised its common position on Myanmar by extending its 
sanctions from 1996 to 2003. The Council released its common position No. 
2003/297/CFSP on 28 April 2003 (Council of the EU, 2003c:36-42) which added 
arms embargo and related instruments; an assets freeze; a visa ban for military elites 
in the SPDC; suspension of GSP; and cancellation of EBA initiatives.  
The military regime released a road map for democracy in August 2003 in 
order to respond to the pressure by the international community because of its 
detention of Suu Kyi (Abbugao, 2004:1). On 17 May 2004, the military regime 
announced its plan to resume the National Convention in order to form a new 
constitution and prepare for political reform in Myanmar. However, the SPDC failed 
to involve Suu Kyi and the NLD. The SPDC controlled the process of formulation 
for a road map which aimed to reconcile all political factions. The military regime 
established the National Convention in 1993. The military regime controlled the 
entire political process and all negotiations inside the Convention. Consequently, the 
NLD withdrew from the Convention in 1996 (European Commission, 2010c:1).  
In October 2004, the EU revised its position on Myanmar by giving permission 
to help that country but only with humanitarian aid (European Commission, 
2010c:4). The EU has given its assistance through the European Community 
Humanitarian Office via the UN agencies, NGOs and local institutions. The EU has 
provided its development assistance for Myanmar with the amount totaling  174 
million since 1996 (Europa, 2012a:1). The development assistance has focused on 
health and education (European Commission, 2007f:3). The EU disagrees that the 
military regime uses its development assistance to strengthen its defence capacity 
(Ibid, p.20). 
After the human rights violations against demonstrators in October 2007, the 
EU strengthened its Council common position No. 2007/248/CFSP on 19 November 
2007 to apply more sanctions to the military regime. The EU banned the EU 
investors from having business in mining; precious stones; and the logging trade in 
Myanmar (Europe, 2007e:5). It rejected exports and imports of instruments used in 
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the logging and mining industries to/from Myanmar (European Commission, 
2007g:1). The EU adjusted its common position No. 2009/615/CFSP with more 
restrictive measures against the military regime after the human rights violations 
against Suu Kyi and her fundamental rights. It applied a travel ban to the EU on a list 
of key persons in the military regime and froze their assets to take effect from 13 
August 2009 (Council of the EU, 2009b:1).   
On 13 November 2010, the military regime released Suu Kyi from home 
detention. She had served 15 of the 21 years of her detention period (BBC, 2010:1). 
In April 2011, the Council of the EU (2011b:1-2) released its objection to the 
political situation in Myanmar and based its criticism on some crucial points. These 
were: firstly, the result of the last 2010 election was not free and fair based on 
international standards. Secondly, the Council called on Myanmar’s new government 
to implement a peaceful transition to democracy and to appreciate human rights. 
Thirdly, it called on the Myanmar government to establish an inclusive dialogue with 
the opposition and all stakeholders in Myanmar. Fourthly, it preserved political and 
economic sanctions. Finally, the EU was ready to have a dialogue with the 
government and all opposition parties in Myanmar and with ASEAN. Since late in 
2011, the Myanmar government has taken steps toward political reform. In April 
2012, it allowed Suu Kyi and the NLD to participate in by-elections and win seats in 
the Myanmar Parliament. In response, in April 2012, the EU suspended all sanctions 
against Myanmar but excluded the arms embargo. Chapter 7 illustrates current 
developments in Myanmar.    
However, it must be noted that the EU imposed political, economic and arms 
embargo on Myanmar before April 2012. The complicated relationship between the 
EU and Myanmar affected the EU-ASEAN relationship, for example in free trade 
negotiations between the two regions.  
 
d. The Implications of this Situation for the Development of the EU Policy on 
ASEAN and EU FTA 
 
At the multilateral level, a deadlock of the WTO’s Doha round negotiations can 
be seen as both a pressure and an opportunity for the EU to respond to a change in 
world economic governance.  The main consequences, caused by the above situation 
are: firstly, many countries/regions shifted their trade policy from multilateral to 
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bilateral/inter-regional approaches by negotiating economic partnership with other 
countries/regions. Their trade policies shifted to benefit from economic opportunities 
resulting from the stagnation within the multilateral trading framework. Secondly, 
within a FTA, countries/regions employed a selected protectionist policy based on 
special measures such as antidumping regulations and selected market liberalization. 
Thirdly, the WTO’s role is weakened owing to the emergence of bilateral and inter-
regional trade initiatives. WTO member states will lose their trust in the role of the 
WTO as a multilateral trading institution (Chandra et al, 2010:1 and UNCTAD, 
2010:ix).  
In the early years of the Doha Round negotiations, the EU focussed on the 
WTO DDA. The EU is a main promoter of the multilateral approach. However, there 
was no significant progress in the Doha Round negotiations. There was a deadlock 
between developed and developing countries with regard to agricultural subsidies; 
market access; non-tariff barriers; trade on services; and protectionism. Therefore, 
the number of PTAs improved from 70 agreements in 1990 to 300 agreements in 
2010. The proliferation of PTAs focused not only on the regionally based agreements 
but, also, in the last decade, was developing a cross regionally based agreement 
(WTO, 2011:6). According to a WTO official, it was true that, if there were 
difficulties in finding a balance between developed and developing countries, then, 
the multilateral system could not deliver new economic integration. There was a 
tendency for that since (PTAs/inter-regionalism) might be easier, but again not 
entirely but definitely easier. However, to some extent, this can be bigger in the short 
term.180 
The EU started to consider an alternative way to build trade relationships with 
other countries/regions. Commission official E emphasized that: “For many years the 
EU had focused on the WTO and agenda Doha Round. There was no bilateral 
initiative with any other country. It was all multilateral. When we realized that the 
Doha Round was not likely to move forward in the short term. We started to look 
around and see which who would be suitable bilateral partners in order to negotiate a 
bilateral agreement”.181  
                                                 
180 Q&A session and interview with WTO official, UK, June 2012.  
181 Interview with Commission official E, 2010.   
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Commission official A agreed that deadlock in the WTO’s Doha Round 
negotiations shifted the approach of EU’s trade policy from a multilateral to a 
bilateral/inter-regional approach. This person expressed the view that: “We always 
consider the WTO and DDA negotiation to be the best way to go international. But 
there has been a shift [...], we actively continued with bilateral and regional 
discussions because of the deadlock in DDA round and so there is new emerging of 
other FTA negotiations between regions and countries”.182 
An official from the Netherlands admitted that: “The deadlock in the WTO 
Doha Development Round always played a role in our agreement. I know that 
pressures like this do have an influence, for example: ASEAN negotiated regional 
trade agreements with its partners in Asia. We see that it is possible. We do not want 
be left behind”.183  
At the regional level, ASEAN plays the role of focal point in order to create a 
balance of regional cooperation within East Asia. This situation constitutes both an 
external pressure and an opportunity for the EU to engage with South-East Asia 
specifically and with East Asia in general. The EU needs a focal point to connect and 
bridge in its relationship with East Asian countries. The EU understands that East 
Asia is one of the fastest growing areas around the globe because of its emerging 
economic production and activities. East Asia must be a stable and peaceful area 
through supporting its growing market (Council of the EU, 2007k:1-2).  
ASEAN’s role, within the East Asia region, is crucial to creating a cooperative 
situation within this region. China, South Korea and Japan can sit and work together 
to achieve the common goal of the East Asia cooperation with ASEAN as a central 
player. They have a complex historical background and sensitive border disputes to 
contend with. There are disagreements between them with regard to Japan’s 
reconstruction of its colonial history in China and South Korea. The Japanese 
Government tends to gloss over its war crimes in its two neighbouring countries 
(Stubbs, 2002:452) and, in history textbooks, to conceal them from the younger 
generation. Additionally, South Korea, Japan and China have territorial disputes with 
regard to some islands on their borders (Ibid, p.454).    
                                                 
182 Interview with Commission official A, 2011. 
183 Interview with national official, the Netherlands, 2011. 
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With all of this in mind, the EU has developed good relationships with ASEAN 
and other economic powers, in Asia, such as China, South Korea and Japan. The 
EAS is a strategic political and economic forum in the East Asia region. ASEAN is 
the driving factor in this regionalism process and holds a crucial role in providing a 
balance in this region. Through the EAS, ASEAN has shaped and influenced the 
development of East Asia cooperation. Within East Asia, the EAS strengthens and 
compliments the existing regional co-operations, such as the ASEAN+3, the ARF 
and APEC. The EAS may become an umbrella for a multilayered regional 
framework with ASEAN as a central point in this initiative. It has surpassed the 
importance of APEC in the Asia-Pacific region because APEC focuses only on 
economic issues and its membership does not include all ASEAN countries.184 The 
ARF focuses only on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The EAS covers 
political, security and economic issues concerning the East Asia region and global 
affairs involving important countries within the region. ASEAN’s role, in the EAS, is 
central to containing China’s domination within the region by including her in this 
regional initiative. The EU wants to ensure that China will be seen to rise peacefully 
as a regional actor in the East Asia region (UK Parliament, 2010:1). It has pursued 
ASEAN as a counterweight to China’s role and influence in the region.  
The EU considered many significant areas of development, which emerged in 
East Asia, such as in economic welfare; the geo-political situation; and in socio-
cultural activities. The EU believes that it needs to be linked more closely with 
South-East Asia and East Asia because East Asia cooperation has deepened. Solana 
stated that: “The EU has a real stake in East Asian regional security and can play a 
useful role. I hope that this can be reflected in due course by a place at the Summit 
table” (Falletti, 2006e:13).  
In order to join EAS, the EU needs political approval from ASEAN and to 
enhance its economic cooperation with ASEAN. In order to gain ASEAN’s political 
approval, the EU acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) on 12 July 
2012 as a precondition for membership of the EAS (Council of the EU, 2012a:1). It 
would strengthen the EU’s political relationship with ASEAN (Indonesian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2011a:1). The EU took almost 6 years (Council of the EU, 
                                                 
184 Interview with Dhannan Sunoto, E-mail, 25 December 2011.  
 204 
2012a:1) to obtain the Council’s authorization to join ASEAN’s TAC because of the 
complexity of the legislative mechanism (Falletti, 2009:14). It waited all Parties, in 
ASEAN, to ratify the Third Protocol Amending the TAC in order to allow regional 
organizations to accede to TAC (Council of the EU, 2012a:1). Then, an ASEAN-EU 
FTA is an initiative to develop substantive economic engagements between the EU 
and ASEAN and the East Asia region. Therefore, the EU wanted to have a FTA with 
ASEAN.   
According to the research data, Commission officials A and E confirmed that 
ASEAN’s role has been crucial in the EAS specifically and in the East Asian region 
in general.185 Commission official A stated that: “There are many aspects, the other 
one is the EAS. The role of ASEAN is very important in this thing. In order to join in 
this Community you have to join the TAC, I think the EU is working to join the TAC 
[…]. The EU is very interested in that. There is a clearly movement and a dynamic to 
have a closer linkage in many areas with ASEAN”.186 An official from the 
Netherlands added that “ASEAN is becoming more important in the region because 
it employs many initiatives, ASEAN+1, ASEAN+2 and ASEAN+3 and the EAS. We 
see all that evolving, we want to be part of it as well. We are always acknowledging 
the importance of this”.187  
The shift in economic activities from the West to the emerging nations of Asia 
(Gray, 2012) has been a trajectory for the EU to benefit from that situation. However, 
the EU was left behind by other countries which established FTAs with ASEAN and 
joined in the EAS. Commission official A and an official from the Netherlands 
admitted that the EU felt somewhat left behind in its involvement in the EAS.188 An 
official from the Netherlands emphasized further that there were difficulties for the 
EU when responding to developments in ASEAN’s regional initiatives particularly 
with the EAS and to justify the relevancy of the EU to these developments. This 
person stated that: “We have a feeling that we are very relevant but we are finding it 
very difficult to convince ASEAN and individual ASEAN countries that we are also 
                                                 
185 Interview with Commission officials A and E, 2010. 
186 Interview with Commission official A, 2010. 
187 Interview with national official, the Netherlands, 2011. 
188 Interview with Commission official A, 2010 and national official, the Netherlands, 2011. 
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more than just an economic player. […] Now especially with the EAS, it is a very 
sensitive issue”.189  
Developments at the multilateral and regional levels have combined to affect 
the development of the EU’s trade policy towards ASEAN. At the same time, the EU 
and ASEAN have had a crucial disagreement with regard to the inclusion of 
Myanmar in their free trade negotiations which affected the process of their 
negotiations at the bilateral level. On the one hand, the EU disagreed with including 
Myanmar in the negotiation process for a FTA with ASEAN. There were political 
and, subsequently, economic reasons why the EU rejected Myanmar from being 
included in the ASEAN and EU free trade negotiations. The political reasons were 
that Myanmar had a long track record of human rights violations and had employed 
an authoritarian regime to rule its people. These situations led the EU to implement 
political and economic sanctions against Myanmar. Consequently, Myanmar was not 
included in the EU’s negotiation mandate for free trade with ASEAN. In turn, this 
had economic implications. 
On the other hand, ASEAN insisted on including Myanmar in the negotiation 
process for free trade with the EU. The main reasons were ASEAN wanted to be 
treated by the EU as a group which meant including Myanmar as part of the ASEAN 
group. ASEAN persuaded the EU that ASEAN had applied an approach of 
constructive engagement in encouraging Myanmar to implement political reform and 
appreciate its people’s human rights. Commission official A argued that: “Myanmar, 
this is a more political way [...]. Myanmar was allowed to be there, but we were not 
actually negotiating with Myanmar directly. That was a somewhat complicating 
factor with regard to the issues of Myanmar”.190 
This obstacle was a source of tension between the EU and ASEAN when, in 
2007, they started their trade negotiations. To some extent, the EU accommodated 
the external pressure from ASEAN for the inclusion of Myanmar in the trade 
negotiations. The EU allowed Myanmar a seat at the negotiating table together with 
other ASEAN countries. However, the EU would not sign a final FTA with ASEAN, 
if, still, Myanmar were included in the group of ASEAN countries. ASEAN 
                                                 
189 Interview with national official, the Netherlands, 2011. 
190 Interview with Commission official A, 2010. 
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maintained its position that Myanmar should be treated as a member of ASEAN. The 
EU had to incorporate Myanmar when it dealt with ASEAN.   
Commission official E stated that: “With regard to the authorization for 
negotiation from the Council, the permission was only granted the negotiation with 7 
out 10 ASEAN countries. Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia were not included in the 
authorization to negotiate”.191 This person stated that “the EU could not sign an 
agreement with Myanmar, so at the end of the day the political clash at the signing 
ceremony was over whether Myanmar could sign the deal or not. We could not 
politically sign the deal with Myanmar because we were not authorized to go for 
negotiations and deal with Myanmar”.192  
The EU member states have similar views on the complex relationship between 
Myanmar, FTA and ASEAN. An official from Germany argued that: “Germany and 
the EU were strongly in favour of ASEAN approaching Myanmar […]. The German 
government is very supportive on constructive engagement and the promotion of 
values in the case of Myanmar”.193 An official from the Netherlands added that “the 
role of Myanmar being a part of ASEAN and having free trade there play a very 
important part in our decision and our focus, not to include Myanmar and at the same 
time have this comprehensive relationship”.194  
An official from the UK argued that:  
In the view of the British government, we think that the Burmese people 
have been suffering for a long time under the military regime. There are 
over 2,000 political prisoners there including a number of political links to 
the UK because the UK was the colonial power. You have more 
involvement in the country politically and economically. We just think it is 
time the Burmese government joined the 21st century and allowed these 
people to live in freedom […].We would like to see ASEAN apply more 
pressure on fellow member of the ASEAN family.195 
 
In considering the ASEAN side, there were differences between policy makers, 
within ASEAN, when they were responding to the ASEAN and EU free trade 
negotiations. Gusmardi Bustami, the Trade Ministry Official from Indonesia, stated 
that: “We actually had a deal with the EU in the past to have a free trade-like 
                                                 
191 Interview with Commission official E, 2010.  
192 Ibid.  
193 Interview with national official, Germany, 2010. 
194 Interview with national official, the Netherlands, 2011. 
195 Interview with national official, the UK, 2010. 
 207 
agreement. But this cannot continue- not because of economic issues, but because of 
a political one. That is why we must agree to take a pause for the time being” 
(Adamrah, 2011:1). When ASEAN met with the EU in the trade negotiations, an 
official from an ASEAN country explained that there was a political problem 
regarding Myanmar and that this was an obstacle in the creation of an ASEAN-EU 
FTA.196  
However, the ASEAN Secretariat official B explained that some difficulties in 
the trade negotiations between the two regions were not political but they were 
technical. This person argued that “the FTA is still on hold at the moment. We hope 
that [...] they will find a way to move forward again although there are difficulties at 
the technical level. [...] The recession is not a political difficulty, it is a technical 
difficulty”.197  
 Despite this difference, the ASEAN Secretariat official B198 and another 
official from one of ASEAN countries199 argued that the EU and ASEAN were 
considering their future FTA. However, within the process of trade negotiations, 
there were differences between them. They hoped that a FTA could be established 
region-to-region or region-to-country as long as there was a consistency between 
both parties.  
In the development of this EU policy, the EU promoted the economic interests 
of its member states and also of the business communities in order to respond to the 
economic opportunities in East Asia and, thereby, recognize the significant role of 
ASEAN in the East Asia cooperation. The EU was under pressure owning to a 
deadlock in the WTO Doha negotiations which led to a shift in its trade strategy from 
a multilateral approach to a bilateral/inter-regional approach. However, the inclusion 
of Myanmar in the ASEAN-EU free trade negotiations created a tension which led to 
the risk of failure in the negotiations. The EU’s value to ASEAN conflicted with the 
EU’s external pressures and opportunities. The EU demanded that ASEAN exclude 
Myanmar from their free trade talks. ASEAN wanted the EU to incorporate 
                                                 
196 Interview with national official, ASEAN country A, telephone, 10 February 2012. 
197 Interview with official B, the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 15 July 2009. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Interview with national official, ASEAN country A, Jakarta and telephone, 7 July 2009 and 10 
February 2012. 
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Myanmar as a part of ASEAN. They failed to solve their differences and to conclude 
a policy.  
There are external pressures and opportunities at the multilateral, regional and 
bilateral levels which have influenced the development of the EU’s policy and, also, 
the negotiation process for a FTA with ASEAN. These pressures and opportunities 
led EU policy makers, to take them into account when they developed and 
implemented the EU’s negotiating mandate toward ASEAN. The EU should consider 
these pressures and opportunities carefully in meeting with its political and economic 
objectives. This assessment explained the external pressures and opportunities in the 
EU’s policy making towards ASEAN and in the free trade negotiations with ASEAN 
which, in turn, affected the way in which the EU dealt with ASEAN. The EU and 
ASEAN would not be able to solve their tensions and transform them into inter-
regional cooperation. This led to a pause in their trade negotiations.     
 
6.4.  Conclusion  
 
The EU’s policy development for an ASEAN–EU FTA was influenced by 
relevant factors. These were: firstly, the Commission and the Council were the 
relevant actors; the first as the initiator and the second as the decision maker in this 
trade policy. They had competence in the development of the EU’s trade policy 
toward ASEAN and in the negotiations with ASEAN. The European Parliament, the 
business communities and the NGOs were involved in the Commission’s 
consultation process with regard to the draft of EU’s position paper. The institutional 
arrangement of (and legal basis for) this trade policy provided flexibility for the 
Commission to include, with the Council’s approval, a non-economic element (ie. 
sustainable development) in the negotiating mandate which exceeded the 
Community’s power. The Council would act unanimously on creating a legal 
relationship between trade provisions and the PCA when the EU and ASEAN 
concluded their negotiations. The institutional arrangement provided a framework for 
the Commission and the Council to discuss their political and economic agendas and 
select a suitable approach to pursue ASEAN on that matter. To some extent, there 
was dissension, within the EU, between relevant (the Council and Commission with 
support from business communities) and related actors (the Parliament and NGOs) 
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regarding the EU’s aggressive approach over an ASEAN-EU FTA. This situation 
reduced the EU’s capacity to form a more unitary position in the development of this 
EU policy.   
Secondly, the Commission and the EU member states had promoted their 
economic interests. The UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands had shown their 
interest in developing a FTA with ASEAN because they were significant traders and 
investors in South-East Asia. In engaging with ASEAN, the Council affirmed its 
economic interests. The economic interests of key member states affected the EU’s 
negotiating mandate for an ASEAN–EU FTA. The EU business communities, the 
European Parliament and NGOs persuaded the Commission to promote their 
economic, social and developmental interests in an ASEAN–EU FTA. It was the 
economic interests of the EU member states and the Commission which influenced 
the development of the EU’s trade policy toward ASEAN rather than common EU 
values (complementary elements). The reasons for this were: firstly, the key EU 
member states asked the Commission to deal with ASEAN in order to gain market 
access for and to eliminate barriers against European business. Secondly, the 
Commission concentrated more on realizing a region-to-region ASEAN-EU FTA 
rather than a PCA with an individual ASEAN country. Thirdly, it gave more access 
to the business communities to shape an ASEAN-EU FTA.    
Thirdly, the EU employed consultation and negotiation mechanisms as its 
modes of engagement when it developed the EU’s negotiating mandate and 
negotiated it with ASEAN. The application of a negotiation mechanism supported 
the EU in advocating its economic provisions; in speeding up the actualization of a 
FTA with ASEAN; and in excluding Lao PDR, Cambodia (least developed 
countries) and Myanmar (human rights violations) from an ASEAN-EU FTA. 
However, ASEAN responded by requesting more time to explore the economic 
provisions in a FTA and asked for the involvement of all ASEAN countries in their 
negotiations. They could not reach any compromises on their differences and put on 
hold their negotiations. Clearly, the EU was not flexible enough to handle ASEAN in 
their negotiations. ASEAN was quite flexible and focused on a more informal way to 
deal with the EU as seen in their consultation and negotiation processes. This would 
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be a challenge for both parties when they applied problem-solving or bargaining 
methods to find solutions to their differences.     
Fourthly, the regional integration within ASEAN was an ongoing process since 
the EU first developed its policy for an ASEAN–EU FTA. When the EU developed 
its policy and negotiated free trade with ASEAN, there were differences in economic 
ambitions. On the one hand, the EU offered a comprehensive FTA to ASEAN. The 
EU believed that a FTA based on an inter-regional approach could assist and foster 
ASEAN regional integration. On the other hand, ASEAN did not want to continue to 
adopt a comprehensive FTA because it had still to develop its economic competence. 
ASEAN wanted a selective FTA. There was a risk that the policy would fail because 
of the above tension. The EU would like to support the realization of the AEC in 
2015 as a part of its objective to use a region-to-region approach for an ASEAN–EU 
FTA. An integrated ASEAN would help the EU to cement its above objective. 
ASEAN’s regional integration affected increasingly the EU’s policy development.             
Fifthly, a deadlock in the WTO Doha Round negotiations; ASEAN’s crucial 
role in the EAS; and the inclusion of Myanmar in the ASEAN and EU free trade 
negotiations were the external pressures and opportunities for the EU which 
influenced its policy development leading up to an ASEAN–EU FTA. At the 
multilateral level, the stagnation in the WTO Doha Round negotiations obliged the 
EU to pursue its objective with ASEAN through a FTA. This situation created an 
opportunity for the EU to seek an additional means of economic cooperation with 
ASEAN. At the regional level, ASEAN’s crucial role, in the EAS, could be viewed 
by the EU as both a pressure and an opportunity. The EU viewed ASEAN as a 
possible counter-balance to China’s growing political and economic influence in East 
Asia. It was a good opportunity for the EU to be engaged with ASEAN in order to 
strengthen its political and economic connection with East Asia. At the bilateral 
level, the delicate relationship between the EU and Myanmar created a tension 
between the EU and ASEAN. The EU rejected the participation of Myanmar in the 
trade negotiations with ASEAN. However, ASEAN insisted on including Myanmar 
in the negotiations. These above situations impacted on the development of the EU’s 
trade policy toward ASEAN and affected, also, the trade negotiations between both 
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parties. In the end, the two regions were unable to reconcile their differences which 
meant that the outcome was a failure to establish a policy.  
 I assessed the relevant factors which affected the development of this EU 
policy. In the next chapter, I draw final conclusions from the explanations of the 
three case studies. A number of factors have come to explain several developments 
in the EU’s policy with respect to ASEAN.  I hope that my provisional conceptual 
framework provides a comprehensive model in explaining the development of the 




























MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION  
 
7.1. Introduction 
In the last decade, the world of inter-regionalism has evolved for three reasons. 
Firstly, the system of global governance has changed with a proliferation of global 
and regional cooperation involving most regional organizations. Secondly, the scope 
of issues, covered under inter-regional cooperation, has expanded tremendously as 
the political, economic and socio-cultural spheres have become more interconnected 
in an integrated world. Thirdly, there has been slow progress in the WTO Doha 
Round negotiations. These developments have led to the question as to why one 
region cooperates with another region or several other regions. However, the 
scholarly literature did little to explain the policies of one regional organization in 
their dealings with another regional organization. The research approach, which I 
employed in this thesis, was inductive theory building from cases. In this thesis, the 
case studies aimed to analyze the relevant factors which explain the development of 
the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. I collected my data from documents and 
interviews with representatives of EU institutions, EU member states, non-state 
actors and ASEAN which were all involved in the development of this EU policy 
and the interactions between the two regions. 
In this thesis, I examined the matters which explained the EU’s policy towards 
ASEAN. In order to address the gaps in the existing literature (see Chapter 2), I 
assessed how, when and, to what extent, internal factors, within the EU, and external 
factors, from ASEAN or outside of the EU, influenced the development of the EU’s 
policy towards ASEAN and had implications for the inter-regional relationship 
between the two regions. More specifically, I highlighted the importance of internal 
and external factors. I explored the relationship between internal and external factors 
and correlated this relationship to the success or failure of the development of the 
EU’s policy towards ASEAN. I connected this correlation to the inter-regional trend 
of increasing interdependence between the EU and ASEAN, which makes external 
factors more significant and should lead the EU to seek to achieve greater 
cooperation between internal and external factors in their policy-making. I illustrated 
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the contribution of this thesis to the study of the external relations of the EU; the 
study of inter-regionalism; and to the field of IR. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The next section highlights the main 
findings relating to internal and external factors from cases and their level of 
importance in the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. The third 
section synthesizes the main findings and the interactions between factors from three 
cases in establishing expected patterns of behaviours as a comprehensive conceptual 
framework for the development of EU policies toward ASEAN. The fourth section 
highlights the general trends in and the implication for inter-regionalism between the 
two regions. The fifth section deals with the theoretical contributions and policy 
implications which can be derived from the conceptual framework of the above 
mentioned studies. This section, in addition to indicating this thesis’ challenges 
provides, also, possible research areas with regard to the strengthening of a 
conceptual framework and identifies routes for further studies on inter-regionalism 
research. The final section is the conclusion.  
 
7.2. Main Findings of Internal and External Factors from Cases   
This section provides the findings of the relevant factors for each of the cases 
from the three main policy areas covered by the study. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, each 
conclusion demonstrates my findings that the following contributed to the 
development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN: 
• the relevant actors, within the various institutional arrangements; 
• the promotion of EU interests and values; 
• the modes of engagement; 
• the level of integration within ASEAN; and 
• the external pressures and opportunities from ASEAN and outside the EU.  
These matter because they have affected the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. Table 7.1 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 My findings spell out which relevant factors were more and which were less 
significant in the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. I proposed an 
ordinal category for the relevant factors. It is possible to define the significant, 
considerable, less significant and insignificant factors in the development of the EU’s 
policy. Qualitatively, to demonstrate their level of importance, these factors were 
analyzed based on a combination of interview data and documentary analyses. All 
interviewees were asked to rank, based on priority, each of the factors as significant 
or considerable or less significant and insignificant. They were told that a significant 
factor should be substantially influential in the development of the EU’s policy 
towards ASEAN. Further discussion with interviewees revealed that they considered 
a significant factor to be a primary element in the development of the EU policy. 
Consequently, for the purpose of this study, a significant factor was defined as being 
substantially influential and a primary element in the development of the EU’s policy 
towards ASEAN. A similar process was undertaken with the interviewees to define 
considerable, less significant and insignificant. Consequently, the considerable factor 
was moderately influential and a complementary element in the development of EU 
policy. It gave concrete effect to and made complete the development of the EU 
policy. The less significant factor was less influential and had minimal effect in the 
development of the EU policy. The insignificant factor had no influence and, 
therefore, it was not considered to be an element in the development of the EU policy 
towards ASEAN.  
The relevant factors were observed using a nominal measurement based on the 
above categories. Out of 28 interviewees, who were consulted in this study, Table 
7.2, on the next page, included 19 interviewees who addressed the level of 
importance with regard to internal and external factors. In order to present interview 
results, every response was given points on a four point scale with four being the 
most significant category. For example, a significant factor received 4 points; a 
considerable factor received 3 points; a less significant factor received 2 points and 
an insignificant factor received 1 point. Within cases, points of response, on each 
factor, were grouped into their categories and based on plurality. It meant that if one 
of these categories received the highest result from interview, it would receive the 
highest plurality. I accumulated points of response for each factor and, then, divided 
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them by the number of frequencies of response in order, within cases, to obtain an 
average point for each factor. I presented these average points in bar charts for every 
case. I gathered all average points, within cases, into an overall bar chart. Within 
cases, these charts demonstrated the level of importance of these factors. Within 
cases, I focused my interpretation and analyses based on the combination of the 
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The cases provided evidence of the variation in importance of relevant factors 
by combining the interview results (see Table 7.2 and Charts 7.1-7.4) with 
documentary analyses (see below and the previous chapters).  
In the case of a New Partnership with South-East Asia (see Chart 7.1), I argue 
that the possible internal and external factors, which influenced the development of 
this EU policy most significantly,  were such as the relevant actors (4); the promotion 
of economic/political interests and common EU values (4); and the external 
pressure/opportunity (4). The reasons as to why these factors were significant are as 
follows: firstly, the emergence of bilateral and regional trade initiatives in the South-
East Asia region, brought about by the greater involvement of the USA and China in 
the region, was the external pressure and opportunity for the EU (Council of the EU, 
2004:4). Secondly, in order to respond to this situation, the Commission raised the 
need with the Council for the EU to create a new partnership with ASEAN. This 
need was affected by the necessity for the EU member states (particularly the UK, 
Germany, France and the Netherlands) to ensure market access for their export to 
and import from the South-East Asia region and to provide security for their 
investments in the region. Additionally, the legal basis of this EU policy (the Council 
Regulation No 443/92) required the Commission and the Council to promote human 
rights and democracy in South-East Asia (EUR-Lex, 1992a:1). The institutional 
arrangement shaped (Wallace, 2010:62) the decisions of relevant actors and 
influenced them to promote common EU values to ASEAN. It facilitated the 
Commission and the Council to respond to the external pressure and opportunity and 
combine the EU’s interests and values into a new partnership with ASEAN. Thirdly, 
therefore, the Commission’s promotion of collective economic interests, particularly 
the economic interests of key EU member states, drove the development of this EU 
policy. The EU included, also, in this policy, its common values as ‘essential 
elements’.  
The less significant factors were the mode of engagement (2.5) and the level of 
integration within ASEAN (2) for two reasons. These were: firstly, at the 
consultative stage of this EU policy, the EU employed a minimum consultation 
mechanism to engage with ASEAN. However, it informed ASEAN only at the 
finalization stage about the completion of this policy. Secondly, ASEAN countries 
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Chart 7.1




























signed and adopted the ASEAN Community only as the main foundation of its 
regional integration (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003f:1). There was no insignificant factor 
















In the case of the EU’s policy on Aceh (see Chart 7.2),  I argue that the relevant 
actors (4); the promotion of both politico-security interests of the EU member states 
and the Council of Ministers (4); and the external opportunity and concerns (3.8) 
were significant internal and external factors which affected directly the development 
of this EU policy. The reasons as to why they were significant are as follows: firstly, 
the readiness of GoI and FAM to conclude and implement a peace agreement and the 
absence of the UN in this peace process became opportunities for the EU to advance 
the EU’s presence in the region (Council of the EU, 2006e:2-3). In order to build 
confidence between both parties, the EU dealt carefully with GoI’s external concerns 
regarding the external interference in Indonesian affairs and the internationalization 
of the issue of Aceh. Secondly, the Council of Ministers and the EU member states 
were key players and fully in charge of the development of this EU policy (Council 
of the EU, 2005e:6-10 and 2007g:3&7). The UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, 
and several Nordic countries persuaded actively other EU member states of the 
importance for the EU to act together in order to respond to this opportunity in an 
effective way. Ahtisaari (the CMI) had an intervening role together with Solana who 
convinced the EU member states to support this EU policy. Therefore, the EU could 
work together with ASEAN, Norway and Switzerland and GoI and FAM in the 
creation of AMM. Additionally, the institutional arrangement facilitated the Council 
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and the Commission in having administrative and political debates (Bindi and 
Shapiro, 2010:343) regarding the legal basis for financing and conducting the EU’s 
mission in Aceh. It provided several schemes, for financing the mission, such as the 
ALA/RRM programmes or the CFSP budget which had implications for the 
Council’s political direction/control over the mission and became an unclear issue in 
the financial sources for ESDP. Thirdly, the EU advocated its politico-security 
interests toward Indonesia and the South-East Asia region (Council of the EU, 
2006e:2-3). The EU policy in Aceh had two specific aims which were both based on 
interests: firstly, the EU nurtured a closer political and security partnership with 
Indonesia because it has the world’s largest population of Muslims and because it is 
an important country in the region. Secondly, peace in Aceh would contribute 
positively to a stable South-East Asia. 
The mode of engagement (3.4) was a considerable factor because the EU used 
consultation and pro-active monitoring as its modes of engagement with ASEAN in 
order to aggregate and harmonize its decisions with ASEAN’s aspirations for their 
collective monitoring mission (Council of the EU, 2007g:4). The level of political 
and security integration, within ASEAN (2.4), and the promotion of common EU 
values were less significant factors in this EU policy. The level of political and 
security integration, within ASEAN, was developing still because ASEAN continued 
to prepare the APSC. According to Feith, the AMM was an integrated mission which 
built confidence between all involved parties (Council of the EU, 2006d:2). Based on 
their experience in Aceh, the EU wanted to develop further its partnership with 
ASEAN which might contribute to peace and security in South-East Asia (Council of 
the EU, 2010b:1). Their partnership would support the political and security 
integration within ASEAN. Additionally, the EU included its common values more 
as a complementary aspect of its policy on the AMM. These are reflected in the 
European Commission’s humanitarian and development programmes (2009b:4). 














































In the case of an ASEAN-EU FTA (see Chart 7.3), I argue that the internal and 
external factors, which affected significantly the development of this EU policy, 
were the relevant actors (3.9); the promotion of collective economic interests of the 
EU member states and the Commission driving this EU policy (4); and the threefold 
external pressures and opportunities (3.92). The reasons, as to why these factors were 
significant, are as follows: firstly, the Commission and the Council played a key role 
in the development of this EU policy. The institutional arrangement of this policy 
provided not only a policy-making mechanism, a legal foundation and a decision-
making system for all the actors (particularly the Commission and the Council) 
within the EU to participate and interact in the development of this EU policy 
(Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg, 2010:221). But it empowered, also, the 
Commission to convince the Council to provide the flexibility to incorporate 
sustainable development in the EU’s negotiating mandate and a certain authority to 
use a suitable approach (a regional or bilateral approach) in interacting with ASEAN. 
The Commission and the Council wanted, in ASEAN, to further their collective 
economic interests such as the enhancement of global competitiveness and market 
access situations for EU industries against EU competitors in South-East Asia 
(Council of the EU, 2007d:3). Secondly, it is a EU response to the external pressure 
and opportunity to derive advantages from the developments in South-East Asia and 
outside the EU such as a deadlock in the Doha development negotiations in the WTO 
(European Commission, 2006a:2) and the role of ASEAN in the East Asia 
cooperation (Council of the EU, 2007k:7). However, the EU and ASEAN had a 
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disagreement about the Myanmar issue (Nuttin, 2011:3) because ASEAN put 
pressure on the EU to include this country in their free trade negotiations.   
The considerable factor was the modes of engagement (3.15) because, when it 
engaged with ASEAN, the EU shifted its approach, from a consultation mechanism 
to a negotiation mechanism. At the consultation of the Vision Group on the ASEAN–
EU Economic Partnership, all ASEAN countries were included in this process. In the 
negotiation of an ASEAN-EU FTA, the EU excluded Lao PDR, Cambodia and 
Myanmar from its negotiating mandate with ASEAN since they were not ready to 
join a FTA because of their low economic capacity. Myanmar has committed human 
rights violations. The EU put more emphasis on the negotiation mechanism than on 
the consultation mechanism owing to its intention to develop an ASEAN-EU FTA 
(European Commission, 2006f:1). The reason was that the EU wanted to promote its 
economic provisions for and speed up the realization of an ASEAN-EU FTA. 
However, ASEAN wanted to include all ASEAN countries in their negotiations and 
to consult more on the economic provisions of a future FTA.  
The level of integration within ASEAN was a more important factor (3.54 or 
S=36) in this EU policy than it was in other EU policies because ASEAN moved 
further forward in its regional integration. ASEAN adopted its charter and gradually 
implemented the blueprints for its Community (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009g:6). There 















The majority of evidence (see Table 7.2 and Chart 7.4) shows that the 
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Chart 7.4 
The EU policies toward ASEAN 2001-2009
A New Partnership with
South-East Asia
The EU Policies in Aceh
An ASEAN-EU FTA
arrangements; the promotion of the EU’s interests and values; and the external 
pressures and opportunities. The modes of engagement was a considerable factor 
(C=30). Interestingly, the modes of engagement changed from a less significant 
factor, in the case of a New Partnership with South-East Asia, to be considerable 
factor in the EU policy in Aceh and in an ASEAN-EU FTA because the EU  
modified gradually its modes of interaction to be more accommodating with 
ASEAN’s aspirations. The level of integration, within ASEAN, was a less significant 
factor (L=20). It shifted gradually from a less significant factor, in the case of a New 
Partnership with South-East Asia, to be a more important factor in the ASEAN-EU 
FTA because ASEAN evolved gradually from a loose regional intergovernmental 
cooperation before 2003 to, nowadays, a solid regional intergovernmental 

















The findings and the variations in importance identified internal and external 
factors which explain the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. The next 
section synthesizes important points about factors and their interactions in the 
development of the EU policy.  
 
7.3. Synthesis and Expected Behaviour Patterns from Internal and External 
Factors  
 
The internal and external factors interlock with each other. It is possible to 
suggest crucial points regarding these factors which, in cases, influenced the 
development of the EU’s policy and their interactions (harmonious, co-operative and 
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conflicting). I compared and synthesized these crucial points in order to generate 
expected behaviour patterns for a conceptual framework. Figure 7.1 provides a 
conceptual framework for analyzing the development of the EU’s policy towards 
ASEAN which is a revised version of the provisional conceptual framework in 




































































   
   
   
   
















   






















        
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

















































































































































































































































































































The conceptual framework consists of relevant factors which are an effective 
means of analyzing the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN (and 
possibly other regions). The conceptual framework does not only influence the 
development of the EU’s policy but is, also, a dynamic framework. With regard to 
ASEAN specifically and inter-regional cooperation between the two regions in 
general, it shows the internal and external factors which affect one another and which 
influence and shape the EU’s policy outcomes (successes and failures). It will be 
useful as a diagnostic tool because, where there is tension between different factors 
in the framework, there is a danger of the policy resulting in failure (ie. ASEAN-EU 
FTA).  
 I argue that, in the case studies, the general pattern of the development of the 
EU’s policy can be explained based on the harmonious, co-operative and conflicting 
relationships between internal and external factors. The harmonious relationship 
between these factors refers to an ideal situation when these factors are linked to 
each other and where no tension at all exists between them which, then, leads to an 
agreement between the EU and ASEAN. The co-operative relationship between 
these factors refers to the linkages between them which may produce tensions. 
Tension can be caused by the interactions between internal and external factors 
coming from the EU, ASEAN and outside the EU. The balanced treatment of these 
factors by the EU and ASEAN resolves tension leading to an agreement between 
them. Moreover, tension, within the EU, caused by the interactions between internal 
factors (e.g. interests and values) can be resolved by the EU institutions and its 
member states because, as reflected in the institutional arrangements for these EU 
policies, they have the authority to incorporate these factors via qualified majority or 
unanimity (Eur-lex,2001:C80/6-7). The conflicting relationship between internal and 
external factors refers to the contradictions between factors and may create tensions 
which cannot be resolved by the EU and ASEAN. Consequently, it leads to the EU’s 
failure to conclude its policy with ASEAN.  
 As shown by the example of a New Partnership with South-East Asia, internal 
and external factors were in a co-operative relationship when the EU formulated this 
policy. There was a possibility that the mode of engagement and external 
pressures/opportunities influenced the economic interests of the Commission and of 
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the key EU member states. With regard to the mode of engagement, the EU realized 
that it employed a minimum consultation mechanism as its mode of engagement with 
ASEAN which led to a small degree of tension between the two regions. The reason 
was that the EU left ASEAN behind and informed ASEAN, only at the last moment, 
about the development of this EU policy. The EU was willing to make a concession 
on development assistance to ASEAN in order to solve any tension. Additionally, the 
EU considered that the emergence of bilateral and regional economic initiatives was 
the result of the USA’s greater involvement and the rise of China in this region and 
that this circumstance constituted both a pressure and an opportunity. The USA and 
China intensified actively their economic cooperation with ASEAN and its member 
countries with regard to natural economic supplies; commercial markets; and 
investment. At that time, the EU focused still on the WTO DDA and started to 
engage more with ASEAN. EU member states supported the need for the 
Commission to create a new partnership with ASEAN in order to further its 
commercial presence and benefit from the emergence of bilateral and regional 
economic initiatives in South-East Asia.  
There was a co-operative relationship between internal and external factors in 
the development of the EU’s policy on Aceh. ASEAN and GoI could influence the 
Council of Ministers and the EU member states through modes of engagement and 
external opportunities/concerns which shaped the outcome of this EU policy. With 
regard to modes of engagement, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU was 
in a co-operative relationship with ASEAN, GoI, FAM and the CMI through 
consultation and pro-active monitoring. In their consultation, they agreed on the 
creation of the joint EU-ASEAN TAM /the IMP and the preparation for their civilian 
mission which reflected the aspirations of the EU, ASEAN, GoI, FAM and the CMI. 
The EU and ASEAN employed a pro-active monitoring mechanism which was not 
only to observe but, also, to verify and to urge the implementation of a peace 
agreement. All parties used these modes of engagement to facilitate and consolidate 
their aspirations and, thus, to strengthen their preparation and implementation of the 
AMM.   
The external opportunities were the GoI’s and FAM’s readiness to resolve their 
conflict and the exclusion of the UN in their peace process. These opportunities had 
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become linked cooperatively with the EU member states’ politico-security interests 
and the promotion of the EU’s presence in South-East Asia. Moreover, the EU’s 
external concerns, addressed by GoI, were the international interference in its 
domestic affairs and the internationalization of the Acehnese issue. The EU was 
prudent in dealing with these concerns since it did not wish to jeopardize the AMM. 
The success of AMM would strengthen its relationship with Indonesia and make for 
a stable South-East Asia region. To some extent, the level of political and security 
integration, within ASEAN, affected partially the development of this EU policy. 
The unity of purpose and action of ASEAN countries to participate in the AMM 
demonstrated their solidarity with Indonesia and, also, their increased focus on 
fostering their political and security integration. At the same time, the EU needed 
ASEAN’s participation as a regional group of monitors to gain legitimacy for the 
AMM and to contribute to the development of the ASEAN Security Community.          
In the case of an ASEAN-EU FTA, there was a conflicting relationship 
between internal and external factors which led to the failure of the EU and ASEAN 
to reach an agreement. Human rights values conflicted with the external pressure and 
opportunity for the EU. The EU’s human rights agenda suggested excluding 
Myanmar but ASEAN insisted on including Myanmar because of its solidarity and 
solidity as a regional group. These factors were in tension and in conflict. Balanced 
treatment of these factors by both parties did not occur and the outcome was a failure 
to establish a policy. Additionally, the level of integration within ASEAN continued 
to develop. Consequently, within ASEAN, there was a low level of economic 
ambition. ASEAN wanted a selective FTA with the EU. However, the EU, because 
of its economic interests, wanted a comprehensive FTA with ASEAN. These factors 
led to tensions which both parties could not resolve. Consequently, the negotiations 
failed.  
From these three cases, there was no evidence of a harmonious relationship 
between internal and external factors. Then, if my five internal and external factors 
were determining increasingly the interaction between the EU and ASEAN, these 
would influence the development of the EU policy. When the EU’s interests and 
values conflicted, the European Commission (2006f:2) and the Council attempted to 
find solutions which served the EU’s economic interests and took into account the 
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political issues (values) within the EU. Simultaneously, the EU tried to incorporate 
ASEAN’s aspirations and to seek a co-operative agreement between them. 
Therefore, if the relationship between internal and external factors was co-operative, 
the EU and ASEAN would likely have concluded successfully the EU policy on 
ASEAN. From this analysis arises the general expected pattern of behaviour: as co-
operative relationship between internal and external factors increases so too does 
the likelihood that the EU policy will be concluded by the EU and ASEAN. 
According to this expected pattern of behaviour, if there is a conflicting relationship 
between the internal and external factors, there is a risk that the policy will fail.  
It follows from the above that the nature of the ties between each internal and 
external factors explains the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN.  
 
7.3.1. Relevant Actors within the Various Institutional Arrangements  
The development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN demonstrated a high-
level of coordination between actors. Many actors, both within the EU’s official 
institutions (e.g the Commission, the Council/EU member states and the European 
Parliament) and outside those institutions (e.g the business community, NGOs and 
individual), contributed to and shaped the development of the EU’s policy. They had 
different roles, competences and functions within various policy formulations. As 
explained in Chapter 3, they were divided into relevant and related actors.  
The Council and the Commission were the relevant actors in the development 
of the EU’s policies towards ASEAN. With regard to the development of the EU’s 
inter-regional cooperation policy, it was implemented within the framework of 
Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with third countries where the 
Commission was a leading and coordinating institution in this EU policy. The 
Council had relatively greater competence to decide on this EU policy. It meant the 
EU member states had a greater say than the European Parliament. The Commission 
coordinated closely with the Council in the development of the EU’s trade policy. 
The negotiating mandate for the Commission on an ASEAN-EU FTA was released 
by the Council through unanimity. Essentially, the European Parliament was a weak 
actor in the development of this policy. The EU member states and the Council of the 
EU were relevant actors in the development of EU policy with respect to Aceh. The 
Council with the support of key EU member states determined a joint action with 
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unanimity. The Commission was a related actor in the development of this EU 
policy; however, the European Parliament was not involved in this EU policy.   
Case studies focused, also, to some extent, on a set of related actors in the 
development of these EU policies, such as the business communities, the European 
Parliament, individuals and NGOs. In most case studies, they were involved in the 
stages of consultation, preparation and implementation. The European Parliament 
was associated to the related actors rather than being a relevant actor because its role 
shifted from a consultative role in the EU inter-regional cooperation to an 
informative role in trade policies. The Parliament was informed only by the 
Commission regarding the development of EU policies toward ASEAN without any 
authority to alter them. The European Parliament, NGOs and business communities 
were involved in the consultative process within the development of the EU inter-
regional cooperation and trade policies. NGOs and business communities attempted 
their advocacy in the Commission and in the Parliament because the policy-making 
process was transferred from national governments to these institutions (Watson and 
Shackleton, 2008:99-100). The prominent individual and a NGO played their 
intervening roles in the development of the EU policy on Aceh.  
These actors interacted in the institutional arrangements for the development of 
the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. Based on policy matters, these institutional 
arrangements allocated the distribution of capacity and authority amongst actors. The 
institutional arrangement of an inter-regional cooperation policy provided a basis of 
support which enabled the Commission and Council, with the consent of the 
European Parliament, to manage its institutional dynamic and political process before 
dealing with ASEAN. To some extent, the legal foundation for a new partnership 
with ASEAN required the EU to include, in this EU policy, common EU values 
together with the EU’s interests. The institutional arrangement of trade policy gave 
flexibility; a certain amount of power; and legal protection to the Commission. With 
the Council consent, the institutional arrangement enabled the Commission to 
include economic and sustainable development issues in the negotiating mandate and 
to determine the EU’s stance on an ASEAN-EU FTA. The institutional arrangement 
had an impact on the political economy debate and on the hopes of relevant actors, 
within the EU, as they developed this EU policy. For example, the Commission 
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convinced the Council to promote the WTO plus arrangement on an ASEAN-EU 
FTA and to employ a region-to-region approach in dealing with ASEAN. The 
institutional arrangements of these policies gave a greater competence and flexibility 
to the EU’s supranational institutions (particularly the Commission) to coordinate 
relevant and related actors, within the EU, and in dealing with ASEAN regarding 
these EU policies which were decided by the EU member states using a unanimity or 
a qualified majority mechanism.  
The institutional arrangement of CFSP/ESDP was to use an inter-governmental 
mechanism whereas the EU member states took longer to decide a final outcome of 
EU policy because the EU policy on Aceh was politically sensitive. Internally, the 
EU member states calculated carefully all political implications from this EU policy 
such as the legal aspects and the financial budget. These implications might change a 
line of command in the joint EU-ASEAN monitoring mission and affect financial 
contribution to the mission. More precisely, they could erode possibly the 
competence of EU member states regarding ESDP and leave unclear the issue of 
which sources were to be used to finance that policy. Externally, to some extent 
when they intended to develop the AMM, the CFSP/ESDP’s institutional 
arrangement enabled the Council and EU member states to open communication and 
establish contact with ASEAN, the CMI, GoI and FAM. The institutional 
arrangements of an inter-regional cooperation and trade policies were more 
significant than CFSP/ESDP in the development of the EU’s policy towards 
ASEAN. Given this reality, various institutional arrangements provide more 
possibilities and avenues for the EU to realize its cooperation with ASEAN. The 
reason for this is that these institutional arrangements may legitimize and support the 
EU policy towards ASEAN because the EU employs any kind of policy which looks 
suitable in achieving its given aims (Söderbaum, 2011:232).  
In conjunction with the above discussion, common positions amongst relevant 
and related actors in the development of EU policy are crucial in realizing the EU’s 
aims. In the case of a new partnership with South-East Asia, the Commission, the 
Council, the key EU member states and the European Parliament reached a common 
position on supporting the agreement between the two regions. The Council, the 
Commission, Ahtisaari and the CMI had a common position on supporting the role 
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of EU and ASEAN as monitors of a peace agreement in Aceh. Ahtisaari (the CMI) 
and Solana convinced the EU member states in the Council to support the AMM. 
According to Müngersdorff (2009:5), the intra-institutional policy process 
suggests that the Commission consults NGOs or industry lobby groups before 
creating a policy initiative in the EU policy. It has influence in the intra-institutional 
discussions because it has more information and has studied more about the 
implications of the EU policy. Zito (2000:24) added that the Commission might 
build, in an informal way, a coalition with non-state actors in order to affect the 
process of EU policy-making (particularly in the Council). The relevant actors have 
authority to form, coordinate and decide a policy initiative. The related actors may 
persuade these relevant actors to include their aspirations and, thus, shape the results 
of the EU’s policy because the institutional arrangements, within the EU, provide 
them with the opportunity to implement those actions. The mutual interest and 
understanding between relevant and related actors strengthens the international 
position of the EU when dealing with its external partners.  
In the case of an ASEAN-EU FTA, however, there was a different view and 
position between, on the one hand, the EU member states, the Commission and the 
business communities and, on the other, the European Parliament and NGOs. The 
EU member states, the Commission and the business communities wanted to offer 
ASEAN a FTA with a WTO plus arrangement. However, the European Parliament 
and NGOs disagreed with a comprehensive FTA, offered by the Commission, since 
it would jeopardize the majority of ASEAN’s developing countries. At the 
international stage, the fragmentation of purpose and political will, within the EU, 
(Ginsberg, 2002:276) might affect its development of policy toward its external 
partners. 
In short, if the relevant actors can reduce opposition from other related actors 
on the EU policy towards ASEAN that would influence significantly the 
development of EU policy (significant factor). If all relevant and other related actors 
share the same position towards supporting the development of EU policy towards 
ASEAN, there is a greater likelihood that the EU and ASEAN will reach agreement. 
The reason is that the common position between relevant and related actors, within 
the EU, would strengthen the EU’s position when dealing with ASEAN. Therefore, 
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as relevant actors and other related actors increasingly share a common position 
within each of the various institutional arrangements, the likelihood of reaching 
agreement increases. According to this expected pattern of behaviour, the likelihood 
that the EU and ASEAN will reach agreement will decrease, if the Council and the 
Commission have a different position from other related actors within each of the 
various institutional arrangements since this situation will weaken the EU’s common 
position when dealing with ASEAN.    
 
7.3.2. The Promotion of Interests or Values 
The case studies, explored for this thesis, suggested that the promotion of 
economic and politico-security interests of the EU member states and the 
Commission and the EU’s collective interest, with regard to South-East Asia, drove 
the EU’s policies toward ASEAN. As the case studies of a New Partnership with 
South-East Asia and a joint EU and ASEAN monitoring mission in Aceh suggest, the 
promotion of economic and politico-security interests of the EU member states and 
the Commission drove both EU policies. The case study of an ASEAN-EU FTA 
suggests that the development of this EU policy was driven by the promotion of the 
economic interests of the EU member states and the Commission. The EU attempted, 
also, through its policies, to share its common values (Lucarelli and Manners, 
2006:202) with ASEAN. 
The development of EU policies toward ASEAN promotes the diversity of 
interests amongst actors, within the EU, and, to some extent, common EU values. 
According to Moravcsik (1998:26), economic interests, inside the EU, would define 
the development of the EU policies. The political ambitions and the political will of 
the EU member states were expressed in the EU politico-security policy (Howorth, 
2007:91). The Commission and other related actors (Zito, 2000:30) shape, also, the 
economic/politico-security interests of the EU and common EU values in the EU’s 
policy developments.  
Through close consultation with the Commission, the Council is competent in 
resolving competition among the interests themselves and, also, between interests 
and values, within the EU, and to decide on the EU position in dealing with ASEAN. 
For example, the EU attempted to create a region-to-region FTA with ASEAN for 
economic matters and a bilateral PCA with every ASEAN country for non-economic 
 236 
matters. However, the cases highlighted that, in the development of EU policies, the 
promotion of the EU’s interests was competing with the promotion of common EU 
values. The EU may need to reconcile its interests and values in order to fit into the 
current interdependent world (Wissenbach, 2009:1). For example, there was 
competition between economic interests and human rights in the development of an 
ASEAN-EU FTA. When the EU’s interests and ASEAN’s interests are in 
competition, the EU and ASEAN needs to adjust their own interests in order to 
consolidate their positions and reach a consensus or compromise between them 
through various modes of engagement such as the development of a new partnership 
with South-East Asia and the establishment of AMM.  
Overall, the case studies indicated that the promotion of economic interests of 
the EU member states and politico-security interests of the EU were more dominant 
than common EU values in the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. If, 
increasingly compared to values, the EU’s economic and politico-security interests 
determine EU policy, these would influence significantly the development of EU 
policy (significant factor). Then, if the EU focuses more on the promotion of 
interests rather than values in the development of its policy, it will increase the 
likelihood of achieving agreement between the EU and ASEAN because the two 
regions can focus on harmonizing their collective interests through economic and 
political co-operation and minimize the impact of their differences on human rights 
and democratic issues. As EU interests takes precedence over values, the likelihood 
of achieving an agreement increases. According to this expected pattern of 
behaviour, if the EU focuses more on the promotion of values rather than interests, it 
will decrease the likelihood of achieving agreement between the two regions because 
they were divided in their views on human rights and democratic issues which might 
risk their co-operation. The above situation creates a dilemma of choices for relevant 
and related actors within the EU since the EU has attempted to improve the portion 
of its values in its external policy towards other regions in the late 1990s (Börzel and 
Risse, 2004:26).  
 
7.3.3. Modes of Engagement between the EU and ASEAN  
The EU employed a combination of consultation, monitoring and negotiation 
mechanisms as its modes of engagement in interacting with ASEAN. As mentioned 
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in Chapter 3, consultation is a process of dialogue between two regional 
organizations in order to build a consensus in pursuing their collective objectives. 
They can solve their differences based on a consensus method. Negotiation is an 
interactive-bargaining mechanism between two regions in seeking compromise on 
their agreements. Monitoring is a process whereby an organization exercises its 
competence and capacity to oversee an agreement. The monitoring mission verified 
and urged the implementation of a peace agreement between conflicting parties. 
As the case study of a New Partnership with South-East Asia suggested, the EU 
used a minimum consultation mechanism as its mode of engagement with ASEAN. 
However, a minimum consultation mechanism created some tension because the EU 
informed ASEAN only about the final conclusion of this EU policy. ASEAN felt left 
behind because of this action. The EU resolved the discontent by increasing its 
development aid for ASEAN. The case study of a joint EU and ASEAN monitoring 
mission illustrated that the EU applied consultation and monitoring mechanisms in 
engaging with ASEAN. ASEAN used these modes of engagement as a method to 
express their aspirations to the EU. The EU and ASEAN could exchange and discuss 
all issues with regard to the preparation of the AMM; the AMM’s role and functions; 
and the implementation of their joint mission. There was co-operative relationship 
between the EU and ASEAN when they applied these modes of engagement in the 
development of this EU policy.  
The case study of an ASEAN-EU FTA suggested that the EU used consultation 
and negotiation mechanisms to engage with ASEAN. With a consultation 
mechanism, the EU and ASEAN reached a collective agreement on the development 
of the EU and ASEAN Vision Group report. However, the EU and ASEAN used a 
negotiation mechanism when they attempted to create a FTA. Meanwhile, South-
East Asian and European NGOs established the EU-ASEAN Campaign Network to 
monitor the ASEAN-EU trade negotiations. It showed how cross-regional NGOs 
advocated their developmental agendas in order to influence and shape the decisions 
of trade negotiators from the EU and ASEAN. In the end, the EU and ASEAN 
suspended their negotiations because of several disagreements on the Myanmar 
issue; a WTO plus arrangement; and the exclusion of the least developed countries 
from the free trade negotiations.   
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Within the EU, the internal interactions were divided into bargaining and 
problem-solving models (Elgström and Jönsson, 2000:685). The EU and ASEAN 
used consultation, negotiation and monitoring mechanisms separately and/or to 
complement one another in their inter-regional interactions. In order to reach the best 
outcome for each side, the EU negotiated a FTA with ASEAN based on a bargaining 
method between both parties. According to Hoekman and Vines (2007:317), trade 
negotiations are an example of integrative bargaining which aims to find a mutual 
gain between both parties. The EU and ASEAN employed an offer-counter offer 
bargaining mechanism (Avenhaus and Zartman, 2007:9). They exchanged their 
proposals with one another over seven rounds in order to settle their differences. 
What people expect normally from negotiation is that it may open possibilities for 
resolving the differences between both parties. However, the ASEAN-EU free trade 
negotiations were not like that. There is a counter intuitive finding because the 
previously mentioned dissention proved insurmountable. Their differences were 
politically controversial and economically complex.  
However, based on a consensus method, the consultation mechanism aims to 
solve their problems or differences in order to reach a mutual solution for both 
parties such as a new partnership with South-East Asia and the EU policy in Aceh. 
Regarding the EU policy in Aceh, a monitoring mechanism was an extension of the 
consultative method involving all related parties to build a consensus on the 
preparation of the AMM and to oversee the implementation of the agreement in an 
effective way.    
If consultation and monitoring mechanisms are used increasingly in the process 
of interaction between the two regions, then, they influence moderately the 
development of the EU policy towards ASEAN (considerable factor). Therefore, if 
the EU and ASEAN employ consultation and monitoring mechanisms as the ways of 
interaction and discussion regarding related issues on the development of the EU 
policy towards ASEAN, they will be more likely to achieve agreement. The reason is 
that the EU and ASEAN have different political traditions; economic regulations; 
and values which may be resolved based on a consensus method as in the 
consultation and monitoring mechanisms. Based on the three studied cases, as the 
EU increasingly uses consultation and monitoring mechanisms, the likelihood of 
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achieving an agreement increases. According to this expected pattern of behaviour, 
if the EU and ASEAN use a negotiation mechanism as their mode of engagement, 
they will not achieve agreement easily. The reason is that, when they adopt a 
bargaining method as in the negotiation mechanism, the EU and ASEAN will face 
difficulties in settling their above differences. 
 
7.3.4. The Level of Integration within ASEAN  
 
With regard to the cases of a New Partnership with South-East Asia and a joint 
EU and ASEAN monitoring mission, the level of integration, within ASEAN, was at 
an early stage. This situations, in these above cases, created co-operative 
relationships between the promotion of the EU’s interest and the level of integration 
within ASEAN because ASEAN focused on the implementation of its free trade area 
project (AFTA) and the strengthening of the politico-security arrangement (ARF) 
(Khong and Nesudurai, 2007:79). ASEAN had signed recently the ASEAN 
Community arrangement and had begun to integrate its member countries. This 
situation was in line with the EU’s intention to share its integration experience with 
ASEAN.   
The ASEAN-EU FTA case study indicated that the regional integration within 
ASEAN was in progress, at that time, as a solid regional inter-governmental 
cooperation which I refer to as ASEAN’s developmental transformation. The level of 
integration, within ASEAN, was more advanced than before as mentioned in 
Chapters 3 and 6. The EU proposed a WTO plus arrangement to ASEAN countries 
but this was not compatible with the current stage of ASEAN countries’ economic 
development. This contradictory circumstance demonstrated a conflicting 
relationship between the EU’s economic interests and the level of ASEAN regional 
integration which led to the EU and ASEAN failure to conclude their trade 
negotiations. 
Within ASEAN, the level of integration changed gradually from being a less 
significant factor to becoming a more important factor in the development of EU 
policies. As the cases of a New Partnership with South-East Asia and a joint EU and 
ASEAN monitoring mission demonstrated, if the level of integration, within 
ASEAN, had been static or weaker than previously, it would have been less 
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significant in the development of EU policy toward ASEAN and the EU would have 
been more likely to achieve its expected agreements with ASEAN. The reason is that 
it would be easier for the EU to seek its economic and politico-security interests 
within ASEAN. Besides its economic interests, the EU shared its economic 
regulations and standards with ASEAN because ASEAN needed the EU’s assistance 
in order to further the commercial activities of both parties and to support its own 
regional integration. From its politico-security interest, the EU needed ASEAN 
countries, in the AMM, to give it credibility and to support the development of the 
ASEAN Security Community. The participation of ASEAN countries in the mission 
served as a lesson for ASEAN and, thus, contributed to ASEAN political and 
security integration. Therefore, as the level of regional integration within ASEAN 
remains static or becomes weaker, the likelihood of achieving agreement increases. 
As the case of an ASEAN-EU FTA has shown, if the level of integration within 
ASEAN had become gradually more robust than previously, the EU would be less 
likely to achieve its expected agreements with ASEAN because ASEAN would 
defend its aspirations (ie, a selective FTA rather than the WTO plus arrangement) 
which conflicted with the EU’s expectation. This situation may counter the EU’s 
assumption that ASEAN was ready to adopt an ASEAN-EU FTA based on the WTO 
plus arrangement and to adhere to the EU’s integration model.  
According to Aggarwal and Forgaty (2004:236), the EU would enhance its 
inter-regional process with other regions if these regions follow the EU’s 
requirements in substantiating further their intraregional institutional identity. 
However, they feel that their argument is speculative. I argue that, in the last decade, 
ASEAN has fostered its regional integration in order to respond to economic and 
politico-security challenges such as the harmonization of economic development 
within ASEAN countries; the proliferation of regional economic initiatives in the 
Asia-Pacific; the competitive economic environment in East Asia; and the 
preservation of South-East Asia security. In their inter-regional relationship, ASEAN 
does not adhere to the EU’s requirements, such as the application of the EU’s 
integration model. The EU’s integration experiences may inspire ASEAN regional 
integration. However, ASEAN prefers solid inter-governmental cooperation to a 
supranational union (as in the case of the EU) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006b:1) because 
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its cooperation preserves national sovereignties and gives ASEAN countries a certain 
adaptability to deal with the above challenges. 
As the three cases demonstrated, the EU’s regional integration experience was 
shared with ASEAN. The promotion of regional integration, as EU policy, is 
supported by its member states because it is not challenging their national 
sovereignty and not changing hugely the EU’s budgetary impact (Farrell, 2007:300). 
The EU is more interested in supporting regional integration within ASEAN than 
previously, through sharing its regional experience, since it would promote its own 
economic and politico-security interests in its relations with South-East Asia. An 
integrated ASEAN would assist the EU in having a region-to-region FTA when 
ASEAN becomes a single market in 2015 and to attain a region-to-region politico-
security cooperation. The EU focuses more on supporting and shaping the process of 
ASEAN integration rather than requiring ASEAN to adopt its integration model 
(European Commission, 2012b:1).   
 
7.3.5. External Pressures and Opportunities 
 
The external pressures and opportunities are divided into two elements, namely, 
the geo-political situation and the external political economy. The geo-political 
situation consists of the GoI’s and FAM’s readiness and willingness of to discuss and 
find a solution to their conflict in Aceh and the absence of the UN in the peace 
process. Moreover, GoI raised the internationalization of the Acehnese issue and 
foreign interference. The external political economy element consists of the 
explosion of regional and bilateral trade initiatives in the South-East Asia region 
because of the greater involvement of the USA and China’s rise in the region; a 
deadlock in the WTO Doha Round negotiations; ASEAN’s significant role in the 
East Asia cooperation; and the inclusion of Myanmar in the EU and ASEAN free 
trade negotiations.  
The external situations and actors may become part of the EU bargaining 
process and be empowered by the EU institutions and its member states to determine 
EU policy (Smith, 2006:393-394). The external pressures and opportunities would be 
important in contributing to the EU’s policy developments towards ASEAN. In 
several instances, they appeared to be the significant factors which influenced the 
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development of these three EU policies. They had combined to affect the 
developments in EU policies. On the one hand, if there are co-operative relationships 
between the promotion of EU interests and these external pressures and 
opportunities, the EU and ASEAN may achieve agreements. For example, the case of 
the EU policy on a new partnership with the South-East Asia region suggested the 
co-operative nature of the relationship between the emergence of bilateral and 
regional trade initiatives in the region and the promotion of the economic interests of 
the EU member states and the Commission. The case of the EU policy on Aceh 
demonstrated a co-operative linkage between (1) the readiness and willingness of 
GoI and FAM to resolve their conflict and the absence of the UN in their peace 
process; and (2) the politico-security interests of the EU and its member states in the 
region. On the other hand, if there is a conflicting relationship between the EU’s 
interests and values and these external pressures and opportunities, it may lead the 
EU to fail to conclude its policies with regard to ASEAN. The reason is that the 
inclusion of Myanmar in the EU and ASEAN free trade talks created a tension which 
both parties could not resolve.  
Overall, if the EU is able to manage the external pressures and opportunities 
from ASEAN and outside the EU, those pressures and opportunities can influence 
more significantly the development of EU’s policy towards ASEAN (significant 
factor). For example, the EU responded to the emergence of bilateral and regional 
economic initiatives in the South-East Asia region because of the USA’s greater 
involvement and China’s rise in that region. Then, the EU was not only taking 
opportunities to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh, 
because of the absence of the UN, but it was careful, also, to deal with GoI’s 
concerns regarding the violation of Indonesian sovereignty and the 
internationalization of the Aceh issue. Therefore, if the EU can respond effectively to 
the external pressures and opportunities from ASEAN and outside the EU and can be 
resolved by the EU and ASEAN without violating the interests and values of both 
parties, the EU and ASEAN will be more likely to achieve agreement. The reason is 
that those pressures and opportunities challenged the EU to be more flexible in 
dealing with ASEAN and more responsive to the developments in South-East Asia. 
 243 
As the EU and ASEAN are able to resolve the external pressures and take 
advantage of opportunities, the likelihood of achieving an agreement increases.  
According to the above expected pattern of behaviour, the EU and ASEAN are 
less likely to achieve agreement, if two situations remain unfulfilled: firstly, if the 
EU is unable to respond effectively to external pressures and opportunities from 
ASEAN and outside the EU and, secondly, if the EU and ASEAN remain unable to 
find a resolution to such an ineffective response without violating both parties’ 
interests and values. The reason is that those pressures and opportunities have eroded 
the importance of the EU in South-East Asia and the relevance of the EU relationship 
with ASEAN. For example: firstly, the EU has not had any FTA with ASEAN and its 
countries and, secondly, the EU is trying still to gain membership of EAS. There is 
increasing competition between the EU and other countries (the USA and China) 
when engaging further with ASEAN. Over time, these EU competitors adjusted their 
approaches in dealing with ASEAN which led them to gain membership of EAS. 
China convinced ASEAN by acceding to TAC; implementing an ASEAN-China 
FTA; and creating an ASEAN-China centre. Chinese Premier Wen explained that 
China’s diplomacy would be to place more emphasis on its relationship with its 
neighbours and to engage actively in regional cooperation with external actors 
(Gov.cn, 2012:1) such as ASEAN. Regarding the USA’s pivot to South-East Asia, 
the USA cemented, also, its partnership with ASEAN by fostering a TIFA; opening 
the US mission to ASEAN; and signing TAC (Clinton, 2011:1).       
In summary, as it stands, the three previously mentioned cases corroborated 
these patterns of behaviour. Future researches may opt to test these patterns of 
behaviour further.  
 
7.4. General Trends in and Implications for the EU-ASEAN Relationship  
 
As indicated by the cases covered in this thesis, the above situation has led to 
general trends in and implications for inter-regional relationship between the two 
regions. These are: firstly, the development of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN 
shifted gradually from being focused on internal factors, within the EU, to an attempt 
to adopt a more balanced treatment of internal and external factors. Things are 
changing partly because of not only what ASEAN has done but, also, partly because 
 244 
of geopolitical and economic changes in South-East Asia/East Asia. South-East Asia 
is becoming more self-sufficient and important. The EU is struggling and needs to 
recognize that fact by taking these external factors into account. It is a crucial 
development and contradicts commonly received wisdom about the EU’s approach 
to ASEAN with many believing that the EU and ASEAN relationship is not a 
priority for the EU (Foster, 2002:758 and Smith, 2008:58). 
However, the EU and ASEAN have cultural divisions in dealing with 
differences. On the one hand, ASEAN believes in the appreciation of national 
sovereignty; the principle of non-interference; and in the ASEAN way as its 
consensus based decision-making system. On the other hand, the EU believes in rigid 
regulations; and democratic and human rights values. Therefore, sometimes, the EU 
and ASEAN have spoken different languages and have had different expectations. 
The ASEAN consensus method of consultation may be a possible productive and 
suitable way for both parties to resolve their differences. They may bridge their 
cultural divide by intensifying dialogue through the consultation mechanism to 
resolve their differences; gradually adjusting their expectations; and pursuing 
consensus building in their relationship.     
From the three cases, these illustrated that the EU and ASEAN could act 
collectively and implement their inter-regional agreements such as a New 
Partnership with South-East Asia and a joint EU and ASEAN monitoring mission in 
Aceh. Both parties developed and implemented these agreements with effective 
results. However, the case of an ASEAN-EU FTA demonstrated that the divisions 
between the EU and ASEAN on political and economic issues could hinder their 
ability to resolve their differences. This inter-regional cooperation was 
overshadowed by the promotion of common EU values which, to some extent, 
ASEAN resisted.  
The above trend has profound implications for the inter-regional relationship 
between the EU and ASEAN. Their relationship was driven mainly by economic 
interests. However, to some extent, the issues of human rights and democratic 
institutions overshadowed the EU political relationship with ASEAN as in the case 
of Myanmar. Consequently, the political relationship between the EU and ASEAN 
influenced the economic relationship between them. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
 245 
dissent between the two regions on the Myanmar issue resulted in them being 
ineffective in concluding the establishment of an ASEAN-EU FTA.  
Once Myanmar had moved forward gradually on the road to democracy, the 
political relationship of the EU and ASEAN would be improved and lead to benefits 
for both regions. Myanmar demonstrated a gradual movement toward democracy, for 
example: the transfer of political and economic authority from the military regime to 
the semi-civilian administration; the release of Aung San Suu Kyi; later release of 
thousands of political prisoners; and the cease-fires between the Myanmar 
government and several ethnic rebels (Karen, Wa, Shan and Chin) (BBC, 2012a:1). 
The American and British foreign secretaries visited Myanmar in December 2011 
and January 2012 (BBC, 2011a:1 and 2012b:1). They saw a momentum for change 
and called for more progress on political reform in Myanmar. The EU observed 
carefully the process and  the results of by-elections in Myanmar and, if the elections 
were free and fair, might use them as a basis for easing its sanctions gradually (BBC, 
2012c:1). On 23 April 2012, the EU recognized the positive result of by-elections 
and the political progress in Myanmar. It suspended gradually its restrictive measures 
against the Myanmar government with the exception of the arms embargo (Council 
of the EU, 2012c:1-2). ASEAN welcomed the EU’s decision to relax its sanctions on 
Myanmar (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012a:1). On 28 April 2012, Catherine Ashton, the 
EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, visited Myanmar 
where she launched a new EU office (Council of the EU, 2012d:1). It means that the 
more the EU balances its internal and external factors, then, it supports the 
development of its policy towards ASEAN which will affect the EU and ASEAN 
relationship positively. 
Secondly, the trend in the EU and ASEAN relationship has been recognized as 
improving gradually and leading to greater interdependence since the 2000s. It alters 
the common perspective that the EU and ASEAN relationship is a dependent 
colonial-master relationship (Tan and Yue, 1997:3 and Godement, 2008:41). Several 
European countries (the UK, the Netherlands and France) had a colonial history with 
several ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam and Indonesia). 
The EU and ASEAN relationship from 1972 to 1990 was not a priority for the EU 
for two reasons: firstly, the US increased its military operations in South-East Asia 
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because of the Cold War; and secondly, the EU focused more on its relationship with 
ACP states and on monitoring the Soviet Union. In 1996, the EU and ASEAN 
established ASEM to improve their relationship.200  
However, the Myanmar membership in ASEAN and the East Timor crisis led 
to a deterioration in EU and ASEAN ties from 1997 to 2000. Afterwards, the EU 
enhanced its new partnership with ASEAN. The significant developments in their 
relationship appeared more in the last decade than previously. There are political and 
economic reasons as to why the EU and ASEAN want to strengthen their 
relationship. The economic reasons are the EU is in the top position as a foreign 
investor in South-East Asia and in the second rank of ASEAN’s trading partners. An 
ASEAN-EU FTA might be seen as a realization of the EU and ASEAN economic 
partnership. Therefore, their relationship is increasing in economic terms and interest 
from both regions may become greater. The political reason is the success of the 
AMM as a model of politico-security co-operation between the two regions. The EU 
and ASEAN politico-security co-operation has developed gradually and expanded in 
the context of areas of cooperation such as terrorism; migration; and border 
management for ASEAN countries (Asthon, 2012:1). The implication of the above 
situation is that, to some extent, the EU and ASEAN relationship has shifted 
potentially from a dependent colonial-master relationship to a mutual interdependent 
partnership. It affects the competence each has in relation to the other for specific 
and general reasons. For specific reasons, the EU’s competence was stronger than 
that of ASEAN in their discussions on first and second cases because of the lack of 
ASEAN’s integration and the state of their development. However, by the time of 
their discussions on an ASEAN-EU FTA, the EU’s competence depended relatively 
on ASEAN because of the Myanmar issue and their differing views on the WTO plus 
arrangement. It means that the EU and ASEAN are becoming mutually dependent on 
one another. 
For general reasons, as the biggest investor and second trading partner for 
ASEAN, the EU may have more economic power than ASEAN. However, the EU 
needs increasingly ASEAN support to emerge from the recent economic recession. 
The reason is that ASEAN has a huge market; a fast growing economy; and abundant 
                                                 
200See Appendix 12. 
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natural resources which may assist the EU’s economic activities. The role of ASEAN 
in East Asia is crucial and is becoming an axis of political and economic cooperation 
for its external partners. These situations increase ASEAN’s leverage vis a vis its 
partners including the EU. For its long term political and economic objectives in 
South-East Asia, the EU needs well-adjusted policies to focus on nurturing its 
relationship with ASEAN. 
Overall, the conceptual framework highlights the different kinds of interactions 
(harmonious, co-operative and conflicting) between internal and external factors (of 
varying significance) which drive EU policy-making and suggests a correlation 
between these interactions and the overall success and failure of the development of 
the EU’s policy toward ASEAN. However, this framework is situated temporally 
when the EU and ASEAN relationship is moving from a hierarchical ex-colonial 
dynamic to one of greater interdependence. As this historical trend continues, EU’s 
inter-regional policies, which do not take adequate account of external factors, will 
incur a greater risk of failure. I anticipate that the increasing weight, which will need 
to be given to external factors, will affect gradually the importance of achieving co-
operative relationship between internal and external factors, and increase the degree 
of correlation between this kind of cooperation and the success of the policy in 
question.       
 
7.5. Theoretical Contributions, Future Research Opportunities and Policy 
Implications  
 
The theoretical contributions and challenges and policy implications, which can 
be derived from this research, are as follows:   
7.5.1. Theoretical contributions  
As is evident from all cases, inter-regionalist scholars and I analyze from 
different angles and adopt different research methodologies in explaining the inter-
regional relationship between the EU and ASEAN. I examined policy development 
from the perspective of one regional organization toward another regional 
organization. The conceptual framework assessed, in a micro context, both the 
development of EU policies toward ASEAN and, in a macro context, the inter-
regional ties between the two regions. From the inductive research strategy, I 
deduced expected behaviour patterns based on the main findings of all cases. This 
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study aimed to develop behaviour patterns of internal and external factors which 
explained and elaborated, in greater detail, the development of EU policies toward 
ASEAN. From a broader perspective, the conceptual framework incorporates the 
main findings on the relevant factors in the study of EU’s external relations with 
other regional organizations and its implications for the study of inter-regionalism 
and the discipline of IR.    
Theoretical contributions can be divided into two areas of literature. These are: 
firstly, the literature of EU external relations; and, secondly, the literature of inter-
regionalism (eg. the EU-ASEAN relationship). Firstly, unlike previous research, the 
conceptual framework enriches the literature about the EU’s external relations with 
other regions. It demonstrates the limitations of integration theories; the concept of 
structural foreign policy; and the approach of supranational inter-governmentalism. 
When examining the formulation of EU policy toward other regions, these are:  
(1) Holland illustrated briefly the development of EU policy in Asia and connected it 
to the discussion of EU integration theories (inter-governmentalism and 
multilevel governance) (see Chapter 2);  
(2) Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008:335) developed the concept of structural 
foreign policy to explain CFSP and EU foreign policy beyond CFSP. They did 
not explain, in depth, the EU foreign policy toward East Asia/South-East Asia 
(ie. the EU policy on Aceh);  
(3) Howorth (2007:30) used the approach of supranational inter-governmentalism to 
examine the EU’s overseas mission (ESDP). He gave only a brief insight into the 
EU mission in Aceh.  
However, the integration theories, the concept of structural foreign policy and 
the approach of supranational inter-governmentalism focused on internal factors, 
within the EU, and tended to neglect the influence of external factors from outside of 
the EU in the context of the development of EU policies toward ASEAN. Modes of 
engagement; the level of regional integration within ASEAN; and the external 
pressures and opportunities combined to shape and affect the EU’s policy 
developments toward ASEAN. Whilst this thesis suggests that the EU needs to take 
into account these external factors in its policy development, it determines, also, the 
inter-locking relationship between the EU’s institutional machinery and ASEAN and 
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external developments outside the EU. EU external relations are not only the EU’s 
affairs but, also, are linked increasingly with ASEAN. This has shaped the leverage 
in and changed the nature of their inter-regional relationship.         
Secondly, this thesis adds some noteworthy contributions to the literature of the 
inter-regionalism. Aggarwal and Fogarty proposed an inter- and trans-regionalism 
model of relationship in order to describe, within the institutional frameworks of 
commercial relationships, the role of involved actors between the EU and other 
regions. They did not provide, in great detail, explanations and empirical work on the 
various policies within the framework of the inter-regionalism between the EU and 
ASEAN. They suggested that many regional entities developed their foreign 
commercial policy more in the last decade. Therefore, there was a need to assess and 
understand the driving factors behind inter-regionalism which would be an important 
theoretical and policy concern (Aggarwal and Forgaty, 2004:238). According to 
Rüland (2010:1280) within the study of inter-regionalism, their work was still at an 
early stage. He suggested that more studies needed to be done in examining when, 
how and, to what extent, national and regional actors affected the emergence, 
evolution and decision-making within inter-regionalism. This thesis provides 
analyses about how, when and, to what extent, internal factors within the EU and 
external factors from ASEAN or outside the EU affected the development of the EU 
policies toward ASEAN. It highlights not only expected patterns of behaviour in the 
interaction between internal and external factors but may connect, also, this 
interaction with the EU policy results. This situation influences profoundly inter-
regional trends of balanced treatment between internal and external factors by the EU 
and ASEAN in their policy-making and the enhancement of a mutual co-dependent 
relationship between both parties.     
Overall, these findings may contribute to the literature on EU external relations 
and inter-regionalism. The conceptual framework includes and bridges explanations 
of both the micro aspect of the EU’s policy developments towards ASEAN and of 
the macro aspect of the inter-regional relationship between the EU and ASEAN. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the analyses by the group of historical scholars and the 
group of functional scholars, focused only lightly on EU and ASEAN interactions 
relating to the system of global governance (the macro aspect). They neglected the 
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process and the explanation behind the reasons for a regional organization’s policy 
developments toward another regional organization (the micro aspect) which, in turn, 
affected the relationship between the two regions. The conceptual framework and 
empirical data analyze systematically what are the relevant factors and their 
importance in the development of EU’s policy toward other regions. They examine 
the patterns of behaviour within these factors which affect the EU policy outcomes. 
Then, they explain what effect the interactions of these factors produce for the inter-
regional relationship between the two regions.  
 
7.5.2. Theoretical Challenges and Future Research Opportunities  
 My aim was not to develop a theory which predicts the EU’s policy with other 
regions. It was quite difficult for me to find a single theory which provided an 
adequate explanation of the development of the EU’s policy with respect to other 
regions and its impact on inter-regional cooperation between two regions. My 
aspiration was rather to develop a conceptual framework which could explain the 
development of the EU’s policy toward other regions, such as ASEAN, and its 
impact on the inter-regional ties between the two regions. This thesis generated 
behaviour patterns which may be useful in formulating theories and developing 
further analyses on inter-regional ties. Because this research was based on case 
studies embedded within the EU and ASEAN relationship, more extensive studies of 
other inter-regional relationships are needed to test the generalizability of this 
conceptual framework. This research does not cover all inter-regional relationships in 
the world. However, other scholars can derive and use explanations of internal and 
external factors from the cases, included in this study, as a conceptual framework in 
which to find out as to why the EU wants to cooperate with other regions (eg. the EU 
and Mercosur relationship and the EU and ACP states relationship) or whether a 
regional organization would like to have inter-regional ties with other regions (eg. 
the ASEAN and Mercosur relationship and the ASEAN and Andean Community 
relationship). If so, then, the internal and external factors need to be adjusted based 
on the characteristics and co-operative models of these inter-regional relationships.  
The conceptual framework is aimed particularly at contributing to further 
discussion and explanation of the literature of inter-regionalism. Further research 
needs to be done by other scholars (e.g. the group of trans-regional scholars as 
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mentioned in Chapter 2) to expand the applicability of the conceptual framework 
beyond inter-regionalism. Further research can be done on how, when and, to what 
extent, the conceptual framework can be employed to explain the trans-regional 
relationship between any two regions. I hope that these internal and external factors 
will open new avenues for further research on trans-regionalism. I employed a 
conceptual framework to explain the developments in EU policies toward ASEAN 
from 2001 to 2009. All cases, which this study analyzed, were established before the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force. The EU and its member states ratified the Lisbon 
Treaty in November 2009. The Lisbon Treaty is the foundation of the EU external 
policy from 2010 to onwards. This situation had implications which led to changes in 
institutional mechanisms and actors within the EU’s policy developments toward 
other regions. Further studies are needed to explain the developments of the EU’s 
policies toward ASEAN and other regions since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Other scholars can adopt this conceptual framework to fulfill the above need.     
 
7.5.3. Policy Implications  
John argued that some theories in the study of politics/public policy did not 
seem to connect with the real decision-making (John, 2012:119) because they were 
theory-driven research and not problem-driven research (Shapiro, 2005:182). Shapiro 
argued that theory-driven scholars had ad hoc fallacy arguments which seemed partly 
convincing to partisans of their theoretical priorities. However, problem-driven 
scholars tend to look at previous theories that explain phenomena and attempt to see 
their limitations and find best alternatives to explain the real problem (Ibid, p.186-
187). Therefore, Jackson advocated that there had to be more room for interaction 
between academics and practitioners and this would encourage these academics to 
engage with global politics through their practical suggestions for practitioners.201 
There was, also, an increasing need for political and social science to link the 
academic researches and the work of practitioners and, thereby, address more 
directly the real problems of society. This trend may become stronger as a way for 
academics to go beyond their world in order to transfer their knowledge to and 
involve themselves in solving obstacles in policy development and social works. It 
                                                 
201Interview with Patrick Jackson, The American University, Edinburgh, 18 June 2012. 
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allows me to propose this thesis as one of bridge building between theories and real 
problems in the development of policy within a regional organization and inter-
regionalism.  
From the three cases, I infer policy implications for the EU and ASEAN in 
their relationship. I do not consider that these implications are the only possible 
recommendations. I believe that many of these recommendations about EU policy 
development towards ASEAN and their inter-regional relationship can be developed 
by further research on inter-regionalism. As for the EU, the conceptual framework 
can manage inter-regional cooperation by treating internal and external factors in a 
co-operative way. In the previous era, the EU seemed to pay more attention to 
internal factors rather than external factors when it developed its policies and inter-
regional relationships with ASEAN and other regions. Keukeleire and Bruyninckx 
(2011:401) argued that the EU should begin to spend more time and energy in 
external negotiations with its external partners rather than focusing merely on its own 
internal negotiations and decision-making system. The EU should consider not only 
the interests of its member states and institutions but, also, take into account its 
external partners’ aspirations. The EU  had taken a transformative leap which when it 
developed its policy, such as in the case of EU policy in Aceh and in the case of EU 
policy on the creation of an ASEAN-EU FTA took into account gradually the 
external factors both of its external partners and outside the EU.   
The EU and ASEAN can develop a mutually-interdependent partnership which 
is more flexible in strengthening the process of their inter-regional cooperation. The 
EU may adjust its promotion of its common values and the level of its economic 
ambition in order to be compatible with ASEAN. When this happens, ASEAN is not 
obliged to accept common EU values and to meet the EU’s economic ambitions. 
This situation would be more attractive to ASEAN in deepening its inter-regional 
cooperation with the EU.  
As for ASEAN, it can improve its capacity and capability to face inter-regional 
cooperation with the EU. Recently, at the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting there 
was the small incident of a diverged position between ASEAN countries on the 
South China Sea issue (Economist, 2012:1). It was an opportunity for ASEAN 
countries to test their ability to resolve their differences and come up with a common 
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position. ASEAN can focus on the realization of the ASEAN Community in order to 
strengthen and consolidate its regional integration and particularly that of the AEC. 
As a result of the realization of the ASEAN Community, ASEAN is more attractive 
to its external partners (eg. the EU) as a solid regional inter-governmental 
organization. The EU and ASEAN relationship would give both parties mutual 
benefit in such as commerce; investment; development aid; and environmental 
protection. 
If ASEAN has an effective inter-regional cooperation with the EU, ASEAN 
may increase its profile in the regional and global arena. Wilson202 argued that, if the 
EU and ASEAN continued to improve their cooperation in the field of preventing 
conflicts, they would contribute effectively to the preservation of regional and global 
stability (Xinhua, 2011:1). For example, the AMM is a valuable experience for 
ASEAN to build its capability and capacity in handling civilian and military 
conflicts; dealing with complex security issues in the South-East Asia region; and 
fostering political and security integration within ASEAN. This experience helps 
teach ASEAN to deal with existing regional conflicts such as the armed conflict in 
the South of Thailand203 and the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand 
over the Preah Vihear temple204. Then, ASEAN may build confidence with China, 
the USA and other external actors regarding territorial disputes in the South-China 
Sea. ASEAN should focus on managing co-operative relationships among external 
actors and reducing competitive actions between these actors in the region.   
By learning the EU’s intentions and motivations, ASEAN can expand its policy 
options to develop inter-regional ties with the EU or other external partners. Through 
effective modes of engagement with the EU, ASEAN may maximize its interaction, 
articulate its aspirations and aggregate its interests. ASEAN can persuade the EU to 
take on board its aspirations so that they are adopted in the EU policy.  
Finally, ASEAN maintains its position as a driving force and is involved 
actively in the political and economic developments in the South-East Asia region 
                                                 
202 The Head of Delegation of the EU to ASEAN.  
203 The resistance of Malay Moslems to the Thai government began in 1902. In 2001, the Thai 
government employed a military approach to end the resistance. Islamic separatist groups increased 
their attacks against the Thai Army (Horn, 2011:1). 
204 Thailand and Cambodia claimed the 4.6 sq km of land around Preah Vihear temple. Between 2009 
and 2011, they had armed clashes over the status of land around the temple (BBC, 2011:1).  
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and in the East Asia region. These regions have become gradually an epicenter of the 
global economy. Outside Europe, China and ASEAN are the EU’s second and third 
largest trading partners (European Commission, 2011d:1). The situation would 
change the economic balance between European and East Asian countries. The 
economic and financial crisis, in the Eurozone, resulted in accelerated economic 
progress in these regions. Consequently, the emerging East Asian economies have 
become attractive to the EU to be part of this development, such as the creation of an 
ASEAN-EU FTA which may foster European economic recovery and economic 
growth (Wilson, 2012). The EU would keep an eye on external pressures and 
opportunities which may arise from further developments in the two regions. The EU 
would contact ASEAN as its strategic partner when it would like to engage more 
with these regions.     
 
7.6. Conclusion  
 
Turning to the analyses and explanations of the relationship between the EU 
and ASEAN presented in this study I am of the view that, in important ways, internal 
and external factors influenced the developments of EU policies towards ASEAN. 
The EU needs to take into consideration external factors from ASEAN and outside 
the EU when it develops its policies towards ASEAN. The EU and ASEAN 
relationship has mutual benefits for both parties when these factors are balanced 
between one and the other. The connection between the EU and ASEAN has shifted 
to a mutually interdependent relationship.  
It is important to select the essential points and to conclude with the main 
findings of this research. These are as: firstly, the significant factors, in the 
developments of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN were: the relevant actors within 
the various institutional arrangements; the promotion of interests or values and/or a 
combination of all of them which may drive the EU’s policies; and the external 
pressures and opportunities. The considerable factor was the modes of engagement in 
the interaction between the two regions. The level of integration within ASEAN was 
a less significant factor in the development of a New Partnership with South East 
Asia and the EU policy on Aceh. It has become gradually a more important factor in 
the development of the ASEAN-EU FTA than in the other cases. In this thesis, these 
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three cases demonstrated the conceptual framework which was employed to analyze 
them.  
Secondly, the EU’s policy development with respect to ASEAN or a regional 
organization’s policy development toward another region needs to be taken into 
account as the main concerns of inter-regionalism. It will bring theoretical 
contributions and policy implications for the EU and for other inter-regional 
relationships. Theoretically, this thesis contributed to developments in understanding 
and explaining the formulation of the EU’s policy towards ASEAN, in particular, 
and to inter-regionalism generally. It assessed how, when and, to what extent, 
internal and external factors influenced the development of the EU’s policy and their 
implications for the inter-regional relationship between the EU and ASEAN. The 
behaviour patterns, advanced in this thesis, were produced after examining the 
influence of these factors upon the development of the EU’s policy. The conceptual 
framework highlights the shortcomings of integration theories such as the lack of 
attention paid to external factors from the EU counterparts and outside the EU when 
they explained the EU’s policy developments and the study of EU external relations. 
The conceptual framework examines the interaction of internal and external factors 
which affect and shape the results of the EU’s policy. It explains, in micro 
dimensions, the development of the EU’s policy and, in macro dimensions, the EU-
ASEAN inter-regional cooperation. On the policy side, the conceptual framework 
can be used as a policy framework to manage inter-regional cooperation between the 
two regions.  
Thirdly, the adaptability of the conceptual framework is needed to explain other 
EU inter-regional relationships with other regions or inter-regional relationship 
beyond Europe. The conceptual framework provides reasons when, how and why a 
regional organization uses its resources and competence to develop its policies 
towards other regional organizations. This framework is an effective analytical 
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Appendix 1 – Maps of the EU and ASEAN  
 
 





































































Source: ASEAN Finance and Macroeconomic Surveillance Unit (FMSU) Database (ASEAN    
Secretariat, 2007a:39 and 2009a:38). 
 
 















































   




















Appendix 5 – Research Notes  
 
Documents and interviews would be the effective ways to collect data about the 
development of the EU policy toward ASEAN. Their functions were mutually 
complementary one to another in order to collect and verify information as well as to 
gain crucial findings about the process of EU’s policy development. I collected the 
data in Europe, in South-East Asia and elsewhere in the internet.  
  
With regard to written materials, I gathered official documents and archives 
from the EU and ASEAN sides, for example, minutes of meetings, agreements and 
reports. Additionally, I gathered information about the EU and ASEAN from daily 
journals of the EU, newpapers, political memoirs and the internet.        
 
With regard to interviews, all interviews were conducted between July and 
August 2009 (in South-East Asia); between July and September 2010 (in South-East 
Asia); and between March and May 2011 (in Brussels and elsewhere-internet). Then, 
by internet and telephone between December 2011 and November 2012, I asked the 
same interviewees for more detailed information. I ensured that, between these time 
periods, there were no relative inconsistencies in their explanations. The last set of 
interviews was designed to increase the reliability of the results and categorize 
factors as significant; considerable; less significant; and insignificant. 
 
I sent a brief explanation of my research topic and a list of questions for 
interviews to the majority of interviewees. The majority of interviews were 
conducted in person, three interviews were conducted by e-mail and one interview 
was conducted by telephone. The last set of interviews was conducted by e-mails, by 
skype, by telephone and in person. I recorded the majority of the interviews. They 
were transcribed and noted. Interviews were conducted in English, in Bahasa 
Indonesian and in Malay. Most interviews lasted between 60 minutes and two hours. 
The majority of interviewees preferred to remain anonymous. The interviewees 



















Appendix 6 - Interviews and Seminars   
 
I.  Interviews 
 
I. 1.  The EU 
 
I.1.1. The European Commission 
• Official A, Jakarta, 4 August 2010 and Brussels, 21 March 2011, 9 January and 
12 September 2012 (in-person and E-mail). 
• Official B, Brussels, 25 March 2011 and 13 June 2012 (in-person and E-mail). 
• Official C, Brussels, 31 March 2011 and 3 May 2011 (in-person and E-mail). 
• Official D, 7 April 2011 (E-mail). 
• Official E, 18 August 2010 and 3 January 2012 (telephone and E-mail). 
• Official F, Brussels, 28 March 2011(in-person). 
• Official G, Jakarta, 17 July 2009 (in-person). 
 
I.1.2 The Council of the EU 
• Official A, Brussels, 30 March 2011 and 21 December 2011 (in-person and E-
mail). 
• Official B, Brussels, 30 March 2011 and 3 February 2012 (in-person and 
telephone). 
 
I.1.3 The European Parliament 
• Roberto Bendini, Brussels, 28 March 2011 and 3 February 2012 (in-person and 
telephone). 
 
I.1.4  European member states, Brussels, Jakarta and Edinburgh 
• David Miliband, MP, The UK, Edinburgh, 26 October 2011 (in-person). 
• National Official, The UK, 29 July 2010 and 25 January 2012 (in-person and 
E-mail). 
• National Official, The Netherlands, 31 March 2011 and 16 January 2012 (in-
person and E-mail). 
• National Official, Germany, 28 July 2010 and 22 October 2012 (in-person, 
telephone and E-mail). 
 
I. 2.  ASEAN  
 
I.2.1.  The ASEAN Secretariat  
 
• Dhannan Sunoto, The ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 26 August 2010 (in-person) 
and 21 December 2011 (E-mail). 
• Official A, The ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 25 August 2010 (in-person). 
• Official B, The ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 15 July 2009 (in-person). 
 
I.2.2.  ASEAN countries  
• Hamid Awaludin, Indonesia, 31 May 2011 and 7 November 2012 (E-mail and 
telephone). 
 261 
• National Official, an ASEAN country, 7 July 2009 (in-person). 
• National Official, an ASEAN country, 7 July 2009 and 10 February 2012 (in-
person and telephone) 
 
I.2.3.  ASEAN Member of Parliament  
• Charles Santiago, a Member of Parliament in Malaysia for the Democratic 
Action Party, Kuala Lumpur, 2 February 2012 (Skype). 
 
I. 3.  European and ASEAN non-state actors  
• Pascal Kerneis, Business Europe, Brussels, 23 March 2011 and 31 January 
2012 (in-person and telephone). 
• Marc Maes, Seattle to Brussels Network, Brussels, 23 March 2011 and 12 
January 2012 (in-person and E-mail). 
• Kris Vanslambrouck, 11.11.11, Brussels, 23 March 2011 and 24 January 2012 
(in-person and E-mail). 
• A trade activist, a Southeast Asian NGO, 23 December 2011 (E-mail).  
• Business representative A, a chamber of commerce and industry of an ASEAN 
country, 20 August 2009 (in-person).   
• Business representative B, an International Business Association, an ASEAN 
country, 1 September 2010 (in-person). 
 
I.4. WTO 
• WTO official, the UK, June 2012 (in-person).  
 
II.  Seminars 
 
Addressed questions to and talked with speakers  
 
II.1.  A public seminar on EU issues   
Official H, the European Commission, the UK, February 2010. 
 
II.2.  An open seminar on EU issues  
A National Official, the UK, the UK, March 2010.  
 
II.3. A seminar on international trade issues 
A WTO official, the UK, June 2012.   
 
II.4. A lecture on Three Boundaries to Loosen in the Global Study of World Politics 

































































































Source: Data complied from ASEAN Secretariat (2012:1), the European Commission (2009c:6-7) 














Appendix 8 – Contributors of the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) for Aceh and Nias  
 









































































































































































Source: Data complied from The World Bank (2009a:1-3 and 2009b:1-3) 
 
 
Appendix 11 – FDI of East Asia Countries, 2006-2008  
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